Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (review)

Necessity, just as a craft, always causes innovations to prevail, and although for a city at peace fixed norms are best, there is need of much contrivance for those compelled by multiple circumstances to proceed.

—Thucydides 1.73.3

War, culture, and change from Homer to Vegetius represent the focus of this work, presaged by the author's study of Caesarian battle narrative (ClAnt 18 [1999]: 273–329) and an interpretive review of some recent works (CJ 99 [2004]: 441–49). The reviewer must confess that his own work inspired much of this book's conceptual and factual content (e.g., 318, 401, 403, 411–12, 414, 415, 426, 432, 434–35) and that he provided Delphic responses (per epistulas electronicas) to a diligent inquirer, although he did not see individual chapters before publication and declined to read a final version of the manuscript. The author's own fertile imagination and vivid style animate these pages. Nestor could only advise Achilles.

The work has its own historiographical ghosts. A cultural approach to war is now au courant, as a result of the clash of cultures in the so-called "War on Terror" (e.g., V. D. Hanson, Carnage and Culture [2001]) and Shannon French, The Code of the Warrior [2003], both missing from Lendon's bibliography) and as a reaction to the much imitated but seriously flawed "face-of-battle" approach to military history (e.g., John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture [2003]; cf. E.L. Wheeler, JRA 11 [1998]: 644–51 and Electrum 5 [2001]: 169–84 for the naïve foibles and excesses of "face-of-battle" studies). Lendon follows what is already a common theme of the cultural approach: culture, rather than technological progress and hardware, shapes the conduct of war.

Older specters also lurk in the shadows: Jean-Pierre Vernant's structural anthropological school, which discovered that war happens and has ritualized aspects, warrior codes of conduct, and even rules (e.g., Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne, 1968); and Hans Delbrück (whom Lendon finds "perverse," 394), the progenitor of studying war within the total context of its time and society in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte (4 vols., 1920). Delbrück's twin principles of Quellenkritik and Sachkritik, basic analytical tools for detailed work, are not exploited in Lendon's sweeping interpretations.

Lendon tiptoes carefully among the briars of previous work: war has rules and culture shapes warrior ethics. A brilliant prologue (1–4), demonstrating from the Vietnam War how rules and culture continue to affect the American conduct of war, raises false hopes, as the rules-culture-conduct nexus is (regrettably) not pursued. But fancy footwork also escapes (for the most part) the face-of-battle morass: unit cohesion and its emphasis on "buddies" are wisely sidestepped in assessing combat behavior; the high road lies with the psychology of the warrior and the stimulus of competition, now a favorite Anglophone emphasis like initiation rites in the 1970s and transhumance in the 1980s. Unique, however, is that for Lendon culture in ancient warfare provides more than a context: culture is an active agent. In an age of limited technological advancement like Antiquity, change meant recreating the past and, as he argues, looking backward made Greek armies better, but eventually ruined Rome.

Lendon attempts a very delicate balancing act. A curious (but not unique) editorial decision conceals the "Author's Note and Acknowledgments" at the end of this work. The note is aimed at the proverbial readership in never-never land (so popular with press editors): both ignorant and "adept" readers. A true confession yields that specialists will find nothing new about What or When; originality lies only with the Why of change. A promise of novelty and...