The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth (review)

66CIVIL WAR HISTORY strikes that were quickly followed by heavy infantry assaults, Sherman ordered his vulnerable horsemen to raid deep behind enemy lines, away from any possible support. This is not to say that Evans denigrates Sherman's abilities as a strategist. According to the author, the famed general's talents for orchestrating masterful campaigns remain untarnished. Instead, Evan's faults Sherman for being an "indifferent tactician" (478). He also claims that the general failed to appreciate the tenacity of his enemy and their remarkable ability to repair damaged railroads that continued to supply Atlanta. In the end, Sherman was forced to send his infantry to cut the rail links, thus forcing the surrender of the city. To enhance this engrossing narrative, Evans has included over twenty maps and nearly forty illustrations of key participants in the campaign. While some may debate the author's conclusions, few will be able to call into question Evan's vast research and methodology. This book will be savored by readers interested in cavalry operations during the Civil War and the Atlanta campaign of 1 864. David D. Dkon Slippery Rock University The Darkest Days ofthe War: The Battles ofIuka and Corinth. By Peter Cozzens. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Pp. xvi, 390. $39.95.) Peter Cozzens, a foreign service officer with the U.S. Department of State, has made a name for himself as the author of several detailed tactical studies of battles in the western theater of the Civil War. His work on Stones River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga are among the best campaign and battle studies yet produced on the conflict. They are based on thorough research and are enhanced by excellent maps and a dramatic narrative style. Those earlier works won acclaim as the best books on their subjects despite the fact that several books had been written on those battles before Cozzens offered his contribution. His current work displays the same admirable qualities as his previous efforts, but with the added distinction of being the first study of the Battles of Iuka and Corinth. Because Cozzens has done such a goodjob of researching all available sources, there is little likehood anyone will need to produce anotherbook on these conflicts in the future. The Darkest Days ofthe War will surely be the definitive work on these sadly overlooked but interesting and significant campaigns. The book covers the campaigns ofMaj. Gen. Sterling Price and Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn in northern Mississippi during the months of June through October 1 862, when the major focus ofthe war in theWest had shifted to Kentucky. When Gen. Braxton Bragg launched his campaign into that border state, he left several thousand Confederate troops behind in Mississippi under Price and Van Dorn with unclear instructions and a divided command structure. They tried to do all their meager force was capable of, resulting in the small but fierce Battle of Iuka on September 19 and the larger, even more ferocious Battle of Corinth on BOOK REVIEWS67 October 3-4. The smaller battle at Davis's Bridge on October 5 ended the campaign , which was a Confederate disaster. Price and Van Dorn failed to win any strategic gains to justify their heavy casualties, and the result contributed to Bragg's inability to hold the ground he had gained in Kentucky. By November, all Confederate offensives in theWest had been repulsed, and the Federals were on their way to Vicksburg. Hardly any major figure comes out well in Cozzens's view. Van Dorn was foolishly aggressive, Price was a poor tactician, and Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell failed to capitalize on the Confederates' most promising opportunity to capture Corinth when he refused to press home his assault againstthe beleagured Federals on the evening of October 3. Even the Federal victors are subjects of criticism. Cozzens's negative view of Grant should be tempered with a little more objectivity , while Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans deserves most of the author's ire. Cozzens accurately notes the supreme irony of these campaigns. Price and Van Dorn were trying to accomplish a great deal against enormous odds; even if they had captured Corinth from Rosecrans's force, which was equal...