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84CIVIL WAR HISTORY inflate their role in winning the election; and citing the number of campaign tracts distributed by the Iron and Steel Association in 1888, when 700,000 tracts cost a mere $4,000, does not indicate an "almost bottomless " campaign purse. Marcus also disputes the legendary power and efficiency of Chairman Matthew Quay and the 1888 Republican National Committee, whose main contributions were negative. It made few mistakes and limited its role in favor of local leaders and organizations. Indeed, Quay wanted to be National Chairman to prevent a rival campaign by the National Committee from challenging his Pennsylvania machine. Marcus' most interesting chapters assess the 1896 campaign and Mark Hanna, the culmination of a long line of businessmen-presidentmakers . Hanna was more fortunate than his predecessors in that he supported William McKinley, whose popularity and availability made him the logical Republican candidate. Nevertheless, to secure the nomination , Hanna and McKinley had to sacrifice their power in Ohio to their arch-enemy Joseph B. Foraker. Working mainly through state politicians , Hanna organized the South and supplied money and coordinating efforts. In short, he played a traditional, not innovative, role in securing McKinley's nomination. What happened in the ensuing campaign, however , was new to American politics. A vast change in voter preferences occurred in the nineties. It favored the Democrats in 1892, but the panic of 1893 shifted the balance to Republicans, and by espousing free silver in 1896 Democrats tipped the Republican scale even further. Republican factionalism disappeared while Democratic businessmen fled to the Republican party and not only donated to it personally but no longer objected to large corporation contributions. With vast funds to distribute , National Chairman Hanna exercised more control over state organizations in the West, where the outcome was doubtful and money was needed. Hanna "did not revolutionize the party," but saw "it through a political revolution" making it the majority party, placing it on a firm financial foundation, and strengthening the national committee and the presidency. Although his concluding, speculative essay on parties in the current century seems a bit out of place, Marcus has written a first-rate book clarifying both the structure and the strategy of Gilded Age politics. Ari Hoogenboom Brooklyn College Railroads and the Granger Laws. By George H. Miller. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 296. $12.50.) Nearly twenty years ago, Professor George Miller published an analysis of the granger laws in Iowa which disputed the widely held contention that these regulatory laws were primarily the result of the organized efforts of radical farmers seeking to curb the excesses of the railroads. BOOK REVIEWS85 In this fine new book, Miller has extended his treatment to all of the granger states and in so doing has produced an important study of the effects of economic change on nineteenth century political and constitutional history. The primary impetus for the so-called granger laws passed by the legislatures of Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota in the early 1870's came from the commercial interests in these states. Miller notes that although farmers often supported the regulatory movement, "the Farmers' Movement of the 1870s was not a major force in the shaping of this regulatory legislation" (p. 196). Indeed, the specific needs of farmers were usually ignored when legislation was drafted and leaders of organized farmers often opposed the regulatory legislation that was finally passed. Nor was the movement for regulation radical. Not only was there ample constitutional and legal precedent for state regulation, but the goals of the legislation were essentially conservative. Local merchants and businessmen feared the erosion of their favored positions as the growing and consolidating railroads offered services on regional and national levels without regard to state and local interests. Leaders of the older established mercantile centers saw rate discrimination and low through-rates as menacing as they watched business they deemed theirs pass through on the way to more distant markets. Consequently, they looked to state regulation as a means to protect their local economic interests. The granger laws, then, arose from the efforts of the established local business interests to protect their hegemony. Like similar regulatory movements in the East they signalled a...

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