Confederate Seaport Strategy

Earl Fornoll holds degrees from New School for Social Research, Columbia University, and Rice Institute. He has written articles for Southwestern Historical Quarterly, American-German Review, and a book of his will be pubUshed soon by Harcourt , Brace. Confederate Seaport Strategy EARL W. FORNELL was the WAH strategy employed by the Confederacy to defend its seaports dominated by land rather than by naval concepts? Except for a few daring and often brilliant offensive thrusts into Northern territory, Southern leaders appear to have foUowed a strategy of puUing their offensive power into the interior areas thereby utilizing a defense in depth as a means of counteracting the superior weight of the enemy. Whüe this strategy may have been necessary as an over-all poUcy for the Confederacy , the wisdom of sacrificing a majority of the Southern seaports to this policy is at least open to some question since this method not only closed off important routes to foreign sources of supply but also may have been a factor in the failure of the Confederacy to gain foreign diplomatic recognition.1 For the purpose of illuminating a small part of the general strategy used by Confederate leaders in the defense of their ports, a brief survey of what actually happened, in political as well as in military affairs, at Savannah, Mobile, and Galveston may illustrate the apparently negative policy followed in the defense of these ports. In some instances the 1 Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman appeared to agree with the Southern strategists. Hc is reported to have stated in March of 1865 that the Confederate policy "of giving up their sea and river coast cities, although taking away some of the prestige of the Confederacy, is making it materially stronger than if they retained the ports in their possession." State Gazette [Austin, Tex.], March 15, 1865. The Richmond Whig voiced an opposite view: "One of the great errors of the war was not to hold the rivers and maintain vigorous contact with foreign ports. We let the enemy penetrate the very heart of our country by falling back." Quoted in San Antonio News, September 3, 1863. 61 62EARLW, FORNELL public statements and orders issued by official persons burdened with the responsibility for the defense of these ports bear little resemblance to the actual measures taken to defend the three seaport cities. At Charleston and Wilmington, it must be acknowledged, the Confederates maintained a vigorous defense. Since New Orleans was captured early in the war by overwhelming Federal force, the loss there was an exceptional one and beyond the control of the Confederate leaders. I. SAVANNAH Confederate strategists decided that since they were not able to counter Union naval guns with equal fire power at the approaches to the port city of Savannah, military logic required them to withdraw their forces to the higher ground several miles to the rear of the city to defend the more important interior areas of the state,2 In their view, the strategic, if not the political, situation recommended the sacrifice of Savannah in the event of a serious assault upon the coast. The city was not to be evacuated ; it was to be relinquished in a holding action, surrendered street by street, house by house to "the last extremity," The key to the strategy, however, is not to be found in the orders issued to the infantry commanders but in a consideration of the positions for the best placement of armament,3 An announced policy of burning the city before surrender caused serious disaffection among the property owners of Savannah, especially after the Georgia General Assembly declared, in a formal resolution, that if Savannah were to be taken, only ashes should be left for the Federals.4 Political repercussions of this policy resulted in a reciprocal exchange of divisive recriminations between the Confederate, state, and city authorities .5 The token preparations made to defend the port were primarily for the political purpose of quieting public criticism, since the Richmond 2 The War of the Rebellion: A Compihtion of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. 14, pp. 531-33, 662-65; cited hereinafter as...