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[ 16 ] asia policy Redefining and Reaffirming the U.S.-Japan Alliance Michael J. Green Is the U.S.-Japan alliance in need of redefinition? Yes. And we have been here before. This is an alliance between two asymmetrically aligned powers that has grown stronger over time because both sides have been willing to make reciprocal adjustments when the security relationship began losing credibility in the eyes of the American or Japanese people or the AsiaPacific region. President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi revised the existing security treaty in 1960 to end the U.S. role in Japan’s domestic security in exchange for a sovereign Japanese commitment to support U.S. bases for the security of the Far East. In 1969 President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato agreed that the United States would return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and that Japan would acknowledge Japanese interests in the security of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula. In the 1970s and 1980s the United States consolidated its base structure in the Kanto Plain, and Japan agreed to play a larger role in defending its archipelago and sea lanes. Then in 1996 President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto agreed to adjust the alliance to a post–Cold War environment by reducing the U.S. footprint on Okinawa while extending bilateral security planning under the Defense Guidelines to regional contingencies “that have a direct impact on the security of Japan.” In each redefinition of the alliance, the United States reduced the burden on Japan of U.S. presence, and Japan reduced the burden on the United States of maintaining regional and international security. There was rarely an explicit quid pro quo, but in each case the reciprocal adjustments reflected a shared understanding of new political and strategic circumstances. While sometimes precipitated by crises such as the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, the result was always an emphatic reaffirmation of the alliance and enhancement of Japanese, U.S., and regional security. The strengthened alliance in the 1980s contained Soviet ambitions for military expansion in the Far East and helped bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion. Likewise, enhanced bilateral interoperability since the 1996 Joint Security Declaration has significantly complicated People’s Liberation michael j. green is Senior Advisor and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Associate Professor at Georgetown University. He previously served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asia. He can be reached at . [ 17 ] roundtable • a new stage for the u.s.-japan alliance? Army (PLA) planning for any non-peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and reduced the insecurity that might have shaped regional calculations in the wake of North Korean missile and nuclear tests. The most recent redefinition and reaffirmation of the alliance was stopped in its tracks by the landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in August 2009. Under Junichiro Koizumi, Japan had deepened bilateral planning in a regional context and deployed the Self-Defense Forces for non-combat operations in the Indian Ocean and Iraq in support of the war on terrorism. The two governments also reached an agreement— reconfirmed by the Obama administration—for a significant realignment of U.S. bases, including the relocation of about half of the 18,000 marines on Okinawa to Guam. However, the new Hatoyama government followed through on campaign promises by withdrawing Japanese refueling ships from the Indian Ocean and reopening the debate on the Okinawa base realignment plan, while promising (at least initially) to create more distance from the United States through the establishment of an East Asian Community. For the Obama administration, which had essentially planned on a continuation of the Bush administration’s Japan policy and already had its hands full with North Korea, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, this was not a welcome complication—but it is one the White House has tried to manage with patience, nonetheless. Some observers have been tempted to claim that the United States has finally gotten its comeuppance and must now fundamentally rethink its strategy of forward deployment in the Pacific in order to satisfy a Japanese...

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