Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880-1896 (review)

BOOK REVIEWS83 in the account, along with many others. Blaine, the "Plumed Knight," was a "brilliant" man with a "formidable memory" and a "shrewd insight into social forces." Highly imaginative, he was also somewhat unstable and lacking in patience. The book is studded with personality sketches and judgments such as the above. It is vividly written, for the most part, and instructors can find here much to enliven their lectures. Without a doubt the book is generally successful as narrative history; but its importance is likely to rest, even more, on the thesis emphasizing the nationalism of Republicans and their fitness to rule. By no means is the author persuasive in every instance. A number of questions arise. This is an example of the "smiling" view of American history, and one wonders whether such an interpretation is really justified, or whether it is even consistent with the facts presented. Yet the book will be valuable , in part, because it is controversial and provocative. Not to be neglected , for this reason, is the lengthy "Bibliographical Note," a bluntly worded commentary on works in the field that should prove interesting to readers generally and suggestive for many researchers. J. Leonard Bates University of Illinois Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880-1896. By Robert D. Marcus. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 323. $7.95.) Robert D. Marcus' thoroughly documented analysis concentrates on late-nineteenth-century Republican efforts to nominate and elect presidential candidates. In an age that searched for order in many sectors, he finds that national party structure remained a loose coalition of state parties. In contrast, state parties were highly organized. By utilizing "inside" polls, their leaders—particularly in the 1880's—predicted the outcome of elections with astonishing accuracy. Nominating a President necessitated a combination of state parties. Curiously—and this is Marcus ' main hypothesis—powerful state bosses were not successful president -makers. Since president-making required loss of power at home,, which most state bosses would not sacrifice, successful president-makers were frequently businessmen-politicians, such as this book's most commanding figure, Stephen B. Elkins. Marcus, however, emphasizes that men like Elkins did not command the politicians they served. Marcus successfully argues many other points. He makes clear that beyond the 1880 campaign and its aftermath the stalwart versus halfbreed concept of Republican party factions has no validity, that it even oversimplifies the 1880 story, and that as a pejorative label used by James G. Blaine's enemies the term half-breed should be avoided. Furthermore , the amount of money spent on campaigns has been exaggerated . The estimate that in 1880 Republicans poured $400,000 into Indiana —much of it to purchase votes—was a boastful effort by stalwarts to 84CIVIL WAR HISTORY inflate their role in winning the election; and citing the number of campaign tracts distributed by the Iron and Steel Association in 1888, when 700,000 tracts cost a mere $4,000, does not indicate an "almost bottomless " campaign purse. Marcus also disputes the legendary power and efficiency of Chairman Matthew Quay and the 1888 Republican National Committee, whose main contributions were negative. It made few mistakes and limited its role in favor of local leaders and organizations. Indeed, Quay wanted to be National Chairman to prevent a rival campaign by the National Committee from challenging his Pennsylvania machine. Marcus' most interesting chapters assess the 1896 campaign and Mark Hanna, the culmination of a long line of businessmen-presidentmakers . Hanna was more fortunate than his predecessors in that he supported William McKinley, whose popularity and availability made him the logical Republican candidate. Nevertheless, to secure the nomination , Hanna and McKinley had to sacrifice their power in Ohio to their arch-enemy Joseph B. Foraker. Working mainly through state politicians , Hanna organized the South and supplied money and coordinating efforts. In short, he played a traditional, not innovative, role in securing McKinley's nomination. What happened in the ensuing campaign, however , was new to American politics. A vast change in voter preferences occurred in the nineties. It favored the Democrats in 1892, but the panic of 1893 shifted the balance to Republicans, and by espousing free silver in 1896...