Breaking All the Rules: American Debate over the Middle East

American Debate over the Middle East I T h e usual debate did not take place during the year and a half that the United States Marines were stationed in Lebanon. American conservatives said almost nothing about their standard concerns: they did not stand by the government of Amin Gemayel as a democratic ally or emphasize the riches Lebanon gained through its laissez-faire economy, nor did they blame Lebanon’s problems on Soviet mischief. As for liberals, they did not blame Lebanon’s problems on unequal distribution of wealth, call for land reform, sympathize with the rebel forces, contest the validity of parliamentary elections, hold the authorities responsible for human rights outrages, or-despite its control over less than one percent of the country’s territory-contest the legitimacy of the central government. In short, neither side put forth its predictable ideological arguments. Rather, conservatives and liberals debated among themselves about practical matters. Some Republicans hesitated to support a military undertaking in a complex situation where the U.S. had no clear vital interests. In contrast, a number of Democrats believed that an American commitment on the ground in the Middle East would help with other issues in the region. Views about the mission in Lebanon grew out of an assessment of its effectivenessnot its morality. Tactics, not ideology, fueled the U.S. debate. The familiar positions on U.S. military involvement did not emerge because they were irrelevant. Aid to Lebanon appeared in American eyes humanitarian more than ideological; U.S. soldiers were seen to help end anarchy and for once enjoyed the role of peacekeepers, not partisans. This particular case illustrates a larger point: the Middle East (meaning here, the area from Egypt to Iran) stands outside the great debate of American foreign policy since World War 11-the disagreement over the danger posed by the U.S.S.R. Briefly put, “foreign policy conservatives” see the Soviet danger as preeminent and view almost every facet of international relations through the prism of the Soviet threat. They interpret critical political diviDaniel Pipes is Associate Professor at the Naval War College. He taught previously at Harvard and The University of Chicago, and worked at the Department of State in 1982-83. He is the author of Slave Soldiers and Islam (Yale University Press), In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power (Basic Books), and An Arabist‘s Guide to Egyptian Colloquial(Foreign Service Institute). International Security, Fall 1984 (Vol. 9,No.2) 0162-2889/84/020124-27$02.50/1 8 1984 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the MassachusettsInstitute of Technology. 124 Breaking All the Rules I 125 sions along East-West lines and believe that nearly all major external problems facingthe United States are related to this dichotomy. For conservatives, the basic goal of U.S. foreign policy is to contain the threat posed by a heavily armed and expansionist Soviet Union. The urgency of this problem gives it precedence over other challenges, both foreign and domestic; conservatives are therefore willing to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to build powerful armed forces. ”Foreignpolicy liberals,” on the contrary, see the Soviet threat as only one of many problems confronting the United States. In place of the conservatives ’ bipolar vision, liberals recognize a more varied array of concerns. If conservatives see a Soviet hand behind most problems confronting the U.S., liberals argue for the primacy of local concerns such as tyranny, poverty, local wars, overpopulation, ecology, and runaway technology. Liberals see less need for spending on U.S. military forces and argue instead for greater attention to domestic concerns. To use the metaphor of Archilochus, liberals are like the fox, for they know many things; but conservatives are like the hedgehog, for they know one big thing. Central America is the most recent battlefield for conservative and liberal principles. In the past, these differences have informed the controversy over American involvement in NATO, in Korea, and in Vietnam. Today, the same disagreements are very much alive. In Europe, they shape the U.S. approach to talks on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. With regard to Africa...