Atomic Scientists and Hollywood: The Beginning or the End?

ATOMIC SCIENTISTS AND HOLLYWOOD: THE BEGINNING OR THE END? By Michael J. Yavenditti Michael J. Yavenditti is Associate Professor ofHistoiy at Alma College m Alma, Michigan In February 1947, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) studios released a commercial film, The Beginning or the End, which offered the first movie portrait of the Manhattan Project and the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. The film not only illustrated Hollywood's desire to capitalize on post Hiroshima interest in the atomic bomb. It also grew out ofthe postwar "scientists' movement" in the United States which tried to lobby for national legislation assuring civilian control of atomic energy and to alert Americans to the need for international control of atomic energy. The Beginning or the End was an artistic failure, but the movie and the circumstances producing it are intriguing. The film reflected and reinforced contemporary American feelings that the United States was justified in building the atomic bomb and in dropping it on Japan. Although the movie conveyed a mostly favorable image of Manhattan Project scientists, the scientists were chastened and disillusioned by their collaboration with Hollywood. The scientists' venture, moreover, invites comparison between the scientists' wartime involvement in the Manhattan Project and the educational campaign of the postwar scientists' movement. World War II transformed the relationship between American science and the federal government, and the war radically altered the roles of American scientists. The Manhattan Project illustrates in extreme and not always typical form some ambiguous consequences of these changes. Vast amounts of public funds-two billion dollars in the case of the Manhattan Project—were channeled into scientific research and development. Motivated by patriotism, a desire to end the war quickly, and fear that Germany might develop the atomic bomb first, American and émigré scientists joined the largest and most secret wartime research venture. Scientists also welcomed the intellectual excitement of translating recent theoretical breakthroughs in nuclear physics into practical use. Younger scientists were glad to avoid conscription and to pursue their professional interests at government expense while working under eminent older scientists, such as Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Hans Bethel Few atomic scientists could be insensitive to the public acclaim they would receive if the Manhattan Project produced a war-ending weapon. Before the war, university-based scientists were heavily involved in basic or "pure" research. These scientists viewed themselves as disinterested researchers, finding and disseminating truth, but leaving practical applications to others. Wartime priorities, however, including development of the atomic bomb, placed main importance on breakthroughs in applied rather than basic research. As atomic scientists became de facto applied scientists, wartime success of their research, rather than advancement of man's basic knowledge, became the prime measure of their creativity. During peacetime academic scientists could acquire satisfaction, fame, and promotions by publishing the results of their work. But the extreme secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project, along with the elaborate compartmentalization that restricted the flow of information within it, 51 meant that scientists' rewards for work on the project were different. Some atomic scientists seemed to sense that only the combat use of the bomb would provide real proof of the scientists' great achievement. (1) The wartime marriage of convenience between science and government resulted in many new weapons, processes, and discoveries that hastened the Allied victory. (2) Despite the pride scientists took in these achievements and despite their assumption they served the government only for the duration, scientists resented their new dependence on Washington. They disliked the control, secrecy, and lack of freedom that wartime conditions imposed. (3) Yet few scientists expressed deep misgivings about participating in war-related projects or how the government used their discoveries to fight the war. As the scientist-administrator Vannevar Bush later explained, "If a war was on, and incendiaries were being used, [the scientists] did not hesitate to make better ones; and when it was necessary to get at the industrial production of Japan...they did not protest. "(4) Like other scientists, those on the Manhattan Project assumed that scientific advances ultimately brought progress; they did not consider themselves responsible for the use or misuse oftheir discoveries by society. (5) These assumptions were reinforced by the extreme secrecy and...