Framing the Problem: China's Threat Environment

[ 61 ] roundtable • sizing the chinese military Framing the Problem: China’s Threat Environment Michael R. Chambers What is the proper size and structure of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)? The answer to this question will be based at least in part on the nature and source of the threats to the security of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In planning for the size, structure, and equipment of a military force tasked to defend their country, government officials and military officers will take many factors into consideration. The primary consideration, however, will be the requirement to defend the nation against immediate and potential security threats. This essay sketches the external and internal security environments that will influence the modernization of the PLA. It concludes that while winning a conflict over Taiwan is driving modernization in the near term, security interests based on China’s aspirations and ambitions as an emerging great power will likely shape military modernization over the long term. The External Threat Environment In spring 2007 the PRC faces few direct and immediate external security threats, and the Chinese leadership believes that “China’s overall security environment remains sound.” Nevertheless, Beijing must plan for a number of potential external security threats ­ and challenges, the most important of which comes from the United States. As the 2004 and 2006 defense white papers made evident, Beijing is clearly worried about a hegemonic and unilateral United States. This is because the United States, as the lone  Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing, December 29, 2006) u http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006. html.  Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006 (Beijing, December 29, 2006) u http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006. html; and Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, December 27, 2004) u http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ doctrine/natdef2004.html. Michael R. Chambers (PhD, Columbia University) is associate professor of political science at Indiana State University, where he specializes in China’s foreign relations and the international politics of East Asia. He is also an editor of the journal Asian Security. He can be reached at . note u This essay is a shortened version of a paper originally presented at the conference “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6–8, 2006 and to be included in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, forthcoming). [ 62 ] asia policy superpower in the world today, is the only country that perhaps could thwart China’s rise to great power status—not only within the Asia-Pacific region but also globally. Based on U.S. political, economic, and military influence, Beijing fears that Washington might attempt to contain the PRC’s rise, particularly by strategically encircling China’s territory. The increased U.S. military presence in Central Asia and Pakistan as a result of the war on terrorism and the invasion of Afghanistan has aggravated such fears, as has the tightening of U.S.-Japanese security cooperation in the last few years. While this strategic encirclement or containment by the United States is a potential problem over the long term, the more pressing security challenge is possible U.S. intervention to protect Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait conflict; such intervention would threaten the territorial integrity of China. The United States has promised to assist Taiwan should the PRC launch unprovoked aggression against the island, even as Washington has sought to restrain Taipei from taking steps which could provoke such aggression from Beijing. Because the PLA has pledged to protect the territorial integrity of the nation and prevent the formal separation of Taiwan from China, Chinese civilian and military leaders must plan for the possibility of confronting U.S. military forces in the event of war with Taiwan. To prepare for such...