Iraq and the American Small War Tradition

46Historically Speaking · June 2003 Iraq and the American Small War Tradition Max Boot Onewould have thoughtthatthe defeat of the Taliban would have shattered forall time the mystique ofthe guerrilla . Apparentlynot Agitated commentators on Iraq invoke comparisons with Vietnam and warn that allied occupiers will never be safe. Such a nightmare scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand—a good general must prepare for every contingency —but, ifthe historical record is anything to judge by, it is unlikely. The U.S., alongwith mostWestern nations, has a longrecord of defeating guerrilla resistance all over the world. And the conditions present the . only time the U.S. suffered a serious defeat—in Vietnam —appear to be missing in Iraq today. The primary job of the U.S. Army until 1890 was fighting guerrillas—American Indians, to be exact, the finest irregular warriors in the world. Defeating them was a slow and arduous process, with some famous setbacks like the Battle of Little Bighorn. Butin the end dogged generals like Nelson Miles and George Crook managed to capture the last holdouts, such as the Apache leader Gerónimo and the great Sioux chiefSitting Bull. Much ofthe historiography ofthe Indian Wars focuses on the U.S. Army's excesses, such as the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890. But the army's ultimate victory was predicatednotupon sheerbrutalitybutupon the essentials of good counterinsurgency strategy: cuttingoffthe guerrillas from their population base byherdingtribes onto reservations ; utilizingfriendlyIndians forscouting and intelligence; and being relentless in the pursuit ofhostile braves. Similar strategieswere utilized,with similar success, by the army in its campaign to stamp out resistance to U.S. rule in the Philippines afterthe Spanish-AmericanWar. The Philippine War was long and ugly. It lasted from 1899 to 1902, with sporadic resistance thereafter, and it cost the lives of 4,200 U.S. soldiers. But its success was sealed througha daringcommando raid undertaken byBrigadierGeneral FrederickFunston. He dressed a unit ofnative allies in insurrecto uniforms and pretended to be their prisoner in order to capture the rebel chief, Emilio Aguinaldo, in his mountain lair. Important as this coup was, it was not enough to assure the long-term acceptance of a U.S. presence in the Philippines. This could only be done through measures designed to win the hearts and minds ofFilipinos . In the early days of the occupation, U.S. troops vaccinated children, set up schools, and repaired roads. Later on, the U.S. granted the Philippines growingautonomy well ahead of other colonies in Asia. Nationalist leader Manuel Quezon was driven to complain: "Damn the Americans, why don't they tyrannize us more?" America went on to wage many more counterinsurgency campaigns in the years after 1898, mainly in the Caribbean, where U.S. troops occupied Panama, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and otherplaces forvaryinglengths oftime.Most ofthese occupations were carried out by a small number ofMarines who fought guerrillas while being careful not to alienate the bulkofthecivilianpopulation. Resistancewas not always entirely stamped out—the Nicaraguan rebel leader Augusto Sandino eluded capture from 1927 to 1933—but vigorous policingusuallykept the guerrillas isolated in the outback where they did not pose a threatto large population centers. The bulk ofthe fighting was done by native enlisted men led by U.S. officers in constabulary outfits like the Haitian Gendarmerie or the Nicaraguan National Guard. This is an important point to keep in mind: while U.S. forces possess superior training and firepower, they lack the local knowledge essential to root out wily opponents. This gap can be bridged only by local allies, whether serving informally alongside U.S. forces (as with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, or the Kurds in northern Iraq) or in a more formal military structure (as with free Iraqis who are working for various U.S. units). While U.S. troops fought openly against guerrillas in the pre-World War ? period, after 1945 the emphasis switched to covert operations, with Washington supplyingarms and expertise to friendlygovernments battling communistinsurgencies. This strategyfailed spectacularlyin China, which was taken over byMaoZedongin 1949 because ofthe strong support the communists received from Moscow and the blunders of the Nationalist government Butthis defeatshould noterase the memory ofvictories elsewhere. A small sample: between 1945 and 1949...