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BOOK REVIEWS321 Gettysburg—Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. By Harry W. Pfanz. (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Pp. xix, 507. $37.50.) Utilizing extensive research in primary resources and an astute knowledge of the terrain based on long service as a Gettysburg National Military Park historian , Pfanz previously wrote Gettysburg: The Second Day (1987), which focused on the July 2 attack by Gen. James E. Longstreet's corps against the left side of the Union line. As he noted in the preface to that magnificent book, the attack by Gen. Richard S. Ewell's corps against the Union right anchored on Culp's and Cemetery hills, although a part of Gen. Robert E. Lee's battle plan, was a distinct action since it occurred after Longstreet's effort had ended. Consequently, he omitted the fighting there "in the expectation that someday someone will give it the full and separate treatment it deserves" (xvi). That "someday" has now arrived, and the "someone" is none other than Pfanz himself. No better choice could have been found! Pfanz's explication ofevents begins with two crucial decisions made on July ? , one excellent and the other an error. The former was by the Union's Eleventh Corps commander, Gen. Oliver O. Howard, who chose Cemetery Hill just south of Gettysburg as the place to rally the Yankees who had been defeated earlier in the day west and north of the town. As more units from the Army of the Potomac arrived in the vicinity, Union lines extended to Culp's Hill east of Cemetery Hill and along Cemetery Ridge to the south. The second decision was Ewell's failure to drive the Yankees from Cemetery Hill while they were still in disarray. Accustomed to Stonewall Jackson's tight command reins, Ewell did not realize that, under Lee's hands-off manner of command, his orders to take Cemetery Hill ifpossible virtually mandated vigorous action. In following the action on the Union right until the guns sputtered into silence on the afternoon ofJuly 3, Pfanz replicates the distinguishing features that made The Second Day so successful. First, once again the author skillfully explains what happened and why, whether describing high-level command decisions or tactical movements even down at the company level. Second, as in the previous book, excellent maps reinforce the word portraits. Third, numerous vignettes and anecdotes, ranging from the humorous to the tragic but always fascinating , again add zest to the narrative. Finally, despite Pfanz's unparalleled knowledge of the battle, some aspects of the fighting, both during Longstreet's July 2 assault and during Ewell's attacks on July 2 and 3, remain uncertain. In a few instances Pfanz frankly admits that because of inadequate source material historians cannot know what happened, but in most cases he makes educated surmises tiiat invariably make good sense. Some events on the Union right flank were highly unusual during the Civil War. Street fighting akin to that in Gettysburg had previously transpired at Fredericksburg , but virtually nowhere else. Although common before a battle, the skirmishing preceding Ewell's July 2 assault was exceptionally important. The author devotes considerable attention to this subject and argues that the noisy 322CIVIL WAR HISTORY skirmishing along Brinkerhoff's Ridge "might well have been decisive" (153) because it kept the Stonewall Brigade fromjoining Gen. Edward Johnson's division for the main assault on Culp's Hill. The missing brigade might have permitted the Confederates to overwhelm the defenders, for the Union high command had blundered terribly by ordering units from the right flank to reinforce other areas of the battlefield. Only one brigade manned almost a half mile of defensive works when Johnson's depleted division advanced. Night fighting, like urban fighting, was rare. But the assault on July 2 against Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill took place after dusk, adding an extra measure of confusion to the normal "friction" of war. Reflecting the poor coordination that prevailed in the Army of Northern Virginia, Ewell's July 2 attack occurred after Longstreet's main action on the Union left, while Ewell's renewed attack against Culp's Hill on July 3 ended before...

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