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Reviewed by:
  • España frente al México amenazado, 1845–1848
  • Sonny B. Davis
España frente al México amenazado, 1845–1848. Edited by Raúl Figueroa Esquer . Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2002. Index. 190 pp. Paper.

In this work, Raúl Figueroa Esquer compiles a series of dispatches from Spain's representatives in Mexico City and Washington DC, in order to illuminate the nature of Spanish neutrality during the Texas independence crisis, Texas's annexation to the United States, and the Mexican-American War. In an all-too-brief prologue, Esquer claims that the dispatches show that Spain's neutrality during these gravest international conflicts had a negative effect on Mexico. Moreover, he argues that Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, Spain's minister in Mexico City from March 1845 to August 1847 , was to blame, in part, for the Mexican-American War.

Esquer believes, and the dispatches show, that Spain did not recognize Texas independence for two powerful reasons. Spain only recognized Mexico as an independent state in 1836 and established full diplomatic relations in 1839 ; it did not want to endanger that nascent relationship. Second, the reasonably close proximity to Cuba made independent Texas a threat to Spain's most important Caribbean colony. Spain feared that an independent Texas would support Afro-Cuban revolutionary groups. Spain's stance was affected by the Mexican policies of interning blacks that escaped Cuba and landed on the Mexican coast and strict neutrality toward internal events on the island. Furthermore, Mexican republicans did not attack Spain for its minister's meddling in internal politics.

Spain's position also reflected Great Britain's neutral stance, while France's position—while neutral—was hostile to Mexico. In so doing, Spanish leaders followed the axiom that when England and France adopted the same position, Spain would follow suit, but when the two European powerhouses differed, Spain abstains. As a result, Spain thought it more prudent to follow Great Britain in proclaiming strict neutrality. [End Page 770]

Much of the blame for the Mexican-American war is levied at Salvador Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish minister in Mexico City. As Esquer correctly points out, the dispatches indicate that Bermúdez de Castro's intrigues in Mexican internal politics (he acted as a financial agent of the golpe that overturned the government of general José Joaquín Herrera) had a catastrophic impact. Herrera's fall was followed by the promonarchy administration of general Mariano Paredes. Herrera, a moderate liberal, wanted to reach a peaceful accord with the United States, but Paredes (under Bermúdez de Castro's tutelage) rebelled against, rather than contained, U.S. forces. Once in power, Paredes followed a hostile course that ensured war. This combined with U.S. territorial desires to propel Mexico into a war that it had already lost.

To a large degree, however, Esquer exonerates Bermúdez de Castro, claiming the Spaniard acted in good faith and only misjudged the military, material, and human capacity of the United States. The problem, according to Esquer, was Bermúdez de Castro's inexperience, vanity, and inflexibility. Nevertheless, the dispatches demonstrate that the Spanish minister's actions were contradictory. While Bermúdez de Castro did not support Spanish mediation of the war, neither did he want Spain to loose its influence in Mexico. Hence, he left much to vice consuls throughout Mexico, which was not the desire of the Spanish government. The dispatches show that Spain's minister in Washington, Angel Calderón de la Barca, was an unorganized man; nevertheless, he understood that Mexican-American relations were but one of the issues debated in the United States, whereas in Mexico they were central to the question of existence of the nation. De la Barca was a seasoned diplomat who had been Spain's first representative to Mexico following the establishment of diplomatic relations (1839-41), and he was keenly aware of the situation. Esquer rounds out the dispatches with those from Bermúdez de Castro's successor, Ramón Lozano y Armenta, whom the editor describes as impotent. Although the dispatches are not edited in the traditional sense, Esquer's choice of documents offers greater insight into...

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