How to Use Pragmatism Pragmatically?: Suggestions for the Twenty-First Century

Introduction

I am never entirely sure what those who call themselves pragmatists or who declare an affinity with pragmatism actually believe in. Pragmatists would probably respond that this is the wrong question, as what matters is not what they believe in but what they do with their beliefs—or, to be more precise, what follows from their beliefs. After all, one of the founding insights of pragmatism is Charles Peirce’s contention that different beliefs are distinguished solely “by the different modes of action to which they give rise” so that “[i]f beliefs do not differ in this respect . . . then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes.”¹ Yet even if it is granted that we should focus first and foremost on the consequences of pragmatism, it cannot be denied that pragmatism also consists of a set of beliefs such as, in John Dewey’s case, a belief in naturalism, in communication, in the scientific method, in intelligence, and in democracy. The problem is that many critics of pragmatism have focused on these beliefs rather than on the particular arguments in which these beliefs function. This has led to much misunderstanding about pragmatism, not only among critics of pragmatism but sometimes also among those who are sympathetic to pragmatism.

In this paper I wish to focus on one particular aspect of this discussion—one particular misunderstanding, so to speak—that concerns Dewey’s appreciation for the method and worldview of modern science. A superficial reading of Dewey’s work—or perhaps we should say a reading that focuses exclusively on the beliefs that can be found in Dewey’s writings—might indeed give the impression that Dewey not only endorsed the scientific method but also seemed to believe in the worldview of modern science. I wish to argue, however, that rather than a celebration of the method and worldview of modern science, Dewey’s philosophy actually amounts to a profound critique of the hegemony of modern science in contemporary life. Rather than an argument for the superiority of scientific rationality, Dewey’s philosophy can actually be seen as an attempt to develop a more encompassing and more humane conception of rationality.

Central to Dewey’s argument is the claim that if we take the procedures and findings of modern science seriously—which means taking them in their own terms rather than interpreting them with philosophical categories that were developed long before the emergence of modern science—we end up with a completely different understanding of reality and truth than what is commonly claimed about scientific knowledge, namely, that it provides us with an account of how the world really is. Reading Dewey in this way not only helps to understand why his critique of the hegemony of modern science is so effective—he begins, after all, by taking modern science seriously; it also helps to understand why discussions about the methods and views of modern science play such a central role in Dewey’s writings. But it would be a mistake to claim, as the German philosopher Max Horkheimer did in one of the most detailed discussions of Dewey’s work emerging from continental critical theory, that all this amounts to a “worship of natural sciences”² and that it makes pragmatism into a form of scientism that is actually unable to be in any sense critical of the role science plays in modern society.

Reading Dewey’s work as a critique of a particular representation of modern science and, through this, as a critique of the role that modern science appears to claim within modern society is, in my view, tremendously important if we are interested in whether Dewey’s pragmatism has anything to offer in the twenty-first century. As long as we approach Dewey’s philosophy just as a philosophy, that is, as long as we engage with his work at the level of his beliefs rather than in function of the wider problem he sought...