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International Politics I I Surprise is an inherent part of human affairs-it occurs in politics, economics, technology, psychology , literature, and music as well as in war; yet research on the subject has thus far been confined to its military use alone.’ Problems such as the causes of frequent intelligence failures; the methods and paradoxes involved in predicting surprise attacks; the role of deception; and the optimal timing 1. The study of military technological surprise for example is a much neglected subject that would be very interesting to investigate. At present, no theoretical study on technological surprise is available to the public. However, Dr. Zeev Bonen, former head of the Israeli Armament and Development Authority, has made some thought-provoking observations on the subject. He suggests that a technological surprise ”out of the blue” is rare if not impossible. ”If the equipment is produced in small quantities, as for example in the U-2 case or the A-bomb in World War Two, it may be kept secret for a long time.” (p. 5) Even in the cases he cites, technological surprise was avoidable. His research points to a dynamic o f failure similar to that which exists in diplomatic and military surprise. The weakest link, according to Bonen, is not in the intelligence acquisition or analysis process as much as it is in the lack of acceptance of intelligence reports by decision-makers. For example, he examines one of the classiccase studies of technological surprise-that of the launching of the first Russian Sputnik-and draws the following conclusions: ”The launching of the Sputnik came as a major surprise and shock to the American public abruptly challenging American supremacy. Was the Sputnik a technological intelligence surprise? Definitely not. The information was given directly and clearly by the Russians themselves on various occasions before the actual launching (October 4, 1957) . . . . Obviously there was no intelligence surprise. The information was freely available. It was a problem of acceptance. The Americans did not take the Russian challenge seriously. Their strong belief in American technological supremacy was a very effective filter that discounted and rejected the possibility of being overtaken by the Russians in the satellite race.” Zeev Bonen, Technological Surprise (Mimeo), pp. 8-9. See also F. J. Krieger, Behind the Sputniks (Washington D.C.; Public Affairs Press, 1958);and Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion (New York Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 106-125. Other preliminary observations on technological surprise are Arthur Lee Burns, ”International Consequences of Expecting Technological Surprise” World Politics Vol. 10, No. 4, July 1958, pp. 512-534; some remarks by Patrick J. McGarvey in C.I.A.: The Myth and the Madness (Baltimore:Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 109-110; Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology (Cambridge, MA: Durellen, 1970), pp. 99-100 in particular; George H. Heilmeir, “Guarding Against TechnologicalSurprise,” Air UniversityReview SeptemberlOctober 1976, pp. 2-7. Another area of interest in the general study of surprise is that of disasters as surprise. See Barry A. Turner, “The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters”, Administrative Science Quarterly, September 1976, Vol. 21, pp. 378397 . See also Barry Turner, “Research Note: A Comment of the Nature of Information in Channels of Observation,” Cybernetica Vol. 20, NO.^ 1, 1977, pp. 39-42. This article is based on research undertaken for a forthcoming book by the same title, which includes a more detailed theoretical and historical analysis of the cases included here. The author wishes to thank Major General Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli MilitaryIntelligence, Richard K. Betts of the Brooking Institution, Jill Shindler, and Arie Ofri, for their suggestions and comments. Michael I. Handel is currently a Research Associate at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, on leavefrom the Hebrew University of lerusalem. 57 International Security I 58 of a surprise attack have all been thoroughly explored.2 Since research on the theory of military surprise seems to have reached the point of diminishing returns, it is necessary to expand in new directions. Although the development of a general theory of surprise may be possible in due course, studies of the non-military manifestations of surprise must come first. This article examines...

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