Give a Little to Get a Lot from North Korea

[ 51 ] special roundtable • advising the new u.s. president “Some believe that coercion will eventually cause North Korea to capitulate, and that ‘just a little more’ pressure on the regime will force it to submit. Unfortunately, past history reveals that this is unlikely.” • Give a Little to Get a Lot from North Korea David C. Kang There is one enduring truth regarding North Korea that any policymaker would be well advised to understand: North Korea will not give something for nothing. Pyongyang responds to external pressure with pressure of its own. Some believe that coercion will eventually cause North Korea to capitulate, and that “just a little more” pressure on the regime will force it to submit. Unfortunately, past history reveals that this is unlikely. There is little reason to think that applying even more pressure will finally result in North Korea meeting U.S. demands and a de-escalation of tension. Understanding this truth is important because many policy advisors agree on the goal: a denuclearized North Korea that opens to the world, pursues economic and social reforms, and increasingly respects human rights. Disagreement only occurs over the tactics—what actions will best set us on the path toward this outcome. To that end, the North Korean problem has been driven by intense U.S. and North Korean distrust of each other. Almost any aspect of the other side’s behavior that is even remotely suspicious is extrapolated to the “worst case” scenario and becomes further justification for caution. Perhaps even more importantly, while we in the United States focus intently on whether North Korea will live up to its side of the bargains that are struck, I am quite confident that in Pyongyang the leadership is just as skeptical that the United States will do what it says it will do. The latest setback is just one of many examples of this pattern. By the spring of 2008, meetings both at the six-party level (at the working group stage) and between U.S. and DPRK representatives had made continued, albeit halting, progress. The DPRK nuclear program had been effectively capped, dismantlement of the Yongbyon reactor had begun, and North Korea had allowed multiple teams of inspectors back into the DPRK. North david c. kang is Professor of International Relations and Business and Director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. He can be reached at . [ 52 ] asia policy Korea had also produced eighteen thousand pages of operating documents regarding its plutonium program and allowed the United States to inspect aluminum tubes that were suspected of being intended for use in a uraniumbased enrichment reactor. For its part, the United States had begun removing economic sanctions, provided fuel oil, and alluded to a possible political relationship in the future. Most significantly, on June 26 President Bush announced his intention to take the DPRK off the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and lift the restrictions imposed by the Trading with the Enemy Act within 45 days. Yet by August both sides had essentially returned to square one. The United States decided not to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, mainly because the United States had added a stipulation that North Korea must provide a full explanation for its suspected nuclear cooperation with Syria. North Korea responded by saying that to unilaterally add other provisions to the agreement was “moving the goalposts,” and privately some U.S. officials agreed. Thus, North Korea began rebuilding the nuclear reactor and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors from the country. Most of the attention in the United States focused on North Korea’s actions, and few pointed out that it was the U.S. actions that had prompted North Korea’s reaction. When the United States finally did delist the DPRK in September 2008, North Korea also responded promptly, inviting back inspectors and agreeing to work with the United States on other outstanding issues. There is more potential for negotiation with North Korea than is generally believed, if such negotiation is done with the realization that the United States will not obtain unilateral concessions from the DPRK. Indeed, it is worth...