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Colin S . Gray Correspondence IMichael Howard Perspectives on Fighting Nuclear War T o the Editors: I There is so much that is sane and sensible in Michael Howard's article, "On Fightinga Nuclear War," that I believe a brief public dialoguemay be fruitful. This is not one of those all too frequent occasions when representatives of radically opposed schools of thought attack cardboard figures and talk past each other. I cannot do justice to the richness of Professor Howard's article in the space of a letter, but I do hope to suggest that he and some, at least, of the more "war-fighting" minded strategists, are not that far apart. Since I was identified several times in the article as an advocate of policies of which Professor Howard (and the late Bernard Brodie) disapproves, I must assume that my views have some representative character. First, I would like to identify some important common ground. I agree with Professor Howard (and Bernard Brodie) that: nuclear war would be so terrible as virtually to warrant description as an obscenity; a policy of firm containment of the Soviet Union is necessary; credible (as opposed to incredible )threats should be posed; war, if it must be waged, must be waged only for clear political objectives that are in balance with the military means applied; a policy of strategic (inter uliu) nuclear deterrence is a regrettable necessity; and, finally, that the Soviet system is manifesting many very serious internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities. On all of that we can agree. Where I find Professor Howard's (and Bernard Brodie's) analysis to be deficient is that it appears to stop when the buttons are pushed. At the very point where we need strategic thinking most, no recommendations are discernible . Of course it is preferable to deter war rather than to wage it; that is not at issue. But what is the connection between prospective prowess in the conduct of war and pre- or early intra-wardeterrenteffect?Furthermore, what should we do if war occurs?Perhaps an East-West war can be deterred, or prevented by policies aimed at political stabilization,indefinitely. But what if it cannot be so deterred?What advice would Professor Howard proffer to American SIOPplanners? Colin Gray is Director of National Security Studies at Hudson Institute. Michael H m d is Regius Professor of History at Oxford University, and author of "On Fighting a Nuclear War," published in the Spring 1981 issue of International Security (Volume 5, Number 4). 185 International Security I 186 Professor Howard endorses the concept of ”victory denial,” but does not appear to endorse the logically sequential concept of ”defeat denial” for the United States.If an American policy of “victorydenial”does not, in prospect, deter Soviet action, the overwhelming interest of Western policymakers will be to attempt to preclude Western defeat. In practice, the achievement of “victory denial” is fully compatible with Western defeat-i.e. we both lose! The 1914 analogy is terribly effective, if true. However, I am not aware of any nuclear “war-fighting” strategists who are guaranteeing victory (“home by Christmas”)-let alone cheap victory. The point of stressing the need for a theory of victory is to provide some overall political integrity to strategic planning-in short, we need a vision of the end game as well as of the opening moves. In the official Soviet view, war and peace are scarcely distinguishable -the Soviet Union is in a self-determined condition of permanent struggle against “objectively” hostile forces. Because of the geopoliticsof the rival alliances, and the enduring deficiencies in Western non-nuclear power, it is very likely indeed to be the West that first would need to have recourse to strategicnuclear actionin attempted compensationfor theater-force weaknesses. In the 1970s,fromJamesSchlesinger ’s “limited nuclear options’’ through Harold Brown‘s “countervailing strategy,” what was offered was a very incomplete war-fighter‘s manual. Neither conception had a vision of political victory, which made it difficult to design the implementing targeting steps (intended to accomplish what?). Moreover, neither confronted the basic problem of U.S. self-deterrence. The issue is not whether or not a nuclear war could be fought and won...

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