Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 (review)

BOOK REVIEWS257 slave cases brought before federal judicial officers sheds some light on the question of which side was really correct, and to historians who are still concerned widi the validity of secessionists' arguments, this book may be of interest. As Larry Gara demonstrated almost a decade ago, however, myth was more important tìian reality in die fugitive slave controversy. Campbell's perspective ignores die extent to which die fugitive problem became a symbolic issue diat had little to do witìi die actual number of fugitive slaves remanded by federal officials. The book offers a corrective to facile generalizations about die Fugitive Slave Act becoming a "dead letter" after 1854, but beyond this insight, Campbell's "systematic analysis," by itself, adds little to understanding die relationship between die fugitive slave issue and die coming of die Civil War. Norman L. Rosenberg Central Michigan University Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865. By Thomas Lawrence Connelly. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 558. $15.00.) By late 1862, writes Thomas Lawrence Connelly, die fortunes of die Army of Tennessee had turned irreversibly downhill. Autumn of Glory, the second volume in his autìioritative study of die Confederacy's western army, chronicles diat downhill patìi, from 1862 to 1865, through die campaigns of Murfreesboro, Chattanooga, Georgia, Tennessee, and North Carolina. Skillfully interwoven widi die detailed narrative of military operations is a study of die command system of the army. Connelly explains die chequered career of die Army of Tennessee principally in terms of Confederate error. Davis, die War Department, and Robert E. Lee togedier neglected die vital role of die western army in defending the soutìiern heartland for a mistaken emphasis on die Army of Northern Virginia; Davis insisted on a scheme of departmental defense which divided Confederate forces in die face of overwhelming Union strength; his system of tìieater command was ambiguous and frustrating both to Johnston and to Beauregard; political discord in Richmond was reflected in a quarrelsome high command; die Army of Tennessee was subjected to repeated reorganization; and die vaunted western cavalry was both mismanaged and misused, draining army strength without providing any corresponding advantage. These were all causes contributing to Confederate failure in die West; but the greatest single cause for diat failure lay, according to Connelly, in die western high command. The commanding generals lacked outstanding military ability. Braxton Bragg had no appreciation of terrain, relied too much on discretionary orders, and did not have die moral toughness necessary to force a favorable decision in battle. Joseph E. Johnston was an habitual pessimist widi an exaggerated reputation, whose retreat into Georgia before 258CIVIL WAR HISTORY Sherman's army was no example of Fabian tactics, but radier an illustration of his lack of overall planning ability. His removal from command before Atlanta did not deprive die Confederacy of a great victory, as Johnston supporters have claimed, since die evidence indicates that die general had no firm plan or intent to attack. John BcII Hood was obsessed with die idea of the offensive and with the conviction that sophisticated battle plans possible in 1862 in the well-coordinated command structure of Lee's army could be applied two years later in die very different Army of Tennessee. None of diese three commanders combined die qualities of mind and of leadership necessary to win success in die West. Their professional limitations were underscored by personal characteristics which made die high command a focus for angry discord. Bragg was sour, quarrelsome, and tactless; Johnston cold and uncommunicative ; Hood ambitious, a chronic liar, representative and victim of the "Virginia syndrome." All quarreled with a particularly factious group of subordinate commanders, prominent among whom were Polk and Hardee. Bitterness and dissent among the generals prohibited a tight and efficient command structure, widi die result tìiat die crisis of impending battle too often found die commanding general unable to direct and control die movements of his men. In these circumstances die Army of Tennessee was unable to execute die tactical and strategic designs entrusted to it. Connelly's two volumes, well-written and exhaustively researched, undoubtedly rank as the definitive study of...