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Reviewed by:
  • Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects
  • Harvey Nelsen (bio)
David Shambaugh. Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems and Prospects. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. xxvii, 374 pp. Hardcover $34.95, ISBN 0-520-22507-4.

The title of this book does not do it justice. David Shambaugh does far more than explore issues related to military modernization; he has written a comprehensive study of China's armed forces. Shambaugh is a highly respected China scholar who spent several years working on this volume. His patience and persistence have resulted in a remarkably well researched and thorough study. In addition to meticulously collecting extensive Chinese-language materials, he interviewed numerous military officers and civilians with military responsibilities. The fact that Beijing is notoriously secretive about military affairs makes Shambaugh's ability to ferret out information little short of astonishing. For example, he is able to explain the entire military budgeting process and provide an in-depth analysis of research and development of army, naval, and air force weapons. After looking at all sources of income—including national, regional, and commercial—Shambaugh estimates that the real defense budget is about double the officially announced figure, that is, between thirty-one and thirty-two billion U.S. dollars. Recent substantial increases in the official budget are misleading. Much of that money has gone to compensate the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for tens of thousands of commercial enterprises that have been stripped from their control. As a percentage of GNP, China's military expenditures rank behind the United States, Germany, and France and lead Japanese spending only slightly.

Shambaugh's study incorporates virtually all English-language contributions to our understanding of the PLA. While the book lacks a bibliography, extensive footnotes provide sources along with a great deal of supplementary material. This reviewer wrote a book on the PLA some years ago and follows the scholarship in that field with continuing interest. The only "error" I could find came from events that postdate his book. He describes China as lacking an effective satellite intelligence system. Within the past year, the PLA has orbited a satellite with "real time" digital feedback based on advanced electronics. The quality of the optics and sensors is another question altogether. Second, the publication deadline did not allow for consideration of the positive changes in U.S.-China relations after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While bilateral tensions have been reduced, the new Beijing-Washington relationship has so far had little impact on military cooperation or sales of military technology and systems. Thus, the author's findings on Sino-American military cooperation, or the lack thereof, remain valid. One omission stands out. Shambaugh fails to devote sufficient attention to Israeli transfers of military technology and weapons systems to China. He [End Page 450] mentions the systems involved, but does not explain how and why this close and mostly secret connection developed.

Shambaugh's volume will serve for years to come as the outstanding reference book on China's armed forces. Its comprehensive coverage is indicated by the table of contents: civil-military relations; doctrine and training; command, control, and force structure; budget and finance; defense industries and weapons procurement; threat perceptions; and policy implications for the United States. Shambaugh is definitely not an alarmist with regard to China's military modernization. As he demonstrates, the PRC is falling further behind the United States in most areas rather than catching up. In military research and development, he points to a number of still unresolved structural problems that have continuously slowed to a snail's pace the rollout of new weapons systems. For example, in one year the four-thousand-person work force at Saab produces more fighter aircraft than the forty-thousand-person work force in Shenyang produce in a decade. Advanced weapons purchased from Russia and Israeli military technology transfers are modest in number. China cannot afford to buy at a higher rate and is having trouble integrating advanced equipment into its combat forces. About half of the SU-27 fighter planes are grounded with maintenance problems.

Shambaugh does, however, detail specific threats to the U.S. military. The weapons purchased from...

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