The Bombing of Osiraq—Revisited

The mmwof Osiraq-Revisited I O n June7,1981, Israel conducted the world’s first preemptive strike against a nuclear facility. On that afternoon, Israeli warplanes flew some 1000 kilometers inside Arab territory and destroyed Iraq’s newly constructed Osiris-type reactor. A year later, it is time to assess the operation’s rationale as well as its effects and implications.* In the raid’s immediate aftermath, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Sigvard Eklund, stated that ”. . . the Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear research center was also an attack on the Agency‘s safeguards.”’ This assessment was later echoed by the United Nations Security Council which considered that the attack “constituted a serious threat to the entire IAEA safeguards regime which is the foundation of the nonproliferation treaty.”* Admittedly, the raid on Osiraq was at the very least a vote of no-confidence in IAEA safeguards. And, as such, it opened up the possibility that other nations would follow suit, turning to self-help measures in place of reliance on the non-proliferation “regime.” Nevertheless, the effects and implications of Osiuuq’s destruction on the future of nuclear proliferation remain an open question. Much depends on how this particular episode is viewed by different states, proliferators and anti-proliferators alike. Israel’s action may be regarded as setting a precedent for other states to follow, thereby contributing to greater instability as regions become nuclear. Alternatively, it may serve primarily as a vivid demonstration of the possible costs .of going nuclear, and as such may contribute to halting nuclear spread. Needless to say, the two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Shai Feldman Shai Feldman is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Arms Control and Disarmament Program. He is on leave from Tel Aviv University‘s Center for Strategic Studies. * This paper was written prior to the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, code name “Peace for Galilee.” 1. ”Peaceful nuclear development must continue,” International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1981),p. 3. 2. Ibid., p. 7. International Security, Fall 1982 (Vol. 7, No. 2) 0162-2889/82/010114-29$02.50/0 0 1982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 114 Bombing of Osiruq [ 115 Clearly, whether in similar situations other states choose to follow Israel’s example will depend on how they assess Israel’s gains and costs. The following analysis attempts to determine how such states might regard the operation ’s balance sheet. Iraq’s Nuclear Program Israel’s decision to destroy Osiruq was propelled by five separate indications of Iraq’s intention to develop a military nuclear capability: -first, Iraq’s initial desire to purchase the non-economical but plutoniumproducing gas-graphite power reactor from France; -second, its purchase of a 70 megawatt (thermal) Material Testing Reactor, an extremely odd move for a nation not involved in the indigenous production of power reactors; -third, Iraq’s insistence that the Osiruq reactor be fuelled by 92 percentenriched weapons-grade uranium rather than by the less-enriched “Caramel ’’ fuel; -fourth, its purchase of some 250 tons of natural uranium, which, given the other components of Iraq’s nuclear program, makes little sense unless plutonium production was intended; and, -fifth, the acquisition of plutonium-separation “hot cell” simulators from Italy. Iraqi-French nuclear relations had begun in the form of a general nuclear cooperation agreement signed during Premier Jacques Chiraq’s trip to Baghdad in 1974. In the framework of this agreement, Iraq asked in 1975 to purchase a 500 MW (electric)uranium graphite power reactor from F r a n ~ e . ~ Graphite-gas reactors produce very large quantities of plutonium and are used to extract this fissionable material for the weapons of the French Force de Frappe. Their manufacture in France, however, has been long since discontinued in favor of the more efficient Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and the Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). Recognizing Iraq’s intentions, the French balked at the proposed deal, offering the 70 MW(th) Osiris reactor instead. Iraq accepted the French offer. 3. Freddy Eitan, “Delayed Reaction,” lerusakrn Post, August 22, 1980. See also George...