The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy: A New Perspective on the Enlightenment (review)

BOOK REVXr~ws 463 and helpful. Overall, however, the portrait of Hume one gets from Yandell is more like that of a twentieth-century logical positivist than of an eighteenth-century sceptic and naturalist. Though Yandell does not give us a historically accurate depiction of Hume, he does give us a thoughtful analysis of many of the issues with which Hume struggled, and poses provocative alternate accounts. DOROTHY COLEMAN Collegeof William and Mary Alexander Broadie. The Tradition ofScottishPhilosophy:A NewPerspectiveon theEnlightenment . Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble Books, 199o. Pp. x44. Cloth, $42.oo. The author of this interesting book attempts "to give an account of two great periods in the history of Scottish culture" (1). The first of these periods "lasted for three or four decades from around 15oo" (2). Its leading figures were John Mair (or Major) and the circle of his friends and students (such as David Cranston, George Lokert of Air, William Manderston, Robert Galbraith, Gilbert Crab, and Hector Boece). This period in Scottish culture is not very well known. However, the second period discussed by Broadie, namely the so-called "Scottish Enlightenment," is one of the most famous periods in the history of Western philosophy. It is generally regarded as having lasted roughly from about 17~5 to a785, and it is characterized by the names of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Thomas Reid, and Adam Smith. While Broadie is not trying to belittle in any way the achievements of the Enlightenment in Scotland, he does think that exclusive attention to the philosophical writers of the eighteenth century "has led to a seriously distorted picture of the history of Scottish culture in general and the history of Scottish philosophy in particular." His book is therefore an attempt at taking "a step towards a truer picture" (1). Broadie believes that there cannot be any doubt that "it is possible to trace a line of philosophical influence from Mair's circle to the philosophers of the Scottish enlightenment ," but he does not himself attempt to accomplish this historical task. Rather, he is content with pointing out what he calls "important philosophical identities between doctrines of the earlier period and of the later" (92), leaving open the question whether these identities are merely accidental or whether they are the result of some sort of influence. Accordingly, the book can be divided into two parts. The first and major part (Chapters 2-7, pp. 12-91) deals with "pre-Reformation philosophy and especially the circle of John Mair," while the second part (Chapters 8-11, pp. 9a-a ~6) discusses topics in Hutcheson, Hume, and Reid that exhibit "similarities" to the earlier doctrines. Broadie identifies two primary issues on which the thinkers of the two periods agree: (i) the "theory of notions" and (ii) "nominalism." (i) The earlier Scots--and especially Cranston--had argued that we must assume a language of thought that makes possible any conventional language, and that without such a language of nature we could not apprehend the meaning of the terms in any particular language. The building blocks of this language were thought to be "notions," or "acts of the mind," rather than some sort 464 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3o:3 JULY t992 of mental object. They can therefore not be understood as an "intermediate object" between the perceiving mind and the external object. Broadie convincingly--and in detail--shows that "the role of notions in Mair's philosophy is the same as the role of ideas in Reid's" (~ ~4). One may indeed wonder whether Reid had read the texts of the pre-Reformation philosophers that could be found in the libraries of the University of Aberdeen and the University of Glasgow. (ii)Broadie is certainly also correct in claiming that the kind of nominalism that was advocated by the early Scots "was strongly represented in the Scottish Enlightenment" (~~9), and that especially Hume's philosophy is nominalist in this sense. However, since the similarities are so broad, general, and vague, and since nominalism was so pervasive in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British thought, it is difficult to accept Broadie's claim that "Hume's philosophy is in many ways a continuation, along...