To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13–25, 1864 (review)

To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864.By Gordon C. Rhea. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. Pp. xv, 505. $34.95.)

One must pick one's superlatives carefully when describing Gordon Rhea's monumental and dramatic history of the Overland campaign of 1864. With the completion of volume three (of what I assume will be a quartet), Rhea joins some very select company. Only Edwin Cole Bearss's three-volume study of the Vicksburg Campaign (Morningside Books) comes close to matching it in scope and detail.

This addition to Rhea's set, while written in the same vivid and easy flowing narrative style of its two predecessors, lacks a climatic centerpiece battle to give it shape and focus. Rhea's first book examined the titanic struggles in the Wilderness (May 5-6, 1864) and Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant's courageous decision to continue the campaign in the face of a strategic draw and a tactical defeat. Rhea's second volume continued the story and built steadily to the powerful assault on the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania (May 12). In contrast, this one treats the closing combats at Spotsylvania (May 13-19), the disengagement and movement south of the opposing forces, and the battles along the North Anna River (May 23-24). Thrown in for good measure are Sheridan's meanderings near Richmond (May 12-13) and a politically motivated attack by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on the Union outpost at Wilson's Wharf, then manned largely by black soldiers. The end result is a book with no beginning or end, but lots of middle.

Nevertheless Rhea tackles his subject with verve and gusto. The depth of his research is a benchmark for all future military histories of this period. He has a good eye for the dramatic or touching vignette and is a superb storyteller. His narrative is clearly formed by a firsthand familiarity with the topography of the campaign, suggesting that he spent ample time on the ground of the actions he is describing. He also does not hesitate to offer insightful analysis and passes a sobering judgment on the acumen of the two central figures of his study: Grant and Lee. As a compelling and dramatic narrative of a Civil War military campaign, Rhea's book performs in exemplary fashion.

There are one or two matters of some significance in this campaign that Rhea has yet to fully explore, which perhaps the final volume will address. While much of the spotlight is on U. S. Grant, almost all of it is solely in the context of his decisions regarding this campaign. Not effectively explored are the effects his experiences here had on the many other decisions he was making in his role as chief general of all Union military operations. Also missing is the Lincoln equation. The president plucked Grant from relative anonymity in the West, made him the highest ranking military officer in the army, and sent him forth with a blank check and a heavy reserve of confidence. Rhea does such an effective job of analyzing Grant's successes and failures in this campaign, that one begs to know how it was perceived in Washington. What was it that enabled Lincoln to keep the faith, even when the news from the front was so unappealing? The Overland Campaign was important, not only for what it accomplished in a military sense, but in the way it tested and ultimately strengthened the political-military team that would win the war. One hopes that Rhea will not overlook this important element as he closes out the saga.

What is here merits high praise indeed. Rhea's estimations of subordinate commanders on both sides add much valuable insight into larger assessments of their abilities. His coldly balanced evaluation of Robert E. Lee's performance injects a weary humanity into a figure still...