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The Imitation of Alexander the Great in Afghanistan

ROBERT J. RABEL

No one was like him. Terrible were his crimes—
but if you wish to blackguard the Great King,
think how mean, obscure and dull you are,
your labors lowly and your merits less . . .

—Robert Lowell, quoted in Paul Cartledge, *Alexander the Great:*

The Hunt for a New Past

As Harold Bloom (2004, 87) has remarked about *Don Quixote*, the novel is capable of sustaining almost any interpretation a critic might choose to impress upon it. The same might be said about Alexander the Great. His character opens itself up to a wide variety of possible interpretations, Alexander being regarded at one end of the spectrum of possibilities as a lawless despot and at the other end as a high-minded philosopher proclaiming the doctrine of the unity of humankind.¹ My concern here, however, lies not with how scholars have understood Alexander but rather with how Alexander has influenced others, in this case three nineteenth-century adventurers who, in imitation of the Macedonian conqueror, tried and ultimately failed to build kingdoms for themselves in remote regions of Afghanistan at the time largely unknown to the people of the west.²

Despite a certain common set of experiences, the three adventurers discussed here differ in the various ways they imitated Alexander. The first figure to be considered is Daniel or Danny Dravot, hero or, it might better be said, antihero of Rudyard Kipling's short story "The Man Who Would Be King," which Kipling composed in 1888 while employed as a journalist in British-controlled India. In Kipling's story, Dravot is a trickster and confidence man; he imitates Alexander in the sense of imitation (*mimēsis*) defined and discussed by Plato in book 3 of the *Republic*. For Plato imitation is impersonation, and Dravot impersonates the son of the Macedonian conqueror. The second figure of interest is close kin to the first: he is the Danny Dravot who serves as the protagonist of John

Huston's 1975 film *The Man Who Would Be King* (screenplay by John Huston and Gladys Hill). Despite the judgment of some critics that he remains for the most part faithful to Kipling, Huston portrays Dravot in ways different from Kipling, these differences involving the manner in which Alexander is imitated. Huston's Dravot, while he begins the film as an impostor or conman in the Kipling mode, gradually identifies himself so closely with Alexander that he comes to believe himself to be Alexander's true son. His judgment is warped and his sense of reality compromised because he falls victim to the deleterious effects of *mimēsis* in the sense of imitation that René Girard in an important study of the novel and in other works has characterized as "mimetic desire" (Girard 1966, 1977, 1987, 2001). The third figure is Josiah Harlan, the first American in Afghanistan. Harlan's adventures there in the first half of the nineteenth century preceded the composition of Kipling's story and may even have inspired its writing. Perhaps because he was an historical figure with a complex of motives and desires rendered still more opaque by a slim historical record and the passage of almost two centuries, Harlan's mode of imitating Alexander is more difficult to comprehend with the clarity that attends the case of his two fictional counterparts. Nonetheless, I will argue that Harlan may also be said to be a victim of mimetic desire, though in a second, weaker, and more universal sense of the concept that Girard worked out when he turned his attention away from the pathological manifestations of mimetic desire specific to the novel and developed a theory of such desire that also covers its manifestations in the day-to-day lives of ordinary flesh-and-blood human beings. I will, in conclusion, suggest that this weaker sense of mimetic desire may also have played a part in the psychological makeup determining the actions of Alexander himself, who imitated and sought to surpass the deeds of several ancestral and mythical models.³ Let us begin with a consideration of Rudyard Kipling's story "The Man Who Would Be King."

Kipling's story centers around the exploits of Danny Dravot and Peachey Carnehan, two quixotic British soldiers of fortune, whose dreams of unjustly acquired wealth are mirrored in the transgressive act of crossing boundaries others respect, in this case the border between British-controlled India and the wilds of Afghanistan to the west. The unnamed narrator of the story, a newspaper correspondent, first meets Peachey on a train traveling through India, where his loquacious fellow traveler admits to having attempted unsuccessfully various acts of extortion in the Native States of India, impersonating a newspaper correspondent for *The Backwoodsman*, the newspaper for which the narrator himself

in fact writes. Peachey's reference to past acts of impersonation thus introduces the major motif that will be carried through the story. Without coming to harm, Peachey has many times been unceremoniously escorted across the borders of these states without making any profit (Kipling 1994, 219). "I had heard more than once," the narrator says, "of men personating correspondents of newspapers and bleeding small Native States with threats of exposure, but I had never met any of the caste before. They lead a hard life, and generally die with great suddenness" (220). Peachey and the narrator quickly strike up a friendship when they discover that they are both members of the Society of Masons—Masonry will play a part in the second half of the story also—and so on the basis of this common affiliation the narrator agrees to go out of his way to convey a message from Peachey to his compatriot Danny Dravot at Marwar Junction. There the narrator first meets the con artist who provides the story with its title. Fearing that his two new friends might land in serious trouble through their acts of imposture, the narrator rescues them (222) and later meets with them in his office, where they ask him to witness a formal contract pledging abstention from alcohol and women as they go about the business of carrying out a scheme to make themselves rich men and kings in Kafiristan, where, they believe, "a man isn't crowded and can come to his own" (226).⁴ "They have two-and-thirty heathen idols there," Dravot explains to the narrator, "and we'll be the thirty-third and fourth" (226). Their plan is simple: they intend to smuggle rifles across the border, arm a group of natives, and carve out a kingdom of their own. In formulating and carrying out this plan, they acknowledge that others will regard them as mad men, fools, and lunatics (227–28), but being thought of in just this way accords fully with their plans. Mad men are regarded by the native Indians as lucky charms, so Danny impersonates a mad priest with Peachey as his servant, and the two join a caravan traveling from Peshawar to Kabul (230). Breaking off from the caravan, they travel north into Kafiristan. "There was just the chance," the narrator remarks, "that Carnehan and Dravot would be able to wander through Afghanistan without detection. But, beyond, they would find death—certain and awful death" (231).

This ominous remark signals a change in the story's tone and in the purveyor of its narrative. What takes place as comedy in the India of the first half—the antics of two foolish soldiers of fortune trying to become rich through various acts of impersonation—is reenacted as tragedy in the Kafiristan of the second. What befell Danny and Peachey in

Kafiristan is explained by Peachey, who after the passage of several seasons makes his way back alone to India and to the narrator's office where his contract with Danny was originally signed. As he tells the story, Danny and he easily impressed the natives with the power of their rifles. Danny became a king and "the people came and worshiped" (236). As Danny and Peachey subdued village after village, their empire grew. Danny's easily won success led him to a more reckless act of imposture than any he had theretofore attempted: he proclaimed that Peachey and he were the sons of Alexander the Great and also gods. As Danny explained the beauty of his scheme to Peachey,

"My Gord, Carnehan," says Daniel, "this is a tremenjus business, and we've got the whole country as far as it's worth having. I am the son of Alexander by Queen Semiramis, and you're my younger brother and a God too! It's the biggest thing we've ever seen."⁵

At this point, Masonry reenters the story, for Danny's strategy of success through impersonation did not stop with the imitation of Alexander. Exploiting the rudimentary knowledge of Masonry possessed by the native Kafirs (240)—exactly how they acquired that knowledge is never made explicit—Danny attempted what the logic of the story seems to regard as a still more hubristic act of imposture than the imitation of a god. With Peachey warning of the dangers of holding a Lodge without warrant, Danny contrived what he saw as a "master-stroke o' policy": "A Good and a Grand-Master of the Craft am I, and a Lodge in the Third Degree I will open, and we'll raise the head priests and the Chiefs of the villages" (240). Danny proclaimed that he and Peachey were not only "Gods and sons of Alexander" but also "Past Grand-Masters in the Craft as well" (241). He claimed kinship with the Kafirs not only on the grounds that they were familiar with the Society of Masons but also because "you're white people—sons of Alexander—and not like common, black Mohammedans" (242).⁶ Once again, against Peachey's advice and also against the terms of the contract earlier drawn up, Danny decided to take a wife; he wanted "a Queen," he says, "to breed a King's son for the King" (246). However, the woman Danny chose feared dire consequences for herself in mating with a god (248), and at the wedding ceremony she bit him on the neck and drew blood, thus establishing that he was no god after all (249). The act of imposture was thus exposed, and the two were forced to flee from their disillusioned subjects. "My own notion," Peachey explains to the narrator, "is that Dan began to grow

mad in his head from that hour” (250). (As we will see below, Huston’s Dravot begins to go mad earlier in the proceedings with a madness brought on by mimetic desire.) Dravot was restored to his senses when, ironically, he was shot in the leg by one of the very rifles that he and Peachey had brought into the country (251). Captured by his former subjects, Danny begged forgiveness from Peachey for bringing him to Kafiristan in the first place (252). Finally, Danny was marched to a rope bridge over a ravine with a river at the bottom. When he reached the middle of the bridge, the rope was cut, and, as Peachey describes the scene to the narrator, “old Dan fell, turning round and round and round, twenty thousand miles, for he took half an hour to fall till he struck the water, and I could see his body caught on a rock with the gold crown close beside” (253). The Kafirs chose to crucify Peachey, but they took him down the next day and set him free, declaring it a miracle that he managed to survive through the night (253). Eventually, Peachey made his way alone back to India, where the story began, carrying Danny’s head, which was given to him as a grisly parting gift. After telling this sad tale to the narrator, Peachey dies two days later, having gone stark-raving mad (254–55). Louis Cornell, I think, nicely summarizes the major point of the story: Kipling regarded with suspicion any “attempt to impose upon modern reality the dreams that belong properly to poetry, history, and legend” (Kipling 1987, xxxvi).

All the various acts of imitation involved in Kipling’s story, including the imitation of Alexander the Great, can be explained as acts of *mimēsis* as Plato deals with the subject in book 3 of the *Republic*. There the subject of imitation is formally introduced in the context of a discussion of the style (*lexis*) employed in narrative poetry. After narrative is defined so broadly as to include all the things said by poets, Plato distinguishes simple (*ἀπλῆ*) narrative, where the poet speaks *in propria persona*, from the process of narrative through imitation (*μίμησις*), which is a kind of double act of narration, wherein the poet is narrating but at the same time pretending to be one of his characters (*Resp.* 392D5–93B8). Plato then defines *mimēsis* by way of a question posed by Socrates: “Is not likening oneself to another, either in voice or manner, to imitate the one to whom one likens oneself?” (*Resp.* 393C5–6).⁷ Plato’s definition of imitation corresponds to a modern dictionary definition of the term, where “to imitate” is usually glossed as something like “to follow or endeavor to follow in action or manner.” Yet this definition fails to capture exactly what Plato has in mind. By imitation, he means impersonation (Asmis 1992, 347; Else 1986, 25). Thus, in the example illustrating the defini-

tion, Plato says that the poet Homer sometimes speaks in his own person, in which case he engages in an act of simple (ἄπλῆ, *Resp.* 393D6) narration. Sometimes, however, he carries out his narration by directing the attention of the audience away from himself, as if someone else were in fact speaking, the old priest Chryses for example (*Resp.* 393D6–7). Hence arises the doubling of narrative functions that takes place in the act of *mimēsis*, resulting in what Plato clearly regards as its *duplicitous* nature. For when engaged in *mimēsis*, the poet is narrating, but at the same time he is masquerading as someone else, engaging in an act of trickery that involves imitating, so far as he can, the gestures, movements, voice, and appearance of others.⁸ Of course, Plato is not primarily concerned with the effects such imposture will have on a poet like Homer. What concerns him is the harm *mimēsis* will do if practiced by the Guardians of his Republic or by anyone else who impersonates others—whether characters in a poem like the *Iliad* or flesh-and-blood people in real life. Hence simple (ἄπλῆ) narrative is best suited to the needs of the just man, because, as Plato says, anticipating the argument of book 3 through an earlier speech of Glaucon in book 2, the just man is also the simple (ἄπλοῦν) and noble man (*Resp.* 361B5–8). The just man lacks the “duplicity” that Kipling’s Dravot and Carnehan, for example, possess in full measure. When such imitation as Plato describes goes beyond the act of simply impersonating others and involves also the imitation of desire, the result is what René Girard has described as “mimetic desire,” which is perhaps best regarded as an example of Platonic *mimēsis* carried to the extreme point where the boundaries between self and other become inextricably confused, as they do in the case of the Danny Dravot in John Huston’s film *The Man Who Would Be King*.⁹ In Platonic impersonation, a poet like Homer or a character like Kipling’s Dravot attempts to deceive others; however, when mimetic desire is involved, the subject experiencing the desire deceives himself or herself instead.

In *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* (1966), Girard distinguishes desire according to the self from desire according to the other. To put it simply, desire according to the self is authentic human desire; it originates from within the self, uninfluenced by others; it is directed in a straight trajectory toward its chosen objects and goals. Such desire exemplifies the workings of an authentic, autonomous individuality and is characteristic of the “passionate man” (Girard 1966, 140). As a kind of caricature of the true desire of the passionate man, Girard posits the existence of a counterfeit or mimetic desire. “When,” Girard says (1966, 2), “the ‘nature’ of the object inspiring the passion is not sufficient to account for

the desire, one must turn to the impassioned subject.” Mimetic desire exists because it seems to satisfy a basic human need for transcendence. In the case of the impassioned subject of mimetic desire, individuality is suppressed through too close an identification with an admired model, whom Girard calls the “mediator of desire.” Though often present only in the imagination, the mediator, enjoying an idealized status, prompts his or her disciple—the impassioned subject—to the experience of desires that do not arise from within the self (Girard 1966, 4–8). In effect, the mediator ignites the passions that enflame the victim of mimetic desire, who then becomes, in the words of Oscar Wilde’s Lord Henry, only “an echo of someone else’s music, a player in a part not written for him” (Wilde 1983, 34).¹⁰ If the mediator is situated—not necessarily in geographical or temporal terms but in terms of what Girard calls “spirit”—beyond the universe of the victim of mimetic desire, then the attitude adopted toward the mediator is one of purely worshipful respect. In these circumstances, Girard speaks of *external mediation*; that is, the mediator is “enthroned in an inaccessible heaven,” so to speak. However, if the disciple is sufficiently close to the mediator in terms of “spirit,” then *internal mediation* becomes possible: the disciple may enter into a condition of rivalry with his or her mediator (Girard 1966, 8–10).¹¹ In a word, external mediation inspires worship, internal mediation rivalry.¹² Whatever the form of mediation, external or internal, the victim is dragged “down into the infernal regions” (103–4), into an “abyss of nothingness” (166). He or she experiences a (metaphorical) fall from grace because mimetic desire is incapable of fulfillment, being an inauthentic desire, not a true passion. The impassioned subject who experiences such desire will inevitably be disappointed, for “possession of the object has not changed his being—the expected metamorphosis has not taken place” (88). The disciple thus lives a life that is for the most part “false, theatrical, and artificial” (79). Girard believes that the major novelistic explorations of mimetic desire in the works of Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust, and Dostoyevsky are devoted not only to the depiction of its insidious nature but also to the eventual resolution of the problems it creates. In this context, Girard speaks of a “conversion in death,” where the subject eventually comes to renounce his or her slavery to the mediator and speaks in terms that in one way or another abjure his former ideas and ideals (292–94).

Girard uses Don Quixote as his programmatic example of the trajectory of the impassioned subject’s experience of mimetic desire by way of external mediation. “Don Quixote,” he says, “has surrendered to Amadis

the individual's fundamental prerogative: he no longer chooses the objects of his own desire; Amadis must choose for him" (Girard 1966, 1), Amadis of Gaul being the primary hero of the books of knight-errantry that consume the attention of Don Quixote and motivate his quest to become a famous knight-errant himself. On his deathbed, however, Don Quixote renounces the life of chivalry that has occupied him for so long and has occupied the reader for many hundreds of pages. In the end, Don Quixote comes to realize the delusional nature of the desires he has borrowed, so to speak, from his model Amadis—and incidentally also from other heroes to whom Girard does not refer, including Alexander the Great.¹³ Don Quixote's deathbed words demonstrate clarity of vision that dispels the illusions and the madness that have plagued him and made him an object of ridicule throughout the novel. At the moment of death, he begs the forgiveness of his close companion Sancho Panza, who accompanied him on his journey: "Forgive me, my friend, for the opportunity I gave you to seem as mad as I, making you fall into the error into which I fell, thinking that there were and are knights errant in the world."¹⁴ The novelistic heroes with whom Girard is concerned finally come to a true understanding of the nature of the world only when they are about to leave it (Girard 1966, 306).

From boyhood, John Huston was a fan of Rudyard Kipling's prose and poetry, and one of his lifelong ambitions was to bring the short story "The Man Who Would Be King" to the screen. At times, the roles of Dravot and Carnehan (spelled "Peachy" for the purposes of the film) were variously considered for Walter Huston, Clark Gable, Humphrey Bogart, Richard Burton, Peter O'Toole, and Marlon Brando (Masden 1978, 152, 196). Later still, Paul Newman was approached with the idea that Robert Redford and he might take on the roles, the duo having performed so well as charismatic rogue outlaws in *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*. Newman loved the script but turned down the part, proposing that Huston instead hire British actors, specifically, Michael Caine and Sean Connery (Hammen 1985, 129), both of whom were eventually hired and do some of their best work in Huston's version of *The Man Who Would Be King*, Connery playing Danny Dravot and Caine Peachy Carnehan.

In the portrayal of the bond of close friendship between Dravot and Carnehan in Huston's film, some critics have seen the cinematic influence of *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*, the ultimate "buddy movie" (Masden 1978, 245). Others, noting how their friendship eventually goes awry over the matter of gold, have discerned a parallel with Dobbs

and Curtin from Huston's earlier film classic *The Treasure of the Sierra Madre* (Hammen 1985, 130–31). In addition to such cinematic allusions, I suggest that there exists a rather close literary parallel as well, though there is no evidence that Huston consciously contrived and exploited the connection. In a number of respects, the characters of Danny and Peachy in Huston's film resemble those of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza in Cervantes' novel.

Both Cervantes' novel and Huston's film follow the same arc from comedy to tragedy through a series of loosely connected episodes. Both subordinate action to dialogue: the wonderful scenes of talking and talking back between Peachy and Danny resemble the conversations between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, during which the two grow in interest as characters and develop "richer egos" (Bloom 2000, 146–47). In terms of specific parallels, Sancho and Peachy resemble each other. Both are unencumbered by any sense of greater responsibility beyond loyalty to their respective comrades; both are free men and intensely practical as well. Sancho keeps his attention squarely focused on the island over which Don Quixote has promised him eventual governance, while Peachy desires only the wealth he and Danny intend to extort as rulers of the Kafirs. Peachy simply wants to take the money and run from Kafiristan. For his part, Danny resembles Don Quixote who, in the words of Franz Kafka, is "metaphysically and psychologically bound" to the mission of knight-errantry he has borrowed, so to speak, from Amadis of Gaul and rejects only at the moment of his death.¹⁵ While Don Quixote has become the impassioned subject of mimetic desire even before the novel gets underway, Huston's film portrays both the initial contraction and the eventual recovery from such desire. In Dravot's case, Alexander the Great replaces Amadis of Gaul as the mediator of desire. As with Don Quixote mediation is once again external, for Dravot comes to view Alexander literally as "the god with the human face."

In describing the relationship between Kipling's story and Huston's film, Hammen can be taken to speak for many critics when he asserts that with only relatively minor exceptions Huston remains loyal to Kipling's conception of the story (Hammen 1985, 130).¹⁶ Such analysis is reductive, however, since it elides at least one essential difference between the two works, which concerns the nature of Dravot's imitation of Alexander. In Kipling's story, Alexander is mentioned only three times and always in the context of the unsuccessful and ultimately fatal act of imposture I have just described. In Huston's version, Alexander is a dominant presence from the moment that Dravot and Carnehan first learn of

his exploits from Rudyard Kipling himself, who stands in for the unnamed narrator of the short story and warns the two of the dangers attending their proposed journey into Kafiristan:

Kipling: You're both out of your minds. To start with, the only way to get there [to Kafiristan] is through Afghanistan . . . No white man has ever been there and come out since Alexander.

Carnehan: Alexander who?

Kipling: Alexander the Great. King of Greece . . .

Carnehan: Well, if a Greek can do it, we can do it . . . If one of us gets into trouble, the other one will stay by him.

As Kipling leaves his office for the night, first making the two promise not to burn down the building with their cigars, Carnehan peruses the books in the office library. From there he recites additional details about Alexander's life for the benefit of Danny and also for an audience likely to be unschooled in the details of ancient Greek history. Carnehan reads haltingly about Kafiristan, mispronouncing names that are obviously strange to him:

Carnehan: Kafiristan . . . Religion unknown. Population unknown. Conquered by Alexander in 328 B.C. According to Herioditus [*sic*], he defeated King Oxyartes, whose daughter Roxanne he subsequently took to wife.

As in Kipling's story, Danny and Peachy, having been previously schooled in the art of imposture through their various adventures in India, feign the madness of a crazy priest and his servant for the first leg of the journey into Afghanistan. So far the film features only cases of imitation in the Platonic sense. Yet while Kipling passes quickly over the details of the passage into Kafiristan, Huston incorporates into his film striking panoramic shots of the rugged landscape through which the two travel. In the process, he foreshadows the mimetic desire that will soon play a major part in the film. Dravot falls victim to snow blindness in the wintry mountains, and for much of the journey he must be led along the way by Peachy, who steadfastly lives up to the terms of the contract, whereby "If one of us gets into trouble, the other one will stay by him." Looked at retrospectively from the perspective of events in the second half of the film, the scene might remind some—the classicists in the audience at least—of the blind Oedipus being led along by his devoted daughter Antigone,¹⁷

for Danny also will soon come to see himself as the elect of fate, specially chosen to carry out a divinely ordained mission. A more concrete parallel, however, can be discerned in the adventures of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. In perhaps the novel's most famous incident, the blindness of mimetic desire inflicting Don Quixote leads him to attack windmills that he mistakenly sees as giants that must be conquered.¹⁸ In a similar incident not found in Kipling's story, Danny and Peachy shoot at large statues in the snowy mountains, which they also mistake for giants. To be more precise, Peachy does the shooting, since Danny suffers from the snow blindness that prefigures the blindness of mimetic desire that will afflict him later in Kafiristan.

As Danny and Peachy go about the job of building their empire in Kafiristan, Danny is wounded by the shot from an enemy arrow, but he comes to no harm because the arrow lodges in his bandolier. For this reason, Danny is identified by the natives as a god and the son of their long-absent king Sikander, Alexander the Great. To the accompaniment of cries of "Sikander, Sikander," Billy Fish, who acts as interpreter for Danny and Peachy among the Kafirs, explains the identification the natives are making:

- Billy:* Sikander a god. Come here long ago from the West.
Danny: Yeah, that'll be the Greek bloke Brother Kipling told us about.
Peachy: Alexander?
Billy: Alexander, Sikander . . . He builded great city, Sikandergul, high in mountains. Sit on throne. All peoples worship him. Then one day, time comes, he say he must go East. People pull their hair out, tear clothes. So Sikander promise to send back son.
Peachy: 328 B.C. The encyclopedia said.
Billy: Soldiers saw arrow go into Danny's chest . . . So, son of Sikander.
Danny: They think I'm a god?
Peachy: A god! Put your big foot out that I might kiss your big toe!
Danny: You may kiss my royal arse!

This mirthful interlude continues until Peachy suggests that Danny pretend to be the son of Sikander; however, in a clever plot twist not found in Kipling's story, Danny's impersonation gradually turns into identification with this son of Sikander and, consequently, with Alexander himself. First, Danny meets a beautiful young woman, unnamed in Kipling's story but here called Roxanne, whom he decides to marry. (Roxanne, of course, was the wife of Alexander the Great, whom the conqueror mar-

ried in the wilds of northern Afghanistan.) When Danny is summoned to a meeting with the high priest of Sikandergul, he jokes: “You mortals wait here.” When the high priest acknowledges him as Sikander’s son, since he wears around his neck an image of the Masonic symbol left at Sikan-dergul centuries ago by Alexander, Danny is dressed in white robes, crowned with a golden crown, and as Peachy looks on with growing suspicion, he begins in earnest the job of living a derivatively royal life of imitation, exercising rule over his subjects and making judgments regarding their various disputes and transgressions. He even asks that Peachy bow before him like everyone else—at this point claiming to be making the suggestion only for the sake of appearances. After the passage of winter, however, when spring comes and the mountain passes are clear for travel, Peachy says that they should take the money and leave Kafiristan, the original goal of their becoming kings there. But Danny refuses to leave his kingdom, since he now imagines himself actually to be Sikander II and Alexander his real—not, as in Kipling, merely a sup-positious—father. His marriage to Roxanne is intended to sire a further legitimate successor in the line of Alexander. This new Roxanne will be “a queen to breed a king’s son for the king”—words spoken as part of a strategy of imposture in Kipling’s story and repeated in Huston’s film in dead earnest. In the film’s most fascinating scene, Sean Connery delivers a speech in the character of Danny Dravot that, while appearing rather dry and jumbled on the printed page, sounds almost Shakespearean when delivered by Connery. It deserves quotation, at least in part:

Danny: I ain’t going, Peachy.

Peachy: What? . . . Have you gone barmy?

Danny: No, I ain’t been drinking neither. I see things clear. It’s like bandages have been removed from my eyes. Have you ever walked into a strange room, and it’s like you’ve been there before? . . . This isn’t the first time I’ve worn a crown. There’s more to this than meets the eye. It all adds up . . . More than chance has been at work here . . . One more thing is needful for my destiny to be fulfilled. That I take her [Roxanne] to wife . . . A queen to breed a king’s son for the king . . . The contract only lasted until such time as we was kings, and king I’ve been these months past! The first king here since Alexander, the first to wear his crown in 2,200 and . . . 14 years. Him, and now me. *They call me his son and I am, in spirit anyway* [my emphasis]. It’s a huge responsibility . . . It’s big, I tell you. It’s big.

Peachy: And, I tell you, you need a physic!

Danny has come to believe the illusion he has created for himself under the influence of others. What began as mimesis in the sense of Platonic impersonation here takes the form of mimetic desire. The Dravot of Kipling's tale exerts himself in pursuit of a kingdom and riches, and though he fails to achieve his ends, remaining throughout the story only a man who *would be* king, he seems properly to exemplify Girard's conception of desire according to the self. Kipling's Dravot remains throughout an example of the "passionate" man, as Girard describes that figure. In Huston's film, however, Dravot exemplifies the "impassioned" subject, with Alexander serving as his external mediator, a "god with a human face." Yet what Girard treats as a metaphor is consummated here as literal truth when applied to Dravot's relationship to Alexander the Great, since Alexander is actually treated as a god. Finding his mediator in Alexander, Dravot desires to become great just like Alexander—Danny Dravot the Great—and also, like Alexander, a god. His desire thus becomes a caricature of what motivated the journey to Kafiristan in the first place, mimetic desire transforming him from a man who would be king to a man who would be the son of Alexander, a man who would be god.

Both Cervantes' novel and Huston's film are concerned with dispelling at the hour of death the illusions created through the operation of mimetic desire. At the end of his life, Danny renounces the attempt to become another Alexander and a god: "Peachy," he says, "I'm heartily ashamed for getting you killed instead of going home rich like you deserved to be on account of me being so bleedin' high and bloody minded. Can you forgive me?" At the conclusion of the film, Peachy puts the final seal on their friendship by forgiving his close friend and lifelong companion immediately before Danny falls literally into the abyss, where once again Girard's metaphor, the abyss into which the impassioned subject falls, is realized as literal truth. Finally, Girard's description of the consequences of renouncing mimetic desire at the moment of death applies not only to Don Quixote but equally well to Danny Dravot: "Deception gives way to truth, anguish to remembrance, agitation to repose, hatred to love, humiliation to humility, mediated desire to autonomy, deviated transcendency to vertical transcendency" (Girard 1966, 294). Girard's *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel* (1966) analyzes the concept of mimetic desire as manifested in extreme form in works of fiction. One of the few passages where he speaks in more global terms about the occurrence of the emotion in the everyday lives of ordinary people occurs when he remarks in passing: "The distance between Don Quixote and the petty bourgeois victim of advertising is not so great as romanticism

would have us believe” (Girard 1966, 31).¹⁹ The distance separating Don Quixote from the victim of advertising represents exactly the distance separating Huston’s fictional Dravot from the historical Josiah Harlan, another imitator of Alexander the Great in still a third sense of the word “imitation.” Harlan’s experience of mimetic desire took the form of the more commonplace emotion that Girard later came to analyze as a universal human phenomenon.

Mimetic desire remains a central concern running through all of Girard’s later work, but his treatment of the topic undergoes a number of changes, both substantive and rhetorical. Without dissociating himself from his early views on mimetic desire as it pertains to the psychology of characters in the novel, Girard later elides the distinction between the passionate man of true desire and the impassioned subject of mimetic desire. He argues, “We must understand that desire itself is essentially mimetic, directed toward an object desired by the model” (1977, 146). In other words, people as they experience desire are all now to be treated as impassioned by nature; there are no passionate subjects. As the concept of mimetic desire is thus extended to cover the full range of human desire, just so the mediator is demoted from the status of a single significant figure and becomes instantiated, first of all, in the voices of all the grown-ups who surround a child, most especially in the voices of the mother and father, all of whom “exclaim in a variety of accents, ‘Imitate us!’ ‘Imitate me!’” (Girard 1977, 147). The future orientation of a child’s desires—that is, the choice of future models—is affected in great part by the models of his childhood, which determine the shape of his or her personality (147–48). No longer does Girard describe the life governed by mimetic desire as “false, theatrical and artificial” (1966, 79), requiring a deathbed conversion for the restoration of sanity. Instead, even as he universalizes the concept of mimetic desire and multiplies the number of influential mediators present in every human life, Girard views mimetic desire as an essential component in the development of a mature moral outlook. Mimetic desire is now seen as the royal road to autonomy rather than an obstacle in its path. “Without mimetic desire,” Girard says (2001, 15), “there would be neither freedom nor humanity. Mimetic desire is intrinsically good.” Josiah Harlan offers a case study of the imitation of Alexander the Great that takes shape as an example of mimetic desire in this less acute and universal form. In Girard’s terms, the mediation is once again external: Harlan looked up to Alexander almost as a god.

Harlan would be little known today were it not for the recent publication of a biography of the adventurer (Macintyre 2004).²⁰ Harlan was

the man who would be king in Afghanistan, like Alexander, fully a half-century before Rudyard Kipling wrote his famous short story. The geographical setting in which Harlan's adventures took place was an Afghanistan that closely resembled the country invaded by Alexander more than two millennia earlier—and also the Afghanistan of today. It was, then as now, an unstable region characterized by “parochialism, tribalism, fierce independence, and mutual hostility” (Holt 2005, 10).²¹ Harlan sought to realize his ambition of becoming a king by serving at one time or another in the employ of almost all the major players in the struggle for power that took place in Afghanistan during the first half of the nineteenth century.²² Maharaja Ranjit Singh, ruler of the Punjab, wished to extend his rule westward into Afghanistan. At the same time, Shah Shuja al-Moolk, who had been forced into exile in British-controlled India, sought to return to the major Afghan city of Kabul in order to reclaim his throne, which was currently being occupied by his main rival for power, Dost Mohammed Khan, the man who had deposed him. Meanwhile, on the further outskirts of Afghanistan, the Russians to the north and the British to the east eyed each other warily and were poised to embark upon the imperialistic conflict between the two powers for supremacy in Central Asia that Rudyard Kipling was the first to name “the Great Game.”

Harlan was born of Quaker parents in Chester County, Pennsylvania, in 1799. While still a young man, he emigrated from the United States and arrived in India in 1824. Though lacking formal medical training, he signed on as a surgeon with the East India Company as the British prepared to make war against Burma. At the conclusion of the first Anglo-Burmese War, Harlan sought to enlist in the service of Ranjit Singh in Lahore but was rebuffed. He then entered into alliance with the deposed Shah Shuja al-Moolk. Harlan's plan was to restore the shah to his throne in Kabul and in return gain for himself a measure of the royal power. As a means to this end, he disguised himself for the journey into Afghanistan as a Muslim holy man (a “fake fakir”: Macintyre 2004, 101). There he intended to link up with forces still loyal to the deposed shah and with their help overthrow Dost Mohammed Khan.²³ Only a very few Europeans—and no Americans—had ever set foot in Kabul in the modern period before Harlan's arrival there.²⁴ Finding Dost Mohammed Khan too strong to be deposed, Harlan turned back to Lahore, where this time he was favorably received by the maharaja. Eventually feeling himself ill-used, however, he returned once again to Kabul, this time entering the service of Dost Mohammed Khan, his former enemy, who treated him

well and dispatched him northward across the Hindu Kush to secure the fealty of tribes in northern Afghanistan. Harlan blazed the trail into northern Afghanistan which would later be followed in fiction by Dravot and Carnehan, a perilous winter venture over the mountains during which the snow blindness that afflicted Dravot in Huston's film—but not in Kipling's story—was a common occurrence. In northern Afghanistan (Dravot's Kafirstan), Harlan, like Dravot, finally achieved his goal: the natives proclaimed him king (Macintyre 2004, 227).²⁵ Soon, however, Harlan was forced to leave Afghanistan in the wake of the British invasion of the country in 1838.²⁶ Before finally returning to America, where he served as an officer of the Union in the Civil War, Harlan briefly visited Russia, apparently hoping without success to serve the czar in the Great Game. He died in 1871 in San Francisco, where once again, as in the India of his youth, he had taken up the practice of medicine. While this short summary of a long and adventuresome life might seem to betoken a man lacking stable principles or transcendent goals and values, Harlan remained consistently loyal to the exemplum of Alexander the Great, who served as his (external) mediator in the sense of the term that characterizes Girard's later work.

Though born of pacifist Quaker parents, Harlan seems for the most part to have ignored their voices, exclaiming "Imitate us!" Rather, regardless of whose interests he happened to be serving at a given moment, he paid heed to the voice of Alexander, exclaiming "Imitate me!" From boyhood and throughout his long and active life—even during the years of contemplation back in America during which he published his memoirs—Alexander always remained Harlan's idol and the mediator of his desire. Macintyre gives due weight to his lifelong obsession: "He could recite long passages from Plutarch's *The Age of Alexander*, and he carried a copy of *The History of Alexander* by Quintus Curtius Rufus throughout his travels" (Macintyre 2004, 11). Curtius's history served as a kind of mirror in which Harlan could see reflected the developing contours of his own life. Indeed, he treated Curtius with the kind of regard that Alexander demonstrated toward Homer.²⁷ Perhaps in order to associate himself in his imagination still further with Alexander, Harlan joined the Society of Masons before embarking for a life of adventure in Central Asia, for in the nineteenth century there was a widespread belief, reflected in both Kipling's story and Huston's film, that Freemasonry was early introduced into Greece from Egypt and played an important role in the development of Greek religion and philosophy at least from the time of Pythagoras (Cross 1865, 213–31).²⁸ Whether entering Afghanistan

for the first time and devising strategies for defeating the enemies who stood in his way, or even in matters of love, Harlan seems invariably to have imitated Alexander the Great.²⁹ When after his adventures he came to write his memoirs, Harlan repeatedly professed his high regard for Alexander. “In seven years,” he wrote, “Alexander performed feats that have consecrated his memory amongst the benefactors of mankind, and impressed the stamp of civilization on the face of the known world” (Harlan 1842, 65). With such an attitude of reverence for his mediator-hero, Harlan drew the conclusion that Alexander’s conquest of Afghanistan was “a blessing to succeeding generations,” for he introduced the refinements of the various civilized arts and sciences to countries “exhausted by luxury or still rude in the practice of barbarism” (Harlan 1842, 62). Alexander was “the universal philanthropist no less than universal conqueror,” the possessor of a “divine mind” (Harlan 1842, 63). Harlan understood Alexander’s acquisition of empire in the same light in which he viewed the nineteenth-century expansion of the United States; both were seen as examples of a moral force bringing enlightenment in their wake (Harlan 1842, 21). Viewing Afghanistan almost as ground sanctified by its ancient conqueror, Harlan seems to have regarded Alexander in the light of a biblical type-figure, in relation to whom he was filling the role of modern antitype.³⁰

By any objective standard, Harlan can only be viewed—to borrow the phrase quoted above from Oscar Wilde—as a faint echo of Alexander’s music, much like Danny Dravot in Huston’s film. (For Kipling’s Dravot, however, kinship with Alexander was only a pose adopted to meet the larcenous needs of the moment.) Nevertheless, rather than requiring a restoration to sanity from a case of mimetic desire, Harlan actually developed a more mature and humane moral outlook through contact with his mediator. Alexander remained always the wellspring of his autonomy, freedom, and humanity, much as Girard in his later work describes mediators as often exercising a positive moral force. Though he arrived in Afghanistan imbued with notions of Western cultural superiority, Harlan gradually came to embrace the alien civilization he there encountered; he took to wearing Afghan clothes, speaking the language, and respecting the traditions of the people (Macintyre 2004, 251). Like Alexander—or at least as he was viewed in the eyes of his troops—Harlan “went native” while he lived in Afghanistan.³¹

Can anything be said in this context about the desires of Alexander the Great, mediator for Josiah Harlan and (Huston’s) Danny Dravot? Girard is helpful on this point. He claims in his later work, discussed

above, that a mediator, no matter how self-sufficient in appearance, always assumes the role of disciple in relation to others (Girard 1977, 147). The life of Alexander—at least as depicted by the historian Arrian—illustrates this point nicely. According to Arrian, Alexander often experienced the effects of a desire (πόθος) that took possession of him at certain critical moments in his life. I want to suggest in conclusion that Alexander’s desire (πόθος) was, on certain occasions at least, clearly mimetic (μιμητικός). In his case, however, the mediation was *internal*, Alexander engaging in mimetic rivalry with his mediators, in *aemulatio*.³² Among his major mimetic rivals, Achilles, Heracles, Perseus, and Dionysus figure most prominently.

In Arrian’s history, desire is naturally a universal human experience and is often expressed through use of the noun *pothos* and its derivatives. Thus, for example, the Macedonians, tired from endless campaigning, are described as experiencing the desire (πόθος...ποθοῦντες, *Anab.* 5.27.6) to return home to their families. At the scene of their king’s death, the soldiers have a desire (πόθου, *Anab.* 7.26.1) to see him once more. In the case of Alexander alone, however, Arrian employs a special expression that functions with little variation just like a Homeric formula, recurring in the description of a number of his particularly ambitious undertakings. On these occasions, *pothos* is said to “take hold of” (λαμβάνειν) or, with less frequency, to “hold” (ἔχειν) the king, consigning Alexander to the object position in the sentence.³³ Alexander, that most restless and active of ancient conquerors, is on these occasions depicted as the passive victim of overmastering desire. Whether the *pothos* motif originated with Alexander and reflected how he chose to present himself or rather was the literary conceit of later historians, what we might call *comparatio*,³⁴ its recurrence in such formulaic fashion achieves the effect of presenting the king in the light he most preferred, as a Homeric hero (Carney 2000, 275). Homer often presents passions and feelings as “taking hold of” (λαμβάνειν) his heroes in the way Arrian describes *pothos* taking hold of Alexander. For example, anger takes hold of Agamemnon early in the *Iliad* (χόλος λάβε, *Il.* 1.387).³⁵ While the operation of a mimetic *pothos* aroused by the exemplum of Achilles can only be inferred in Arrian’s history from the depiction of Alexander’s intense rivalry (φιλοτιμία, *Anab.* 7.14.4) with the Homeric hero,³⁶ the historian sometimes attributes a specifically mimetic quality to the king’s *pothos*. Thus *pothos* takes hold of the king (πόθος λαμβάνει, 3.3.1) and directs him to visit the shrine of Ammon in Egypt and to consult the oracle there. The visit is said to spring directly from rivalry (φιλοτιμία, 3.3.2) with Heracles and Perseus,

the former having visited the shrine when on his way to Libya and the latter when he was proceeding against the Gorgon. Later, *pothos* takes hold of Alexander (πόθος λαμβάνει, 4.28.4) and leads him to lay siege to Aornus because of the legend that not even Heracles had been able to capture this rock (4.30.4). Later still, Alexander was seized by a *pothos* (πόθος ἔλαβεν, 5.2.5) to visit the city Nysa, which was supposed to have been founded by Dionysus, in order to see the place where the inhabitants displayed memorials to the god. Having accomplished this visit, Alexander could then say that he had already reached the furthest place the god had reached and had proceeded even further. His motive was “eager rivalry” (ζῆλον, 5.2.1) with Dionysus. Alexander appears to have sought to rival Dionysus not only in distance traversed but also in terms of cities founded. True, the *pothos* that seized Alexander (πόθος λαμβάνει, 3.1.5) and led to the foundation of the great city of Alexandria in Egypt is not specifically attributed by Arrian to mimetic rivalry. Nevertheless, the Nysaeans later beg the king to spare their city out of respect for Dionysus. After all, they say, Alexander has already founded an Alexandria by Mount Caucasus and another Alexandria in Egypt, so that he has given clear proof of achievements that surpass even those of a god (5.1.5).

Evidence for the greatness of Alexander can be found not only in the frequency with which he served as the mediator of desire for those who came centuries later, such as John Huston’s Danny Dravot and Josiah Harlan, but also in the way he strove in rivalry to surpass those who preceded him centuries earlier, whether they be gods or mortals.

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Notes

¹ For a recent account of the legends and legacies of Alexander, see Cartledge 2004, 251–66.

² I speak throughout this essay of Afghanistan as a country, though its geographical borders were not drawn until the end of the nineteenth century, years after the events of concern in this essay took place; see Tanner 2002, 5–6. Even today, "Afghanistan has no center to speak of, and no clear edges": Holt 2005, 21.

³ Following the work of J. S. Richardson, Peter Green distinguishes among *imitatio*, *comparatio*, and *aemulatio*. While *imitatio* may be attributed to the imitator himself or herself, *comparatio* is *imitatio* deduced or described by some third party. *Aemulatio* occurs when an effort is made to rival or surpass a model (Green 1989, 193–209). In these terms, as we will see, the two Dravots and Josiah Harlan practiced *imitatio* proper, while Alexander the Great seems to have carried out acts of *aemulatio* in relation to his models, whose exploits he clearly sought to rival and even surpass.

⁴ Kafiristan (“Land of the Infidels”) is the region in northeastern Afghanistan that remained independent until it was subdued by Rahman Khan and converted to Islam in 1896, almost a decade after Kipling wrote his story.

⁵ Kipling 1994, 239.

⁶ The reader may perhaps infer from this statement that the craft of Masonry was supposed to have been brought to Kafiristan by Alexander the Great. Huston makes the connection between Alexander and the Society of Masons clearer in his film.

The belief in a lost world of Hellenistic Afghanistan, peopled by descendants of Alexander the Great, was prominent in the nineteenth century when Kipling wrote his story. Modern archaeology has confirmed that belief, while stripping away much of its romantic element: Holt 2005, 149–64.

⁷ The word I translate here as “manner” covers a wide range of significances, including “shape,” “form,” “gesture,” “appearance,” “role,” and “form of speech”; see Rabel 1996, 366.

⁸ Not all commentators understand Platonic *mimēsis* as impersonation. Thus Annas (1981, 94–101), for example, thinks that in book 3 Plato uses the word *mimēsis* to mean not impersonation but rather representation.

⁹ Girard has sometimes been accused of failing to acknowledge the influence of Plato on his theory of mimetic desire, a criticism that he tries unsuccessfully, I think, to counter; see Girard 1987, 15–17.

¹⁰ Lord Henry continues with the argument that all influence is immoral: “Because to influence a person is to give him one’s own soul. He does not think his natural thoughts, or burn with his natural passions. His virtues are not real to him. His sins, if there are such things as sins, are borrowed.”

¹¹ Such a condition of internal mediation, resulting in rivalry, would be productive of the type of action Green calls *aemulatio* (Green 1989, 193–209, and note 3 above).

¹² In this essay, I will be concerned primarily with examples of external mediation, where the mediator is worshipped as “the god with the human face” (Girard 1966, 61). In the conclusion, however, I will briefly discuss the case of Alexander the Great himself, whose relationship to his primary mediators involved internal mediation, sparking intense rivalry.

¹³ In part 1, chapter 6, the priest and the barber burn the books dealing with a whole host of Don Quixote’s heroes (Cervantes 2003, 45–52). In part 1, chapter 1, Don Quixote admires his horse Rocinante, which seems to outshine in beauty even the Bucephalus of Alexander (Cervantes 2003, 22).

¹⁴ Part 2, chapter 74 (Cervantes 2003, 937).

¹⁵ The quotation here is from a remark of Franz Kafka, cited in Bloom 2004, 82–83. Neither Kafka nor Bloom, it should be noted, analyzes Don Quixote as a victim of mimetic desire.

¹⁶ Kaminsky (1978, 199–201) considers the differences between Kipling’s story

and Huston's film on the level of plot. For example, Rudyard Kipling, played by Christopher Plummer, appears as the newspaper correspondent in the film, whereas Kipling's narrator remains unnamed in the short story. I am concerned with differences between story and film on the level of character, a subject that, to my knowledge, has yet to be treated.

¹⁷ Oedipus is one of Girard's favorite literary examples of the destructive effects of mimetic desire (Girard 1977, 169–92). While I see no evidence that Huston borrowed from Girard in the construction of his film, his depiction of the fate of Danny Dravot, as we will see, provides striking evidence of the presence of mimetic desire in film, a subject that deserves further exploration. In Huston's films, characters frequently aspire to become someone else, and such aspiration always has disastrous consequences (Brill 1997, 39).

¹⁸ See Cervantes 2003, 58–65 (pt. 1, ch. 8).

¹⁹ Modern advertisements for milk sometimes feature characters like Yoda of *Star Wars* fame, sporting a milk moustache. These advertisements, I suppose, are trying to convince us that we should want to drink milk not for its many virtues but because wise figures like Yoda drink it.

²⁰ The summary of Harlan's life given below is much indebted to Macintyre 2004 and also to Tanner 2002, though the latter makes no mention of Harlan's role in the complex intrigues revolving around Afghanistan in the first half of the nineteenth century.

²¹ Holt (2005) emphasizes the unchanging nature of the country and its people from the time of Alexander until the present day.

²² The exception is Persia, which threatened Afghanistan from the west. Harlan seems never to have contemplated working in the interest of Persia.

²³ Harlan's impersonation of a Muslim holy man anticipated and perhaps influenced how Kipling describes Danny Dravot's journey into Afghanistan in the guise of a native priest.

²⁴ The anonymous referee points out to me that this assertion of Macintyre's is "hard to believe and hard to prove." Macintyre (2004, 81–120) provides an amusing account of Harlan's exploits and intrigues along the road to Kabul.

²⁵ BBC News reports on Hollywood actor Scott Reiniger, star of the film *Dawn of the Dead* and a descendant of Josiah Harlan, who found out after the publication of Macintyre's book that he was the holder of the hereditary title "Prince of Ghor." See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3750931.stm> (25 October 2006).

²⁶ Harlan's subsequent animus against the British permeates his published memoir (1842). The book is remarkable for the animus of its personal attacks on various British explorers and soldiers with whom Harlan had become acquainted during his years in India and Afghanistan. Harlan now saw Russia as the only power capable of checking British designs for control of Afghanistan.

²⁷ Alexander's "attitude to war was fundamentally Homeric. . . . He slept with two things beneath his pillow: a dagger and a well-thumbed copy of the *Iliad*": Green 1991, 92.

²⁸ For Harlan's interest in Masonry, see Macintyre 2004, 12, though Macintyre leaves unexplained Harlan's reasons for joining the Masons.

²⁹ For Harlan's thoughts of Alexander on first entering Afghanistan, see Macintyre 2004, 65. Harlan sought out links between the names of the regions through which he

traveled and the places mentioned in Plutarch and Curtius, and he lamented the absence of architectural monuments from Alexander's time. The waters of the Indus aroused thoughts of Alexander in his mind (Macintyre 2004, 66). When confronting enemies in his path, he usually borrowed tactics from Curtius's account of Alexander's march through the East (Macintyre 2004, 68, 69, 73, 81, 146, 147, 210–12, 220, 231–32). Meeting an Afghan named Sikandar, he felt himself transported back to Alexander's time (Macintyre 2004, 104–5). Unable to make use of elephants while crossing the Hindu Kush, Harlan took consolation from the fact that even Alexander had to leave his elephants behind near Kandahar before ascending the Hindu Kush. Macintyre even suggests that Harlan fell in love in the northern regions beyond the Hindu Kush in imitation of Alexander (Macintyre 2004, 224–27).

³⁰ For Harlan's view of Afghanistan as holy ground, see Macintyre 2004, 66. Macintyre's source here is an unpublished handwritten manuscript (Harlan, n.d.) lodged not in the Chester County Archives, Pennsylvania, as Macintyre says, but rather at the Chester County Historical Society. Macintyre has done scholarship a service by deciphering it in part. There Harlan waxes rhapsodic: "To look for the first time upon the furthest stream that had borne upon its surface the world's victor two thousand years ago. To gaze upon the landscape he had viewed. To tread upon the earth where Alexander bled. To stand upon that spot where the wounded hero knelt exhausted when pierced by the arrows of the barbarians."

³¹ So Holt 2005, 114, citing Arrian, *Anab.* 7.6.5.

³² For this term, see Green 1989 and n. 3 above.

³³ Cf. *An.* 1.3.5, 2.3.1, 3.1.5, 3.3.1, 4.28.4, 5.2.5, 7.16.2. At *Ind.* 20.1.2, the expression is slightly different: πόθον εἶναι Ἀλεξάνδρου. The variation in this example of the *pothos* motif seems to arise from the fact that Arrian is here quoting in indirect discourse from the account of Nearchus.

³⁴ See Green 1989 and note 3 above.

³⁵ See also *Il.* 3.34, 4.230, 5.394, 11.402, 14.475, 17.695, 23.468, 24.480.

³⁶ For the details of this rivalry, see Lane Fox 1973, 61ff.; Palagia 2000, 193.