The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (review)

134 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:1 JANUARY 1992 experience in terms other than those based on vision and touch" [~8: emphasis mine]). She frequently mentions techne in the dialogue, but never systematically examines what it means. She does not ask why the dialogue is named after Philebus, and her only comment about him is to say that he is philosophically inept. Her discussion of Johnson and Sayre does not seriously address the question of how Aristotle should influence our reading of Plato. It should be remembered, however, that every Platonic dialogue seems to provoke endless questions. This is why they are at once so attractive and so maddening. The Philebus is an especially acute case of this. Like every commentator, Hampton had to narrow her view and make her choices. This she did, and the product will benefit those who share her sense of which questions are worth pursuing. DAVID ROOCHNIK Iowa State University Nancy Sherman. The Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1989 . Pp. xiv + 213. $39.95. This book's title suggests that its subject is the way the various moral virtues fit together to make up good character, but Sherman only casually refers to Artistotle's discussions of the specific moral virtues. The book's true subject is "practical reason," which "integrates the different ends of character" (4-5)- What is "woven" is not character but "a life that expresses character" (xo), of which the wool is "the various components of the good life" (77), that life being "interwoven" with the lives of friends in various ways (127-39). Out of these general constituents practical reason weaves a particular life responsive to concrete circumstance. After a brief introductory chapter Sherman devotes one chapter each to "four aspects of practical reason['s]" weaving activity (5): the perception by which one becomes aware of the morally relevant features of a situation (chap. 2); deliberation and choice, which on the basis of these features reach an "all things considered" judgment of what to do (chap. 3); the exercise of such deliberation in collaborative action with friends (chap. 4); the education necessary to develop these reasoning capacities (chap. 5). Before matters of substance I address the book's goals and methods. Sherman's "objective is to understand Aristotle's ethical theory, not to construct a theory which uses Aristotle," while at the same time "to deliver his insights in a way that has relevance to questions which concern us now" (4). The second of these aims (it is surely mistaken to think them one) has the upper hand, which is just as well, for Sherman has not done the serious spadework necessary for the first. Of the secondary literature Sherman cites only a handful of Anglo-American writers, and only Gauthier and Jolif's EN commentary among non-English works. Her discussion is marred throughout by a remarkable philological carelessness. E.g., on p. 163 Sherman gives a translation of EE 122ob5- 7 which, aside from a minor change introducing an error, is taken, verbatim and unacknowledged, from Woods, despite Sher- BOOK REVIEWS 135 man's contention that unmarked translations are hers (xiv). Worse, she gives as the corresponding Greek not Woods's text (cf. his p. 204) but that of Rackham's Loeb, which requires a different translation. Virtually every quotation reveals Sherman's unreliability in matters of text and translation. Sherman's approach to the text is illustrated in her arguing for a (correct) translation of to agapSton (Pol. t262b23) not by determining the meaning of the Greek word but by asking what expression can best "convey Aristotle's intense disagreement with Plato about the exclusiveness of friendship" (146-47). As in this passage, so in the book--the broad lines of interpretation are set in advance and determine the interpretation of passages adduced piecemeal for easier absorption. Hence, too, the frequency of statements like: "Although Aristotle says little explicitly on this subject..." (1o5; cf. 3o, 74, 76, 84, 138 n.25, 171, x93). Furthermore, Sherman is heavily dependent on recent authorities (especially Irwin and Nussbaum), and readers may well feel frustrated in the face of her...