The Army's Way of War: An Interview with Brian McAllister Linn

January/February 2008 · Historically Speaking The Army's Way of War: An Interview with Brian McAllister Linn Conducted by Donald A. Yerxa In The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War (Harvard University Press, 2007), Brian McAllisterLinn examines how the army has searchedforthe lessons of past conflicts in ordertoprepareforits nextclash of arms andsurveys the army's many visions of warfare up to thepresent day. Linn is aprofessor of history and Claudius M. Easley, Jr. Faculty Fellow at Texas?&? University. He is the author of The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (University of Kansas Press, 2000), winner of the SocietyforMilitary History's Distinguished Book Price; Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (University of North CarolinaPress, 1997), oho winnerof the SocietyforMilitary History's DistinguishedBook Pri^e; and The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Historically Speaking editorDonald ?. Yerxa interviewedUnn on November 13, 2007. Donald A. Yerxa: Would you provide our readers with a brief summary of your argument in The Echo of Battle? Brian McAllister Linn: Alost military history is about the practice of war, battles, operations, generals , and so forth. This is a book about how the U.S. Army has thought about warfare during peacetime— how it interprets lessons from the past, assesses current military situations, and then envisions future contingencies. I argue that the army's way—or philosophy —of war has been defined in peacetime by officer intellectuals, and then I examine how these concepts of war were translated into preparations for the next conflict. Yerxa: How has the military search for a usable past helped shape its thinking about war? Linn: Officers who have written about war since the army emerged as a distinct institution fall into three schools of thought. The Guardians, who have their origins in 19th-century harbor fortification programs , view war as an engineering project best understood and best conducted through the application of scientific principles. The Heroes were shaped by the experience of combat on the frontier, both western and imperial, and also by much of the debate after the Civil War on modern warfare. They tend to view war as a contest of each side's martial virtues— for lack of a better term—and focus on leadership, courage, discipline, spiritual qualities. And then the Managersemerged in the late 19th century. They tend to view war as a matter of efficient organization. While these three traditions have evolved and adapted, they have also remained remarkably consistent in many ways. In fact, much of the army's military thinking today restates these three positions. Yerxa: And these traditions are braided in much of the American military past? Linn: Right. That's actually an image that my wife came up with, and it really fits because, like a braid, sometimes one of them will be dominant and you can't really see the other two. And at times it's very tight, as was the case in the 1990s when there was very little disagreement in the army's concept of war. At other times, for instance in the interwar period, when they went in three different directions, it's very hard to tell if military intellectuals were even writing about the same type of war. Yerxa: What prompted you to write the book? Linn: I was a visiting professor at the Army War College, and that put me in daily interaction with officers who were studying and debating the big issues of national security—things like strategy, military policy, procurement, and the nature of war, especially of the next war the army will likely fight These officers constandy referred to history to support their ideas, but they constantly disagreed with each other about the lessons of history. So I started doing research to find out who was right, and ultimately I found out that, in their own way, they all are right. Yerxa: Why these three military traditions? Is there anything that would account for their emergence? Are they inherited from the European military experience? Is there any geopolitical basis for them? Linn: The issue of foreign influence in the exchange of ideas is...