In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The American Journal of Bioethics 3.3 (2003) Web Only (2003)



[Access article in PDF]

Are There Answers?

Louis C. Charland
University of Western Ontario

The Question

In an innovative discussion Jason Scott Robert and Françoise Baylis (2003) argue that "the creation of novel beings that are part human and part nonhuman animal is sufficiently threatening to the social order that for many this is a sufficient reason to prohibit any crossing of species boundaries involving human beings." The "hypothesis" they propose is that "the issue at the heart of the matter is the threat of moral confusion." They also argue that we cannot resolve this moral confusion by turning to science and appealing to the notion of species identity. This is because "there is no one authoritative definition of species." Consequently, there is "no consensus on what exactly is being breached with the creation of interspecies beings."

So how are we supposed to go about answering this question about cross-species transgression? Curiously, this intriguing interdisciplinary discussion might say more about the intractable scale and complexity of bioethical inquiry in this domain than it does about the specific question it sets out to address. It boldly raises all the right issues in all their interdisciplinary splendor. But at the same time it invites the question how this multiplicity of interdisciplinary premises and arguments is supposed to lead to an answer. Bioethical discussions of this sort seem to promise answers, even if they do not provide them; they raise questions that are presumed to have answers. Yet this particular discussion left me wondering whether there really are answers of the expected sort to be had. In this commentary I explore this methodological worry by discussing two of the article's central themes: species identity and moral confusion.

Species Identity

Robert and Baylis argue that contemporary bioethical debates on the ethics of chimeras normally assume that fixed boundaries between species can be drawn. Against this they argue that "there is no one authoritative definition of species." Call this the "no consensus" thesis. Now the manner in which Robert and Baylis invoke this thesis and the relevant discussions in biology represents an important innovation. However, the "no consensus" thesis is problematic.

The simplest problem with the "no consensus" thesis is that one can dispute the nature and relevance of the evidence provided in its defense. On the face of it, this is an empirical claim, the result of a literature review. Suppose it is true that as a matter of fact there is much disagreement in discussions in this area. How does that preclude the philosophical judgment that there might be one position that is the right one and that the others are simply wrong? Viewed this way, the "no consensus" thesis comes close to begging the question. For to assume that "no consensus" implies "no right answer" is to terminate debate arbitrarily. Ironically, in this case there is a position that might count as a favored candidate, although it is not mentioned. This is the view that species can be defined as evolutionary homologies.

In their analysis of the various definitions available for species identity, Robert and Baylis mention the view that species can be defined by evolutionary lineage. Building on the work of Griffiths, they also cite the view that the identity of species might be defined in terms of homeostatic property clusters. What they apparently fail to see is that in the context of biology Griffiths's homeostatic property clusters also come with evolutionary lineages.

According to Griffiths (1997), natural kinds are homeostatic property clusters and evolutionary homologies. This combined view lends itself nicely to the suggestion that we might "baptize" new species as we create them. At the same time, because it is allied with the viewthat natural kinds form homeostatic property clusters, it also inherits all the explanatory advantages of thatapproach. New species would then simply represent the creation of a new lineage—a new branch on the tree of life.

Now obviously this is not an option that will please everyone. In particular, it will not please those who believe that natural...

pdf

Share