Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (review)

The "puzzles" of Chinese politics—recurrent and debilitating power struggles particularly over succession, political purges, incessant confrontation over ideological "lines," and frequent policy shifts—have long engaged the attention of students of China. Thus far, the most persuasive explanations of the causes and manifestations of intra-leadership conflict and its consequences have focused on the prevalence of informal ties and the inadequate institutionalization of political authority and policy processes in the Chinese Party-State. The general reasoning has been that the dysfunctional pattern of elite conflict has been maintained and exacerbated primarily by factional groupings and competition. Factional ties may emerge from Field Army affiliations or other common career experiences, similarity of policy choices and ideological goals, or clientism. Whatever their origins, factional activities inevitably are detrimental to rational policy making and political stability.

Jing Huang's Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics questions such conventional wisdom on the impact of factionalism on leadership relations and decision making. Prevailing models of factionalism, Huang argues, are inadequate because of their assumption that factionalism is a dependent variable that results from policy disputes, conflicts of institutional interest, or power struggles. His own contention is that factionalism is an independent variable that shapes leadership relations and policy outcomes. In the Chinese context, factionalism has developed as a consequence of four features of the system: (1) power is exercised by individuals in a hierarchical framework, (2) all legal channels of communication for the expression of diverse interests are monopolized by the Party, (3) a formal process for decision making is lacking, and (4) there is frequent intervention in civilian affairs by the military. Huang concedes that the relationship between factionalism and power is the crux of the issue as has been theorized by existing models, but the defining characteristic of his own analysis is the thesis that "power struggles do not give rise to factional activities, rather it is factionalism that turns power into an overriding goal in CCP politics" (p. 5).

Huang's analysis details the process by which the authority of the supreme or dominant leader was first established on the foundation of factional politics. Strong personal bonds between leaders and their forces facilitated the creation of "mountaintops"—the CCP base areas—in the pre-Liberation period, and the loyalties of the leaders to Mao's command constituted the structure of the Yanan Round Table that emerged in the 1940s. After the adoption of Mao Zedong Thought as the Chinese Communist Party's "guiding principle" during the 1937-1945 period, Mao's power was buttressed both by his ideological preeminence and his exclusive and simultaneous control over the Party and military systems. The stability of leadership relations and political authority was derived from Mao's hegemonic position within the hierarchy and the balance of power between the various mountaintops. Any attempt by a subleader to expand his base would be perceived as a zero-sum struggle not only within the context of the mountaintops but also in relation to Mao, and would thus meet with resistance and suppression by the paramount leader.

In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping's ascendance and his ability to replace Hua Guofeng with his own protégés were similarly premised on his extensive linkages with and eventual control over both the Party and military systems. Deng's limitations as a theoretician, however, denied him the ideological authority that Mao had enjoyed. Hence, Deng failed to achieve the level of predominance within the system that Mao had commanded.

The factional political order that evolved from Yanan had two structural flaws, according to Huang. First, the feudal (my term) arrangement on which the authority of the supreme leader was based required a hierarchical chain of loyalty from individual subleader to Mao, but specifically precluded channels of communication among factional chiefs. The vertical flow of control and communication ensured Mao's dominance while discouraging coalition formation among the subleaders that could threaten his control. After 1949, as the CCP made...