PLA Navy Building: Rationale and Prospects for the Future

[ 89 ] roundtable • sizing the chinese military PLA Navy Building: Rationale and Prospects for the Future Michael McDevitt The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been introducing capable new ships, submarines, and weapons over the past fifteen years. Building andsustainingsuchamodernnavycapableofconductinga“modernwarunder high-tech informationalized conditions” is a very expensive proposition. This modernization effort strongly suggests that Beijing—a leadership that is not schooled in maritime affairs—believes that the strategic interests of the state can be secured only with a robust naval force. This new strategy is a historic departure from the strategic traditions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This essay explores the drivers behind changes in force posture, size, and capabilities of the PLAN, examines the history leading to China’s current naval capabilities, and closes by postulating that China will undertake yet another round of change in naval strategy. Maritime-Oriented Strategic Drivers This essay postulates that five separate but interrelated factors animate or drive the leadership to actively support the development of the PLAN: (1) what the PLA calls the “major strategic direction,” which essentially means the compass direction from which potential threats to Chinese interestsoriginate,(2)amaritimestrategythatcomportswiththecontinental strategic tradition of China, (3) the need to deter Taiwan’s independence and, if necessary, to deter or defeat an approaching U.S. Navy relief force  U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C., May 2005). This and the preceding years’ annual reports are the most authoritative open-source references to PLA modernization. In terms of major warships, since 1995 the PLAN has commissioned about 31 new submarines and 26 new surface combatants (destroyers and frigates). The Navy has also fielded sundry modern missiles and torpedoes with which to arm these vessels.  Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing, December 27, 2004) u http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ natdef2004.html. Michael McDevitt (Rear Admiral, retired) is Vice President and Director of the Center for Naval Analyses at the CNA Corporation. These views are his own and do not represent the views of the CNA Corporation. He can be reached at . note u This essay is a shortened version of a paper originally presented at the conference “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6–8, 2006 and to be included in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, forthcoming). The essay reflects the views of the author and may not reflect those of the National Defense University or any other agency of the U.S. government. [ 90 ] asia policy if the PRC elects to attack Taiwan, (4) the historically novel situation in which international seaborne trade is what drives the economic growth of China, and (5) the fact that the PRC’s economic development is increasingly dependent on oil and natural gas that is delivered to the PRC by ships. The PRC is investing in navy building for the straightforward reason that without a capable navy, China has serious strategic vulnerabilities that it otherwise cannot address. China’s land frontiers are stable; looking east from Beijing beyond its seaboard, however, the situation is more strategically problematic. The PRC’s maritime approaches are replete with unresolved sovereignty issues and genuine vulnerabilities. Strategic vulnerability from the sea is not a new issue for China. Weakness along China’s long maritime frontier has been a problem for Beijing since at least 1842, when the Treaty of Nanking ended the First Opium War. This three-year conflict with Great Britain exposed imperial China’s military weakness and ushered in the so-called Century of Humiliation. The repeated military and diplomatic humiliations and defeats that China suffered, which came mainly from the sea, were inflicted by Western powers and Japan. What is different today is that the PRC has the resources and political coherence necessary to address the reality that the vast majority of...