We Have the War upon Us: The Onset of the Civil War, November 1860–April 1861 by William J. Cooper (review)

Historians have long been fascinated by the five tense months from Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860 to the fall of Fort Sumter in April 1861. Books by Kenneth Stampp, David Potter, William Freehling, Russell McClintock, among others, as well as a plethora of biographies and state studies explore this era. If these are well-tilled fields, William J. Cooper brings a strong background and enviable reputation to the challenge of adding to that work. His books on South Carolina, southern politics, and, particularly, Jefferson Davis remain invaluable for anyone studying the sectional conflict. And like his other investigations, We Have the War upon Us rests on extensive work with primary and secondary sources and a careful attention to detail. Nonetheless, this study of those five crucial months is disappointing. Despite valuable accounts of particular episodes, Cooper’s overall interpretation, which resurrects the “blundering generation” school, remains unpersuasive.

Cooper organizes his book chronologically, with each chapter covering a few weeks—an approach with noteworthy strengths and weaknesses. Detailing the crisis step-by-step imparts a sense of immediacy and helps convey the viewpoint of participants, who did not know the outcome of their deliberations. Some of his set pieces, such as the discussion of William Seward’s struggle to reshape Lincoln’s first inaugural address, are superbly done. But Cooper’s approach also makes for a fragmented account. Discussion of the various efforts to forge a compromise are spread across many chapters, as are depictions of the groups—such as the Committee of Thirty-Three, the Committee of Thirteen, and the Peace Convention—laboring over those deals. The forest disappears amid the trees.

Moreover, Cooper’s focus remains a narrow one. The book is largely a study of leaders in Washington, with only occasional excursions to note the progress of secession, the formation of the Confederacy, and events at Fort Sumter. Women and African Americans are absent. So is any serious study of constituencies or crosscurrents within the sections. Nor is the book a lively read, which is surprising given the material and the popular imprint issuing this work.

Still more problematic is Cooper’s interpretation, which suggests that unbending and ill-informed politicians caused the rupture, while sensible conservatives sought to continue the American tradition of compromise. Lincoln, in particular, fares poorly in this study. For Cooper, Lincoln was “tone deaf” to southerners’ views; he failed to realize how any affirmations of the Republican platform might enrage slaveholders; and he foolishly refused to speak out during the first months after his election, when conciliatory words were so desperately needed (73). Cooper also emphasizes Lincoln’s inexperience; the Illinoisan knew little about the South and had never governed, even on a state level. The new president was further burdened by his intense partisanship: Cooper observes, “His actions also made clear that he approached the crisis not as president-elect of the United States, but as leader of the Republican party” (76). Lincoln rejected compromise, argues Cooper, because of his concern that any concessions might undermine the Republicans’ hard-earned victory.

Cooper roundly condemns most Republicans, regularly calling the dominant group within the party “hard-liners.” He also argues that it is more accurate to label Republicans as “anti-South” rather than “antislavery,” by emphasizing that few had any genuine concern for African Americans. While Republicans rushed through legislation that pleased them, like the Morrill tariff, they ignored, delayed, or brazenly opposed measures that might have knit the country together. In various guises and forms, as this account makes clear, the stumbling block that Republicans could not climb over or march around was the extension of slavery into the territories. If they had accepted that reasonable demand, Cooper suggests, there would have been no Civil War.

The secessionists of the Deep South are the other culprits in...