"Kill-Cavalry," Sherman's Merchant of Terror: The Life of Union General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick (review)

252CIVIL WAR HISTORY The most unfortunate problem with the book is with the troop position maps. These maps, intended to be vital resources to assist the user in reconnoitering the ground where the battle was fought, are critically flawed and contain many errors. They are difficult to read and contain no contour topography or elevation information. This provides a two-dimensional (flat) view of the rugged terrain that governed the formation and the direction of the battle, as fought, on the Shiloh plateau. A modern overlay of Shiloh National Military Park, which illustrates current conditions for both forest and fields, is used as the base map. Beyond random identification of a few principle creeks, roads, and the Tennessee River, no geographical referencing ofthe important 1862 cultural landscape features is provided. Identifying these historical landscape features—the boundaries of fields and wood lines; primary roads, farm lanes, and traces; and over seventy log homes, barns, and churches—interprets the Shiloh plateau as experienced by the soldiers in 1862. On many of the maps, a number of the primary roads and creeks are not identified; and, although 90 percent ofthe roads present today are the same historic routes used by the armies in 1862, the authors incorrectly cite these as modern roads "built to take the visitor around the battlefield ." Besides not adequately citing terrain features on the maps, several army organizations (regiments, brigades, and batteries) are incorrectly identified, and/ or, their movements and positions are incorrectly located in context to both time and space for various phases of battle represented on some maps. The slight format and numerous cartography problems reduce the effectiveness of this battlefield guide as a learning tool. A second edition, corrected and improved, is needed to elevate the Guide to the Battle ofShiloh to the "on the ground" interpretive standards of its War College predecessors. Stacy D. Allen Shiloh National Military Park "Kill-Cavalry, " Sherman 's Merchant ofTerror: The Life ofUnion General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick. By Samuel J. Martin. (Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press ofAssociated University Presses, 1996. Pp. 325. $48.50.) As Samuel J. Martin proclaims is in his prologue, this is the biography of an antihero. Indeed, there were few redeeming qualities in the personal character ofcavalryman Hugh Judson Kilpatrick. He was audacious to the point of recklessness , often acting with foolhardy bravado when faced with pressure. While Kilpatrick seldom placed himself in harm's way, he never hesitated to send others needlessly to their deaths.At Gettysburg he ordered his subordinate, Gen. Elon Farnsworth, into the maelstrom of certain doom in a desperate bid to win a little glory for himself. Kilpatrick was also unscrupulous—selling military contracts, conniving with profiteering cutlers to fleece the enlisted men, and confiscating civilian property for his own personal gain. At one point his de- book reviews253 ceitful actions cost him three months in the Old Capitol Prison. Even in his personal life Kilpatrick demonstrated contemptible and immoral behavior. His open liaisons with common prostitutes became a well-established factthroughout the army. His romp with camp follower Annie Jones received the attention of President Lincoln; and, after the war, while serving as ambassador to Chile, his affair with "a woman of abandoned morals" nearly cost him his diplomatic post. During the war, he even sank so low as to desecrate several churches located in enemy territory. Taken altogether, Hugh Judson Kilpatrick could very well be regarded as the most contemptuous and despicable officer in the Union army. While Martin is quick to recognize Kilpatrick's moral failings, he does occasionally rise to the defense of his subject. According to the author, the general was often effective when raiding into enemy territory and disrupting lines of communication and supply. He concedes that, in most instances, Kilpatrick was only marginally successful in accomplishing his military objectives; however, this was generally more than his peers could achieve. Following his unsuccessful attempt to rescue federal prisoners in a raid on Richmond in March 1 864, Kilpatrick was transferred to Sherman's command at Chattanooga.As Martin points out, "Kill-Cavalry" could be counted on to prosecute a destructive "total war" advocated by his superior. According tothe author, Sherman looked the...