In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life
  • Svetla Slaveva-Griffin
Daniel Russell . Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp.ix, 272. $74.00. ISBN 0-19-928284-6.

This book is important for two reasons. First, it offers a comprehensive analysis of the concept of pleasure and its relation to "the good life" (according to the philosophers) and happiness in the Euthydemus, Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic, Philebus, Laws, Timaeus, and Protagoras. This breadth makes the book one of the most complete presentations of Plato's ethics. Second, Russell proposes and defends with marked persistence the thesis that we can talk about conditional and unconditional good in Plato. That is, happiness is based on a lifestyle directed by wisdom (as an unconditional good), while pleasure is only a conditional good in need of a rational direction. This view presents an instructive perspective on the traditional debates on whether Plato is a hedonist and whether his dialogues present an integral ethical theory. Chapters 1–3 expose the evidence that Plato does not view happiness as an accumulation of pleasures ("additive happiness") but as a result of the rationality with which all elements of one's life are brought together as a whole ("directive happiness"). The answer of the latter question constructs the overarching argument of the study that one cannot talk about a developed value theory in Plato.

Chapter 1 establishes that in the Euthydemus Plato distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic goods. Wisdom and intelligent agency are among the former, while everything else which has value in one's life, including pleasure, is among the latter. Russell argues that wisdom is the only unconditional good that has the power to direct one's life as a whole, and that it constitutes what he calls "directive happiness." Chapter 2 reveals that this, indeed, is the case in the Gorgias, in which Plato allows that happiness depends only on that which is unconditionally good, and that all pleasant experiences, if they are not guided by rationality, amount only to "additive happiness." Chapter 3, then, examines pleasure as a conditional good in the Phaedo. The analysis crystallizes the distinction between the healthy and unhealthy ways of experiencing pleasure. Russell observes that this distinction is further carried by the duality of human nature and the dichotomy between "soul" and "body." Unsurprisingly, he addresses Plato's discussion of pleasure in the Republic as chapter 4 demonstrates how wisdom directs pleasure towards happiness and makes it an essential part of "the good life." Even more, the rational incorporation of pleasure, chapter 5 concludes based on the Philebus, provides the means by which we live our lives not in an otherworldly contemplation but in a rational tailoring of the nature we have. Chapter 6 goes even further to explain the seemingly paradoxical position in the Philebus that pleasure is necessary for the virtuous life and even for happiness. For Russell, Plato is no stranger to the mysterious depth of human psychology. In the last chapter, he demonstrates that Plato is aware that the reality of human nature is not straightforward and that we try either to rationalize or fight off our wayward desires. The book concludes with an epilogue exposing that even in the Protagoras Plato does not endorse hedonism [End Page 453] because it is inconsistent with the anti-hedonistic views presented elsewhere in his works.

Russell has lucidly exposed the fundamental relation between pleasure and the good life in Plato. The first six chapters contain the meat of his argument and stand in a somewhat tangible structural and conceptual opposition to chapter 7 and the epilogue. It is surprising that the section on the Protagoras has not found a place among the main chapters of the study. For example, it would be a good first chapter, providing the background of the opinions against which the rest of the book stands. It is also interesting to note that the book contributes, without an explicit mention, to the controversial view, promoted by Pierre Hadot, that ancient philosophy is simply about the way of life one should lead. The book is written in a refreshing and clever style which combines elegantly the...

pdf

Share