What do Disneyland, the Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison, the Mall of America, and the Y-12 nuclear security complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee have in common? They have wildly different purposes, but they share a common characteristic as employers of private police. This answer-indicative of the prevalence and numbers of private police today-would have struck the nineteenth-century observer as evidence of a gross failure by the state. Yet that reaction, in turn, would seem odd to us. Vocal support of private police can be found among public police chiefs, lawmakers, and even President Bush.
What kinds of criticisms were once leveled at private police by public officials? How did one attitude, deeply skeptical of private police, evolve into another that sees heavy reliance upon private policing as beneficial, or at least benign? Here, I take a fresh look at the dynamics of that change, and by doing so, restore to their proper place fundamental questions about the use of police who are privately financed and organized in a democratic society. These questions, and the violent history that midwived them, have been largely and undeservedly forgotten by the legal literature.
Using this historical perspective, I examine the shifting status of private policing: first, by examining the history of public criticism directed against them; second, by recounting the partnership model that first gained a foothold in studies sponsored by the federal government in the 1970s and 1980s; and third, by questioning the meaning and intentions behind the idea of partnership advanced today.
Privatization of welfare reflects the political pressure to limit public responsibility for protection of social citizenship. Recent welfare reforms incorporate three classic market-like privatization mechanisms-contracting out services, forcing allocation of a limited pool of benefits, and deregulation. Deregulation entails strategic diversion and disqualification of large numbers of would-be applicants who are left without alternatives to the labor market. In this article I discuss an empirical study of the effects of deregulation of welfare on the self-perceptions of recipients. Interviews with recipients and with low-wage health care workers, former recipients, show that, criticisms of welfare notwithstanding, they have embraced welfare reform's valorization of market labor, despite the women's continuing poverty. The interviews suggest that the "consent" of women in low-wage health care work is grounded in both powerlessness and resistance. Care taking, a role devalued by welfare reform, is valued by them and a foundation for identity and an imagined career.
In this article, I describe and analyze three principles of First Amendment doctrine. First, the Establishment Clause generally forbids governmental expression that has the purpose or effect of promoting or endorsing religion. Second, and conversely, private religious expression is broadly defined and is strongly protected by the Free Speech Clause. Third, as an implicit exception to the first principle, the government itself is sometimes permitted to engage in expression that seemingly does promote and endorse religion, but only when the expression is noncoercive, nonsectarian, and embedded within (or at least in harmony with) longstanding historical tradition. Comparing these three principles to the demands of French laïcité , I conclude that the United States and France share fundamental common ground on the first principle, but that the second and third principles demonstrate that the American approach is in some respects more protective and tolerant of religious expression in the public domain. I suggest that these variations are not accidental, but rather are the product of historical, philosophical, and cultural differences.
This article draws upon leading works in the sociology of religion to assess what I shall call "the secularization claim" regarding the United States. It endeavors, in particular, to clarify the possible meanings of "secularization," and then to use these conceptual refinements to examine what sort of evidence exists that the United States has been secularized. Though it is not possible to falsify every version of the secularization claim, there is little evidence to support it, especially in its most prominent and politically relevant variations. The article then goes on to offer a preliminary analysis of to what extent, if any, are constitutional factors responsible for sustaining a public culture in the United States that is, by comparison to most other nations, durably religious. The article identifies four constitutional or quasi-constitutional factors that sociologists and political scientists have suggested might be partly responsible for the vigor of American religion: disestablishment, the fragmentation of political authority, ethnic diversity and immigration, and provocative judicial decisions. The article concludes by recommending that scholars who are interested in the conditions that sustain religious activity and other forms of civic association in the United States should pay more attention to the constitutional fragmentation of political authority.
Rights to free exercise in the United States are governed by a doctrine of formal neutrality, which seems to resemble the French doctrine of laícité. This resemblance tempts one to conclude that the doctrinal regimes of religious liberty in the United States and France are also essentially the same. Despite their superficial resemblance, however, formal neutrality and laícité generate regimes of religious liberty that are substantially, even radically, different. Notwithstanding conceptually similar organizing principles, there is a significant difference in the substance of religious liberty in the United States and France owing to very different conceptions of the proper role of the state in securing religious freedom and other human rights. This difference is evident in the grammar that each country uses to describe free exercise rights, in their respective responses to the problem of religious and moral difference, and in their differing conceptions of equality adopted.
In this article, the absence of an American equivalent to the French word laícité becomes an ethnographic opening to an exploration of the church-state divide in the U.S. context. Drawing on classic social theory, sociological accounts, and current events, I suggest that the constitutional separation of church and state-in addition to whatever it may mean in legal terms-also expresses a cultural proposition. Specifically, the separation of church and state posits a dual role for local communities as both the source of federal power (through representative government) and the foundation of its moral authority. The latter role can be sustained only to the extent that moral community is conceptualized as "outside" the state, extending to the state solely through the democratic process. The article concludes with a reflection on the politicization of "moral values" in the 2004 presidential election.
This article, originally written for a French audience, attempts to explain the American law of church and state from the ground up, assuming no background information. Basic legal provisions are explained. The relevant American history is periodized in three alignments of religious conflict: Protestant-Protestant, Protestant-Catholic, and religious-secular. Some frequently heard concepts are explained, distinguished, and related to each other-separation, voluntarism, equality, formal and substantive neutrality, liberty, toleration, and state action. Finally, the principal disputes over religious liberty are assessed in three broad areas-funding of religiously affiliated activities, religious speech (with and without government sponsorship), and regulation of religious practice. These disputes are reviewed in historical, political, and doctrinal terms, with brief comparisons to the substantially different French solutions to the same problems.
La conception Américaine de la laïcité consists principally of a constitutional norm-the nonestablishment norm-and of the law that the U.S. Supreme Court has developed in the course of enforcing the norm. The nonestablishment norm forbids government-both the national government and state government-to "establish" religion. American laïcité also consists of what we may call "the morality of liberal democracy." My aim in this essay is to explain why religion in politics does not violate American laïcité; more specifically, my aim is to explain why political reliance on religiously grounded morality violates neither the nonestablishment norm nor the morality of liberal democracy.
American separation of church and state is much more exigent than French laïcité, in that it prohibits the state from helping one or all religions in any manner; either in making religious representatives accredited and recognized political interlocutors in political and social dialogue, in putting edifices at their disposition for religious practice, or in financing religious schools-all things that French public authority does to benefit certain religions present in the territory of the Republic. As a result, religions, churches, or sects in the United States are all on equal footing with the others; none is privileged. The downside of the situation is that freedom of religion is in no way helped or assisted as is often the case in France and in Europe more generally.
To date, global protection of biodiversity has been largely dominated by governmental actors. Ecosystems transcending state boundaries find themselves at the mercy of international agreements, for better or for worse. Steven Sanderson of the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) suggested for worse in The Future of Conservation, but he gave hope for more effective environmental conservation, if the private sector could gain more standing globally. The plan that Sanderson created for self-assertion of nongovernmental environmental groups describes approaches typically endorsed not by NGOs but by governments: global alliances, political strategy, human-centered conservation, and economic development. This Note isolates the current use of these strategies by NGOs or in private environmental preserves and examines their efficacy for successful conservation, and finds Sanderson's argument to have merit. NGOs are employing these concepts in environmental management and successfully overcoming some private sector pitfalls.
A new, privately owned preserve in Tierra del Fuego provides an ideal forum for comprehensive implementation of Sanderson's plan-and the WCS has discretion to manage the land accordingly. Ultimately, I predict successful conservation here, based on strategies previously advocated by its managing organization.
This Note explores the role that nongovernmental organizations can and do play in the preservation of global biodiversity hotspots. The hotspot concept-developed in the late 1980s alongside the new field of conservation biology-identifies particular areas of the world that contain high levels of endemic species that are highly threatened or endangered. Some experts have argued that by focusing species conservation efforts on these areas, a maximum amount of species can be protected and preserved using a minimum amount of time, money, and effort, allowing the remaining, scarce funds and resources to be directed toward species conservation efforts elsewhere.
Without commenting on the propriety or the effectiveness of utilizing the hotspot concept itself as a way to focus biodiversity conservation efforts, this Note examines several methods that nongovernmental organizations can use to assist in the protection of such hotspots. The first category of such methods includes direct funding efforts or the making of unencumbered contributions by nongovernmental organizations to other organizations in a position to affect preservation efforts in a particular hotspot. The second category includes all types of nongovernmental organization involvement in debt-for-nature swaps. The third category includes a broad array of opportunities for nongovernmental organization involvement in the international arena, including involvement with both public and private or semi-private international organizations. In an ever-more globalized and interconnected world, the actions of such organizations increasingly affect hotspot preservation. The effectiveness of each of these three categories of potential and current involvement will be analyzed and opportunities for future expansion of protection efforts will be presented.
The objective of this Note is to use global themes and perspectives to aid in reframing the bioprospecting debate. The current state of this debate, its problems, and proposed solutions are reviewed. In looking at the impact of local responses to globalization on bioprospecting themes, I propose that more internationally competitive laws could allow an escape from some of the undesired effects of bioprospecting, while promoting more desired effects. I also suggest, independently, that undesired effects could be avoided and desired effects promoted through methods that seek to recognize the global identity of concerned citizens.