The Implications of Sino-American Normalization

The Implications of SinoAmerican Normalization Jonathan D.Pollack C h i n a in early 1979 is poised on the edge of a new political era. Nearly three decades after the formal establishment of the People’s Republic, full diplomatic relations with the United States have finally been achieved. A Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Japan, signed in October 1978, has consummated an equally historic process of rapprochement, with Tokyo prepared for the first time to align with one of the principal disputants in the Sino-Soviet conflict, at obvious cost for its relations with the other. In a broad range of international initiatives, China’s leadership is now pursuing concrete, long-term ties to the West and to Japan in foreign trade, purchases of advanced technology (both military and civilian), and diplomatic measures aimed at countering Soviet political and military power. Party-to-party relations with Albania and Vietnam, both close Chinese allies in the past, have been vituperatively severed, along with all economic and military agreements. Peking’s sudden military assault into Vietnam’s northernmost provinces in February, 1979, furnishes even more potent and revealing evidence of the magnitude of the departure from past policies. As old allies have been discarded and even invaded, China has made its peace with still older antagonists. Thus, partyto -party ties with Yugoslavia, scorned for nearly two decades as the principal source of modern revisionism, have been fully restored, with President Tito and Hua Kuo-feng, China’s new Party Chairman, exchanging highly publicized visits. Finally, many of these changes have diminished China’s long identification with and focus upon the third world. With a speed and apparent finality that few observers would have thought possible, the People’s Republic’s leadership seems determined to pursue an international course in the coming decade that at best bears only partial resemblance to the professed ideals of the past. Changes underway in China’s domestic politics and economics since the death of Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung in September 1976 hold even more potential significance. While comparisons to Soviet politics following the death of Stalin are inevitable and perhaps somewhat facile, they are not wholly inapt. A remarkable range of political, economic, and institutional initiatives, launched under the aegis and active guidance of Party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-p’ing, have progressed farther and faster than most obJonathan D. Pollack is a staff member of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation. The views expressed in this paper are his own, and should not be attributed to Rand or its research sponsors. The author wishes to thank Wendy Allen for her comments and criticisms of an earlier draft of this essay. 37 International Security I 38 servers would have dared predict. Decisions made in late 1978 to restore a number of Mao’s bitterest rivals to political respectability have conveyed to the Chinese populace that very littleassociated with the late Chairman should still be considered sacrosanct. At the same time, clear signs of openness in voicing opinions and airing grievances-both among Chinese and between Chinese and foreigners-suggest a political system in considerable transition, with old norms now subject to intermittent but at times cogent challenge. The manner and ultimate extent of this political evolution are very difficult to gauge at this point. But at least some of China’s new leaders-beginning with Teng Hsiao-p’ing himself-are not inclined to interfere too strongly with such increased expressiveness. No matter how modest this political breakthrough might appear, the contrast with previous policy is extraordinary . Wherever the People’s Republic might be headed, greatly heightened attention to economic modernization is already a principal consequence of this transition. China’s industrial and scientific development, so long stymied by divisive internal politics and a frequently doctrinaire pursuit of self-reliance, has been launched on its most ambitious course in two decades. Achieving the “comprehensive modernization” of the nation’s agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (labeled the “four modernizations ”) by the year 2000 has been enshrined in the new Party constitution. Growth targets in various economic sectors border on the grandiose, most being premised on the rapid introduction and assimilation...