The Civil War: A Soldier's View (review)

Book Reviews467 War. It is a book which should really come into its own with this third edition and obtain the wide circulation it richly deserves. Arthur Lerner Los Angeles, California. The CivilWar: A Soldier's View. By Colonel G. F. R. Henderson. Edited by Jay Luvaas. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1958. Pp. xi, 323. $6.00.) most civil war students are acquainted with Colonel Henderson's Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War, a splendid biography of Lee's most able lieutenant, wherein the author's style, ability, and capacity as a military historian, student, and analyst are excellently demonstrated. In the present volume, Jay Luvaas has selected some of Colonel Henderson's other writings: "The Campaign of Fredericksburg" (1886), an essay written for the second edition of Mary Anna Jackson's Memoirs of Stonewall Jackson (1895), and four chapters from The Science of War (1905). Henderson was the first English officer to undertake a serious study of the Civil War after 1870, although prior to that time the Civil War had been a popular subject at the Royal Staff College. The swift, decisive campaign of the Prussians, overrunning and destroying what had been considered Europe's best military machine, focused all eyes and thoughts on the German Army. Campaigns before the introduction of the breech loader as the standard foot arm were disregarded, German influence spreading so thoroughly that spiked helmets were introduced in many of the world's armies (including that of the United States) . The reorganization of the British military structure moved Henderson to look at its composition, training, and potential. His feeling that the English Volunteers needed something other than the study of the German Army—a conscript force of professional discipline and leadership—led to his dissertation "The Campaign of Fredericksburg," designed as a tactical text for officers of die English Volunteers. His concern over the education and training of the volunteer and his own progress in the hierarchy of the British military structure are strongly reflected in his writings. "Fredericksburg" is concerned with battlefield tactics, and their execution from his own viewpoint as a line officer. The complexities of discipline andleadership aresearchingly reviewed—notonly from the high command, but more purposefully for his objective—from the actions of regimental, brigade, and corps commanders. The character of the average soldier and company (line) officer is developed to illustrate sins and virtues of commission and omission during the battle. Henderson believed that a sound knowledge of military history was the best substitute for actual battle experience. The sum of his "Fredericksburg" is an object lesson to the volunteer officer and his role in battle. The chapter "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War" is a long review of that 468 CIVIL WAR HISTORY four-volume publication which appeared originally in 1887 and was included in The Science of War as Chapter VIII. Basically, this chapter is an analysis of the problems in assembling, training, and fighting with a volunteer army. Henderson 's concern with the British volunteer establishment and its effectiveness is well illustrated. Incidentally, his comments on battle discipline are of no less value today, with the "Korean Conflict" and its problems still fresh in mind. "The American Civil War—1861-1865," originally two lectures (1892), is an exposition of employment of the combined arms (infantry-artillery-cavalry) and Henderson's thoughts on the latter. In it he pays great tribute to American ingenuity in first use of the breech loader, repeater, and ironclad, and the utilization of balloons, torpedoes, submarine mines, the telegraph, lamp and flag signalling "to a degree unheard of." Our engineering works "have no parallel in European Warfare." "The Battle of Gettysburg," an 1893 lecture to the Aldershot Military Society, was included as Chapter X in The Science of War. Primarily a dissertation on leadership and staff duties. His development of the battle's failures, lack of intelligence of the enemy, lack of co-operation, lead him to the conclusion that the Confederates were overconfident. "The Campaign in the Wilderness of Virginia, 1864" was an 1894 lecture, Chapter X of The Science of War. His own conclusion was that the Wilderness battles were a better clue to the fighting...