In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

IÓ2CIVIL WAR HISTORY nooga Campaigns (1998). Three edited volumes contain contributions by numerous scholars and deal with bibliography and issues of command. The fourth is Woodworth's edition of a Union soldier's dairy and letters. No Band ofBrothers is a compilation ofWoodworth's own articles, aU but one of which have been previously pubUshed. In these pieces, Woodworth starts from the premise that "the South lost a very winnable conflict, and among the many reasons for that loss was the performance of the Confederate high command" (xii). The book's title clearly states the conflict he sees as all too prevalent among the leaders of the Confederate military effort. Investigating the high command, Woodworth ranges widely: from discussing commanders at set-piece battles, Williamsburg and Bermuda Hundred, to relations among the leading generals and between them and their commander in chief. In fact, six focus on Jefferson Davis. As one would expect in a collection of this kind, the articles vary in quaUty. A few—like the ones on Jefferson Davis and the trans-Mississippi and Davis, Leónidas Polk, and Kentucky neutraUty—are based primarily on original research, albeit mostly in the Official Records. Some, however, such as those on Braxton Bragg and Chickamauga and Davis, John B. Hood, and theArmy of Tennessee, depend chiefly on secondary sources. Still, this volume will appeal to the reader with a real interest in Confederate miUtary history. William J. Cooper Jr. Louisiana State University Don 't Shoot That Boy! Abraham Lincoln and Military Justice. By Thomas P. Lowry. (Mason City, Iowa: Savas Publishing, 1999. Pp. xii, 320. $24.95.) For several years now, Thomas Lowry and Beverly Lowry, his wife, have undertaken the prodigious task ofreviewing the records of 80,000 court-martials held by the Union Army during the Civil War. In examining the first 37,000 of these case files, the Lowrys have uncovered over 750 annotations by Lincoln, ofwhich over five hundred had not been previously known. Students of Abraham Lincoln and ofCivil War miUtaryjustice will long be deeply in their debt for undertaking such an extensive and important research task. Drawing on the records reviewed thus far, Thomas Lowry explores the question of Lincoln's reputation for compassion and illuminates several interesting aspects of the Union militaryjustice system. He provides a general overview of the conduct of a court-martial and the challenges of maintaining miUtary discipline in a democratic citizen army. He outlines the chain ofappeal from the trial verdict to the authorizing officer, the departmental commander, JudgeAdv. Gen. Joseph Holt in Washington and eventually, in hundreds of cases, to President Lincoln himself. To determine whether Lincoln's legendary reputation for compassion for soldiers has any basis in fact, Lowry compares the extent ofLincoln's agreement with those at the other levels of the appeal process. After providing BOOK REVIEWS1 63 brief summaries of hundreds of court-martials, Lowry concludes that "much of Lincoln's clemency consisted of endorsing the recommendations of the several levels of reviewers as the case moved upwards toward the Presidential office" (258). Although Lincoln most often agreed with his chief legal adviser and his generals, he did not have to do so, and Lowry finds that "the legend of his compassion is not legend at all, but truth" (263). Despite the Lowrys' impressive research, this volume fails to take full advantage of this wealth of material. Several decisions hamper it. First, the study is based on a review of only roughly half of the court-martial records. Second, it excludes over 250 decisions by Lincoln because they are included in Roy P. Basler's Collected Works ofAbraham Lincoln. These unfortunate choices yield an incomplete record, even of Lincoln's decisions. Furthermore, the presentation of the material weakens its conclusions. The volume is organized around a curious mixture of the rank of the offender, the nature of the offense, and the geographical location of the offense. While the large proportion of officers as defendants in court-martials (20 percent) and their success in avoiding death penalties (100 percent) are remarkable, they were often charged with the same offenses that enlisted men were. Lowry also fails to offer a comparative perspective. While...

pdf

Share