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BOOK REVIEWSI7I and entertainingly written, Rescue by Rail will hopefully inspire others to investigate further the various aspects of military science that made it possible for Civil War armies to function. Michael B. Ballard Mississippi State University Wilson 's Cavalry Corps: Union Campaigns in the Western Theater. October1864 through Spring 1865. By Jerry Keenan. (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 1998. Pp. vii, 263. $32.50.) In the introduction to his definitive three-volume study, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, Stephen Z. Starr intimated that James Harrison Wilson was perhaps one of the best cavalry commanders during the conflict. However, his accomplishments in western theater have been largely ignored by scholars who favor focusing on more flamboyant horsemen such as George Custer or J. E. B. Stuart. In his new book, Wilson 's Cavalry Corps, Jerry Keenan sets out to fill this void by producing a comprehensive study of the campaigns and mounted raids that Wilson's troopers conducted in Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama in the closing months of the Civil War. During his famous Atlanta Campaign of 1864, Gen. William T. Sherman had been constantly plagued by Confederate horsemen under the able leadership of such noted cavalrymen as Joseph Wheeler and Nathan Bedford Forrest. At the same time, the Union cavalry had been thwarted in its many attempts to supply adequate support to Sherman's army. As Keenan notes, the lack of success achieved by the Union horsemen was due, in large part, to Sherman's failure to appreciate the tactical potential that cavalry could offer when consolidated and used as mounted infantry. When Sherman proposed to strike eastward from Atlanta in the fall of 1864, he was determined to have with him an able and aggressive cavalry leader. Consequently , he sent a dispatch to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant requesting just such a commander . Grant responded by ordering James Wilson to assume command of Sherman's horse soldiers. With Sherman's promise to give Wilson full authority and control, the twenty-seven-year-old officer began to reorganize his mounted force into a well-trained corps, eager to prove its merits and capable of acting independently from infantry support. Wilson's first task was to impede a Confederate invasion of Tennessee that began in November 1864. During this campaign Wilson's troops were successful in driving off Confederate horsemen under Nathan Bedford Forrest. When the Rebel army under John Bell Hood began to withdraw from Tennessee following its defeat at Nashville, Wilson and his men played an active role in taking up the pursuit. For the remainder ofthe war, Wilson's Cavalry Corps proved to be invincible. The Union horsemen drove deep into Alabama and, near the end of the conflict, managed to capture Selma, a feat that marked the first time cavalry were successful in capturing a fortified city. 172CIVIL WAR HISTORY Keenan's study is memorable in several respects. First of all, his work indeed fills a void in the sense that it is comprehensive and detailed. In addition, the author should be commended for the fine prose that transforms what could have been a rather dull recitation of facts into a compelling narrative. The book is well-illustrated with photographs of the major participants and maps detailing the scene of action. Wilson 's Cavalry Corps is an outstanding contribution to our understanding of cavalry operations in the western theater and belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the mounted army during the Civil War. David Dixon Slippery Rock University War Along the Bayous: The 1864 Red River Campaign in Louisiana. By William Riley Brooksher. (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, 1998. Pp. xiii, 287. $27.50.) William Riley Brooksher has written one of the few monographs about the Red River campaign since the publication of Ludwell Johnson's Red River Campaign : Politics and Cotton in the Civil War in 1958 [Ed. note: The Kent State University Press reprinted Ludwell Johnson's book in 1993] The retired Air Force general states in his preface that "it was not my purpose to analyze and unravel the web of politics, diplomacy, personal machinations, and economics that hovered over the campaign; nor to do a scholarly analysis of its...

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