By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War (review)

BOOK REVIEWS By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War. By Bern Anderson. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962. Pp. xiv, 303 + vin. $5.95.) Admiral Bern Anderson made history as a naval officer and dien retired to shape anodier career for himself as scholar and writer of history. His last work is an excellent account of the navy's role in the Civil War. As a brave sailor would like to do, widi die completion of a task well-done, he promptíy sailed on into vaster seas—die end of his life coming swiftiy after publication of this book. Admiral Anderson contributed greatly to die final volumes of Admiral Samuel E. Morison's noted History of Naval Operations in World War II. He brought to his work with Morison and to his own sound histories the natural contributions of an officer who has diought profoundly on his profession and has put die tiioughts into practice. The whole purpose of a navy is to carry out, in peace or war, die broad policy and strategy of a nation. Thus it is natural diat of die handful of creditable works on die overaU naval aspects of the Civil War, Anderson treats best the strategic aspects, including command performance in joint operations and die far-reaching effects of naval blockade. The Civil War, known to Americans as a land struggle bright widi valor and stirring leadership, is also a profound lesson in the influence of die sea. The Union's wise and vigorous use of superiority there was critical if not decisive. Early in the war a joint committee in Washington, which Anderson labels die "Board of Strategy," settled upon how best to employ die North's overwhelming strengdi at sea. The Board's decisions included (though not all consciously) the following: (1) blockade, (2) control of the sea, (3) preventing foreign intervention, (4) effective combined operations, (5)assault on die Soudiern coast and strong points on inland waters, and (6)splitting die Confederacy on die line of die Mississippi, and tiien into fragments. The combined influence of diese powerful uses of die navy are perhaps too great for a single volume to cover. Even Anderson's study fails to examine properly the full scope of the last three categories in their fatal effect upon die Soudi. Examples of what might have been added abound in die first year of the war alone: At the outset, in April, 1861, the Baltimore riots cut off Washington by rail from the North. Captain du Pont in Philadelphia and others embarked troops in ships there and at the head of Chesapeake Bay, and debarked them 211 212CI VIL WAR HISTORY at Annapolis to proceed to the beleaguered capital. This timely grasp of the advantages of sea movement may have swayed the balance to save Washington and Maryland for the Union—both of incalculable influence upon the war. The first important victories for the North came from employing sea superiority in combined operations against the Carolinas. The early naval success at Hatteras and die subsequent capture of Port Royal meant more than a lift of morale for the North. They began the deadly drain on the Confederacy in troops, ordnance, and key coastal points, and die lodgement of Union forces behind die lines diat forced dispersal of Confederate strength from die main battlefields. On die Western rivers (which have yet to welcome their definitive historian ) the indomitable John Rodgers overcame Herculean tasks to shape a river fleet for Foote and Grant. The first ships, energetically and swiftly put into service, helped prevent die secession of Kentucky. Behind die strength of this fleet Grant knifed into the heart of the Confederacy in combined operations diat brought repeated disaster to the South. In addition to die foregoing omissions, the South's efforts are inadequately treated and diere are some inaccuracies, such as die account of the H. L. Hunley, the Confederates' valiant submarine. Yet these blemishes merely show diat no book can be perfect. Anderson's broad overall grasp of die conflict and of the interrelation of army and navy as separate but dependent blades of die same shears, mark him as a...