Moral Philosophy Does Not Rest on a Mistake: Reasons to be Moral Revisited

There are many basic normative questions a person can ask. Why should my beliefs be responsive to evidence? Why should the interests of my future self count in my present deliberations in the way prudence recommends? Why should I adopt what I believe are the necessary means to my ends? Why should I value the sublime? Why should I do what is right? It is the last of these questions that seems to have attracted the lion's share of philosophic attention. H.A. Prichard, whose "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" has largely shaped the contemporary debate, went so far as to suggest that replying to that question was the central issue moral philosophers have historically attempted to address. Because he thought that question cannot possibly be answered – at least not by argument – he believed that the main project of moral philosophy is misguided. The question it seeks to address is "illegitimate" or "improper" in the sense of being unanswerable.² A person must have the intuition that she has reason to do what she believes (or knows) her moral duties require, and if she lacks that belief then philosophy can be of no further help to her. To waverers and doubters about morality's authority, Prichard recommends that they imaginatively engage with their moral problems in the hope that these mental encounters will stimulate the acquisition of the relevant intuitions.³

Most of the contributors in this volume maintain either explicitly or implicitly that Prichard was wrong and that philosophy can in fact facilitate meaningful engagement with questions relating to morality's authority. That engagement may take a variety of forms. For, as many of the contributors to this volume have noted, there are substantively different questions that can each travel under the English expression "Why be moral?" In these introductory remarks, we aim to set the stage for the essays by erecting some signposts along the conceptual landscape by focusing on Prichard's argument. The concentration on Prichard may seem strangely inopportune and of interest mainly to historians of philosophy. But it is a fitting point of departure. First, Prichard's most famous essay still serves as a reference point for many contemporary discussions about reasons to be moral, including the contributions to this volume made by Black, Copp, Johnston, LeBar, Schmidtz, Sobel, and Tiffany. Second, Prichard's thoughts on nor-mativity in practical reason retain their relevance. He returned over and over again to the themes set forward in his classic paper, and his oeuvre provides a sustained discussion of the relevant issues, as penetrating as any to be found in the literature today. In these introductory remarks our purpose is to highlight differences rather than try to resolve them. Our thoughts on resolutions can be found in the essays we have each contributed.

I. Three Questions

In the closing sentence of his inaugural address, "Duty and Interest" (1928), Prichard remarks that "in spite of his obvious errors" Kant rightly "retains so close a hold on his readers."⁴ Kant's influence can be detected throughout Prichard's writings in ethical theory. Prichard's views on morality can be summarized by the motto that "teleological reasons are reasons of the wrong kind for clarifying the nature of morality." Irrespective of the particular axiology employed, teleological reasons are deficient in at least three separate ways: extensionally, constitutionally, and normatively. In this section, we attempt to explicate these deficiencies so as to illuminate Prichard's thesis that moral philosophy rests on a mistake.

A. The Content Question

Prichard believed that teleological moral theories were extensionally inadequate. Like most critics of utilitarianism, Prichard believed that theories that ground rightness on some good answer the content question in a way that "most plainly does violence to our moral convictions."⁵ In "What Is the Basis of Moral Obligation?" Prichard asks us to imagine a village devastated by a landslide in which all but one villager is seriously injured. Supposing that one survivor is capable of providing food and shelter for just one individual...