"Preserving the State": Modernizing and Task-Organizing a "Hybrid" PLA Ground Force

[ 73 ] roundtable • sizing the chinese military “Preserving the State”: Modernizing and Task-Organizing a “Hybrid” PLA Ground Force Cortez A. Cooper III Those U.S. policymakers hoping to gain perspective on Chinese military modernization face daunting challenges that can block progress in both bilateral and multilateral security dialogue. On the one hand, positing an increased China threat behind every move to build a more capable People’s Liberation Army (PLA) understandably frustrates Chinese leaders focused on addressing the security requirements of their country as a re-emerging power. On the other hand, given the need to guarantee U.S. freedom of movement and action in Asia, generally accepting extensive PLA modernization as natural for an increasingly more powerful player on the world stage registers as unwise. Finding the “golden mean” is difficult. As a rapidly developing regional power with global economic influence, China has myriad security concerns demanding transformation of its technologically challenged and combat-inexperienced military. Many developments in China’s missile, air, and naval forces, however, rightly elicit concern that Beijing is focused on acquiring offensive capabilities disproportionate to the threat environment. Developments in the PLA ground force are tougher to evaluate. This essay seeks to highlight the various, wide-ranging missions for which China’s leadership maintains a 1.3 million strong ground force, to show that this is not a homogeneous force in terms of capabilities and focus, and to emphasize those ground force developments that should be the focus of U.S. analysts and decisionmakers. As about one-third of this huge army forms an increasingly modern, professional war-fighting force, U.S. policymakers must deepen their understanding of why the Chinese are building the ground force that they are—and recognize the signs that might indicate an increasing readiness and willingness to use such a force to resolve regional disputes. Cortez A. Cooper III (Lieutenant Colonel [ret.]) is Vice President and Director of the East Asia Studies Center at Hicks and Associates, Inc. Prior to joining Hicks and Associates, Mr. Cooper served in the U.S. Navy Executive Service as the Senior Analyst for the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). He can be reached at . note u Preserving the State” is a chapter title taken from “T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings,” purportedly written to provide advice to kings Wen and Wu of the Chou dynasty in the 11th century BC. From the Ming edition of the Sung Dynasty classic, Wu Jing Qi Shu. Translated by Ralph Sawyer as The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, including the Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). This essay is a shortened version of a paper originally presented at the conference “Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organization,” Carlisle Barracks, PA, October 6–8, 2006 and to be included in Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell, eds., Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Press, forthcoming). [ 74 ] asia policy Security Tasks and Ground Force Missions China’s national defense tasks as described in the 2006 white paper on national defense are wide-ranging, demanding a military poised to protect Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control, support internal stability operations, defend a vast border, and oppose “terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms.” Translating broad goals and tasks into operational mission requirements, the ground forces are required to provide a range of forces: forces capable of domestic control and service support operations across China forces capable of border defense operations forces capable of conducting amphibious and airborne/airmobile operations against Taiwan forces capable of conducting heavy mobile operations into potentially unstable areas on China’s periphery in order to protect economic interests units and personnel capable of supporting global exchange programs, UN peace-keeping operations, and foreign military training programs To meet these mission requirements, China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) appears to be task-organizing specific units for particular campaigns or local missions rather than modernizing the force so that each unit is capable of conducting myriad missions. For this reason, the PLA ground force likely will retain over one million soldiers for at least...