Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress

Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress Payam Akhavan Faculty of Law, McGill University; formerly Legal Advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY–ICTR, The Hague As scholars and advocates, we are formidable taxonomists and explorers of distinctions, ever probing new conceptual frontiers in the elusive quest to render an overwhelming universe of human struggle more coherent and manageable. The proliferation of terminology, however, the incantation of new strategic mantras, while obviously relevant to the legal and political construction of the world, can often become a self-contained exercise creating the mere illusion of progress. In some circumstances, it can even divert precious resources away from the consolidation of existing, and hard-won, norms and institutions. In considering the introduction of the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the already complex lexicon of humanitarian discourse, we need to take account of its relative weight in terms of the most important challenges confronting the prevention of genocide. In particular, we need to ask whether the cost–benefit calculus of promoting this new concept and purported discipline justifies a significant commitment of energy and resources, whether intellectual or political, that might otherwise be focused on strengthening established concepts and disciplines that may be adequate but still at the margins of political consciousness. While I have the utmost respect and admiration for David Scheffer’s unique contributions to the prevention and punishment of genocide and crimes against humanity, I have misgivings about the relative weight and importance that he assigns to ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ as a useful instrument for promoting this cause. The argument that the loaded term ‘‘genocide’’ intimidates states from responding effectively must be assessed against the fact that alternative categorizations have only marginal impact on meaningful action where there is a failure of political will. Are we to conclude, for instance, that US willingness to characterize the Darfur situation as ‘‘genocide’’ resulted in a more robust response compared to Rwanda, where there was reluctance to use this term? Or, conversely, that if the term ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ had been used in an early-warning context, there would have been greater preventive engagement on the part of the United Nations prior to escalation into genocidal violence? Furthermore, the newly established mandate of the UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide clearly indicates that a prior legal determination that acts constitute genocide or crimes of comparable gravity is not required for preventive action. With the gradual mainstreaming of this mandate in the UN system, it is increasingly understood that there is a distinction between ‘‘genocide’’ and ‘‘prevention of genocide.’’ In any event, to the extent that conceptual categorization has an appreciable impact in a preventive context, there is evidence that the elevated status of genocide or crimes of comparable gravity has justified prioritization of certain situations amidst the multitude of issues clamoring for global attention. A safer, more diluted concept such as ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ may actually undermine such privileged treatment. Even assuming that a less intimidating concept is required, Payam Akhavan, ‘‘Proliferation of Terminology and the Illusion of Progress.’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2, 1 (April 2007): 73–80. ß 2007 Genocide Studies and Prevention. there is no compelling reason not to use well-established and easily recognized terms such as ‘‘gross’’ or ‘‘large-scale’’ human-rights violations, which are standards applied in different contexts for prioritizing international scrutiny of certain situations by UN bodies. If anything, restricting ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ to the elementary category of war crimes while not including the broader category of human-rights violations falsely and dangerously assumes that abuses in situations not amounting to a state of war or armed conflict do not have the potential to culminate in genocide. It is also doubtful that a new concept of ‘‘atrocity crimes’’ would somehow focus the attention of the wider public and thereby mobilize opinion and encourage action. It is safe to assume that public calls for action are primarily the result of shocking contextualized images of suffering conveyed by the media, or the intimate accounts of survivors, and not of abstract legal categorization of situations. The bottom line is that what we need most is not a conceptual or rhetorical magic bullet but, rather, a greater focus on integrating and...