Promote Domestic Consensus to Enable Policy Continuity

[ 21 ] special roundtable • advising the new u.s. president “Despite the rise of China, the United States has consolidated a strategic presence in East Asia while maintaining regional stability and U.S.-China cooperation on Korea and Taiwan.” • Promote Domestic Consensus to Enable Policy Continuity Robert Ross There are three elements of U.S. policy in East Asia that will command the attention of the new president: the Korea issue, the Taiwan issue, and the U.S. forward strategic presence in East Asia. In each case the new administration is inheriting policies that promote U.S. interests and longterm stability. The challenge is to sustain a domestic consensus that enables policy continuity. In the first term of the George W. Bush administration, the United States wielded economic and military coercion to try to roll-back North Korea’s nuclear program. But North Korea’s nuclear capability only expanded. The administration then turned to the six-party talks and reached agreement for North Korea to disable its nuclear facilities. But it is highly unlikely that the United States will be able to persuade North Korea to give up the nuclear capability Pyongyang already possesses. In these circumstances, U.S. policy has amounted to an “exit strategy” from Washington’s commitment to North Korean nuclear nonproliferation. The United States has abandoned coercive diplomacy and has increasingly ceded to China the burden of dealing with a nuclear North Korea. Rather than expend U.S. prestige and diplomatic capital on what is likely an unobtainable objective, the new president should maintain his predecessor’s low-profile negotiating strategy and prepare for a stalemate in the negotiations. The ongoing leadership succession in North Korea will make a stalemate even more likely. The challenge for the new administration will be to deflect domestic criticism of the very same policy pursued by its predecessor. A policy that disengages the United States from a responsibility for nonproliferation in North Korea could well be a lightening rod for criticism from Republican hawks. Having constituted a major obstacle to policy reform in the Bush administration, this group will strive in opposition to mobilize congressional and public opinion against the new administration. Policy continuity will robert ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and a Research Associate at the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University. He can be reached at . [ 22 ] asia policy thus require marginalizing this group though cooperation with moderate Republicans. A second issue that will require attention is Taiwan. Taiwan’s independence diplomacy has been the most sensitive and potentially destabilizing issue in U.S.-China relations since the end of the Cold War. But in the island’s 2008 presidential election, voters elected a pragmatic leader who has abandoned Taiwan independence and has focused on cross-Strait political and economic cooperation. The United States has long resisted Taiwan independence and the new administration should continue this general policy. But the administration will also need to address how the United States can express support for Taiwan’s democracy and security. Given the constructive turn in Taiwan’s mainland policy, the United States can loosen restrictions on Taiwan leaders’ travel in the United States, with the understanding that such travel be “unofficial” and that all activities refrain from any suggestion of political or diplomatic purpose. The most pressing issue in U.S. policy toward Taiwan is the pending sale of F-16s. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan make at best only a minimal contribution to Taiwan’s defense; the island’s security against a rising China is, for the most part, a function of the commitment of U.S. military power. Arms sales do signal U.S. support for Taiwan and do bolster Taipei’s confidence and negotiating strength in dealing with Beijing. Nonetheless, arms sales—if not prudently dispensed—can also inflame Chinese policy, disrupting both cross-Strait cooperation and U.S.-China relations. An F-16 sale has this disruptive potential. As Taiwan’s leaders understand this danger, Washington can consult with Taipei on the timing of arms sales to Taiwan. It may well be that F-16 sales to Taiwan can be deferred indefinitely—although this would require that...