The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the Mid-1870s (review)

For decades scholars have variously ascribed the “war in sight” crisis of 1875 to overzealous journalists, to Prussia’s flawed record of civil-military relations (which they project onto unified Germany), or to an uncharacteristic diplomatic misstep on the part of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In this exhaustive and original study, James Stone rejects those interpretations and argues instead that the crisis was at once the product of Bismarck’s “German and European Kulturkampf ” (9), as well as an attempt to implement a “containment” (86–87) policy aimed at countering any future French war of revenge. To achieve that objective, Bismarck pursued a consistent foreign policy toward France, aimed at both consolidating a republican regime in Paris and preventing a return of the French monarchy. That policy was, of course, purely tactical: Bismarck calculated that a French republic would not be an attractive ally to conservative powers like Austria-Hungary or Russia. In practical terms, his strategy was designed to undermine the position of French President Patrice de MacMahon by applying German pressure, through diplomacy and the “reptile” press, to force the proto-royalist regime in Paris to act against the interests of its main political supporters: the army and the Catholic clergy.

A significant strength of the book is its discussion of the international context of Bismarck’s French policy. Stone’s striking conclusion is that that policy was aimed not so much against France as against a potential alliance of aggrieved Catholic powers. While historians have often questioned the sincerity of Bismarck’s anti-Catholic pronouncements (this was true of his contemporary liberal critics as well), Stone detects a pattern in the Chancellor’s thinking: linking the “containment” policy against France with Bismarck’s concerns about a revival of clerical influence in Austria-Hungary, he makes the case that the chancellor viewed a possible restoration of the French monarchy as a potential foundation for an anti-German, international alliance of the defeated Catholic powers of 1866 and 1871. This portrayal of the Kulturkampf as an instrument of an integrated Bismarckian policy combining nation-building at home with German support for secularizing programs in Italy, Belgium, Austria, and France has considerable explanatory power.

Stone gives us much to ponder about German domestic power relationships, suggesting that the Chancellor’s handling of the crisis demands revision of the usual interpretation of civil-military relations in the new Kaiserreich. Despite Bismarck’s later denials, Stone sees his imprimatur in every aspect of the crisis: in particular, in the continuing semi-official press articles warning of warlike French intentions and anti-German clerical conspiracies in Austria. Of greater significance, he argues that Bismarck actually exploited the army as a tool of diplomacy, thus reversing “the problematic interaction between ‘sword and scepter’” (343). In line with the recent biography by Jonathan Steinberg (Bismarck: A Life [Oxford UP, 2011]), Stone stresses Bismarck’s skillful personal manipulation of friends, enemies, and rivals in managing the crisis. In this reading, the author proposes that Bismarck successfully manipulated Kaiser Wilhelm I, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, and Helmuth von Moltke, recruiting them all to play assigned roles in managing the crisis. Stone concludes: “The stereotypical picture of political leaders resisting war mongers in the Ministry of War or the General Staff clearly needs to be revised” (344). Stone similarly insists that Bismarck viewed Alsace-Lorraine as “the modern equivalent of Silesia” and regarded its annexation as vital to German security, given “his unshakeable belief that another war with France was unavoidable” (48–49).

Political historians will find several of the author’s propositions intriguing, but perhaps a little perplexing. Scholars of German liberalism might consider Stone’s tendency to view the Kulturkampf as simply a pendant to foreign policy as somewhat overstated. It is notable as well that the book provides a more thorough discussion of French and Austrian domestic politics than it does of German politics. Although Stone alludes...