Abstract

Held in a virtual state of suspended animation for the past twenty years, US relations with Myanmar have received fresh scrutiny as the country undergoes a political transition from martial law to quasi-parliamentary governance. As a result, the Obama administration has fashioned a new policy of "pragmatic engagement" to balance US sanctions against Myanmar's military regime, to reinvigorate America's relations with ASEAN and to create a more flexible policy structure for fashioning US responses to a variety of possible outcomes in Myanmar's transition process. Whether this will lead to "rapprochement" between the two governments is uncertain, because the barriers to better understanding remain formidable on both sides. Furthermore, the shift in US policy over the past year has failed to produce a positive response from Naypyidaw. On the contrary, the Myanmar government's determination to manipulate the 2010 elections to disadvantage non-government parties, particularly the National League for Democracy (NLD), to pursue closer relations with North Korea and to allow rumours of a nascent nuclear weapons programme to persist have been interpreted in Washington as signs that Naypyidaw has no interest in engagement with the United States at this stage. Because US policy is influenced by a variety of constituencies both inside and outside government, the future direction of the new engagement policy will crucially depend on whether Myanmar's elections result in genuine political and economic reform. In the absence of near-term progress, those promoting further sanctions are likely to exert pressure on the US government to take new measures, such as championing an international commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity by Myanmar's current top military leaders.

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