Advance and Retreat (review)

324CIVIL WAR HISTORY who would like to have an authoritative account of the Battle of Brandy Station will have to await another volume. Hans L. Trefousse Brooklyn College. Advance and Retreat. By General John B. Hood. Edited by Richard N. Current. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press—Civil War Centennial Series, 1959. Pp. xii, 376. $6.00.) "advance and retreat" was an unfortunate book. Written to repair the military reputation of its author, it succeeded only in shattering it completely. As a contribution to history, it merits nothing since it is a maze of contradictions, distortions, and evasions. But those acquainted with the gay, honorable Hood of pre-Chickamauga days, and who can see, in this unwitting revelation, the transformation of an ambitious and promising favorite to a scheming, frustrated failure, it will be interesting autobiography. The fateful bullet at Chickamauga cost Hood more than his leg. Never an intellectual man, and certainly no philosopher, the change from dashing Richmond beau to a cripple on crutches appears to have set up in him an increasing frenzy which led not only to his own undoing but, also, to the ruin of the Army of Tennessee. The habit patterns established during that transformation are apparent in this book. The simple, forthright Hood had become a genius at dissembling , a master of equivocation. It is kinder to believe that the myriad "errors" in his book were not deliberate falsifications but rather the products of a tortured mind which had persuaded itself that they were true. It would take a far longer book to rationalize them all, and should some competent person assume the task he would be doing a great service to the sadly neglected field of factual history. Earlier, Hood had been a superior lower echelon commander. When others bore the responsibility, he rose rapidly and promised well. But when the burden fell upon him, he avoided the battlefield and placed others in immediate command. To have a scapegoat in case of failure? Consciously, perhaps not. But the evidence points to the dominating influence of a subconscious mind which could not face alone the risks of its own decisions . And so, in his book, Hood could not admit harsh truths. Far better for his reputation had he faced the facts honestly and defended his management with courage and truth. Although the editor attempted to rationalize disputed matters, he was on unfamiliar ground. He credits Johnston's "decision to strike Sherman at Peachtree Creek" to Hood, takes the popular amateur view as to Sherman 's "primary objective," permits Hood to claim credit for the vast fortifications of Atlanta (begun in 1863 and completed under Johnston's direction), and calls Hood "undoubtedly justified in contending that they could not be held, even though he—with a thrice defeated army—held them until Sherman finessed him out of them at Jonesboro seven weeks Book Reviews325 later." At Cassville he cites, in Hood's support, only some !insupportable conclusions of others: Dyer's in the case of Wood's brigade which care would have revealed to be an interior brigade which could hardly have "wandered" across three division fronts without someone asking, profanely, where it was going; and Horn's, which is merely a rewrite of Hood's account . And all three of them ignore the fact that Johnston, not Hood, was in command, and that Hood's alleged insistence upon attacking Sherman was merely a subordinate's recommendation—one which would have delighted Sherman had Johnston accepted it. Comparing Hood's statements with actual events, as shown clearly in the Records, one wonders if he wanted Johnston to succeed at Cassville— or anywhere. It appears doubtful, else so eager a fighter would hardly have avoided the chance given him by Johnston to smash Sherman's left. Neither would he have diverted his whole corps to do a regiment's job of investigating the "wandering fragment" which, Dyer, Horn and Hood's unidentifiable "General" Carson (page 104) nothwithstanding, Hood admitted in his report (page 334) "turned out to be the enemy's cavalry" with which his skirmishers were already engaged. The facts point to the ugly conclusion that Hood deliberately avoided battle on the morning of the 19th...