In this article the organization of early modern trade is analyzed through
a case study of the business of Hans Thijs, an Antwerp merchant who worked
in Danzig and Amsterdam in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
century. His career demonstrates how early modern merchants combined
markets, personal relations, and firms to govern their transactions. The
complementary relationships among these institutions helped to minimize
information and enforcement costs. A comparison of Hans Thijs' business
organization in Danzig (1585-1595) and in Amsterdam (1595-1611) shows that
trade was governed more efficiently in markets of greater scale and scope.
DDT (Insecticide) -- Environmental aspects -- California -- Los Angeles.
Hazardous wastes -- California -- Los Angeles.
In this article, we examine the decisions made by corporate executives
and government officials that led to the discharge with minimal treatment
of hundreds of metric tons of dichlorodiphenyl- trichloroethane (DDT)
waste into the Pacific Ocean over several decades. After World War II,
Montrose Chemical Corporation of California's Los Angeles plant began
making the new wonder pesticide, and Montrose executives worked with
local officials to develop a waste disposal system that funneled the
plant's process wastes into the county sewer system and ultimately into
the ocean. Faced with increasing scientific concern about pesticides and
a changed political climate in the 1960s, Montrose vigorously defended
DDT and relied increasingly on exports to remain profitable. Years after
the plant closed, a federal suit forced Montrose and related companies
to pay the costs of environmental cleanup.
Collective labor agreements -- Steel industry -- United States.
United Steelworkers of America.
United States -- Economic conditions -- 1945-
Most studies of labor politics in the United States focus on those
politics as they are embedded within larger electoral and national party
politics. In this article, we investigate how the relationship between
the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and steelmanufacturing firms
shaped the political economy of the Rust Belt. We show that the 1959
steel strike and subsequent collective bargaining agreements between
the USWA and the ten largest steel manufacturers in the United States
reshaped institutional labor politics and led to a greater emphasis on
negotiated pension and unemployment benefits. In turn, these institutional
commitments profoundly shaped deindustrialization. Pension and severance
benefits motivated firm managers to sustain relatively large, antiquated
steel plants and to close smaller plants in order to avoid enormous
legacy liabilities. Using theoretical insights from economic studies
of auctions, as well as historical and quantitative data, we show how
the labor agreements shaped the choices concerning, and the timing of,
mill shutdowns. We conclude that these choices help explain important
variance in the fortunes of steel towns in the Rust Belt.