The Bayh–Dole Act transferred to universities and government laboratories the responsibility for operationalizing the vision of Vannevar Bush's doctrine Science, the Endless Frontier (1945). Twenty-four years later, these organizations seemingly continue to struggle with incorporating this federally mandated function of "technology transfer" as an integral component of their operations. This paper examines the decision process involved in formulating and assessing an institution's technology transfer function. Several important conclusions follow from this analysis. The first is that technology transfer is a subset of the knowledge dissemination mission of research institutions, and is therefore an important part of their core mission. Another conclusion is that there are different types of new knowledge generated at research institutions that require different dissemination strategies. The five most important functions of an institutional technology transfer office are identified, three of which fall within the auspices of intellectual asset management. Finally, for institutions to maximize the public benefit of their research, they must optimize their technology transfer process. To accomplish this, each institution must embrace a clear and specific objective for their technology transfer function, and then implement technology transfer operating tactics consistent with the chosen objective.
Expert systems (Computer science) -- United States.
Computational intelligence -- Technological innovations -- United States.
Information technology -- United States -- Psychological aspects.
To gain the full value of expert systems (ES), transfer from design to application must not only ensure use of the technology but also that users are heeding the decision advice of the system. We report on a study that investigates variables relating to an intention to use an ES and acceptance of ES advice. A technology acceptance model is applied to test that perception of usefulness and whether ease of use has a strong link to the user's intent to use ES technology. A separate model of persuasion relates measures of confidence to the acceptance of the advice provided by an ES. A laboratory study of 205 student subjects utilizing a computer-selection ES served to test the two models. The study data confirmed the two models and also indicated that intent to use an ES and acceptance of the advice provided by the systems relate to different sets of variables. Organizations employing ES for crucial decisions must be alert to design an ES to build user acceptance along both psychological considerations.
Chemical industry -- Technological innovations -- United States -- History -- 20th century.
Technology transfer -- Economic aspects -- United States -- History -- 20th century.
Technology transfer -- Economic aspects -- Germany -- History -- 20th century.
Chemistry, Organic -- Economic aspects -- United States -- History -- 20th century.
This paper deals with one component of one of the major aspects of hegemonic competition, technological change achieved largely through technology transfer, in this case in the chemical industry. It deals with how the new technology of organic chemistry was created and encouraged in the late 1800s by the global textile industry's need for dyestuffs; how that technology, though invented in Britain, was developed in Germany; and how that technology was finally successfully transferred to America once its central importance to the production of explosives became obvious in World War I. It follows the argument developed by Hugill (1988, 1993) that a switch began in the late 1800s from one form of capitalist world economy to another: from one in which agro-industrial supremacy was what mattered—the argument of Wallerstein (1984)—to one in which techno-industrial supremacy became the main route to the efficiencies demanded by hegemony. It also follows Hugill's argument that software innovations in the way work is done are often more important for success in the world economy than the hardware innovations of what is actually produced (Hugill, 1993). What made the switch from the agro- to the techno-industrial world economy possible was innovation and technology transfer across a wide range of activities, although some technologies turned out to be much more critical than others.