Berkeley on the Perception of Objects

Notes and Discussions Berkeley on the Perception of Objects Two respected Berkeley scholars--Michael Ayers and George Pappas--thifik that Berkeley holds that 1. In normal sense perception, one immediately perceives so-called physical objects---i.e., things like apples, trees, etc. In the Introduction to his edition of Berkeley's works) Ayers says: "The vulgar, Berkeley believes, do not make the distinction between ideas and qualities, but rightly assume that they immediately perceive physical objects" (xiv). And in his review of my book Berkeley," in the Times Literary Supplement for June 16, 1978, he says: "Pitcher... is... guilty of some fairly breathtaking failures to understand. For example, he attributes to Berkeley the view that we do not immediately perceive the collections of ideas which constitute physical things... " (68o). Pappas, in his paper "Berkeley, Perception, and Common Sense,''s argues that "there is little question.., that Berkeley accepts [the view that physical objects are immediately perceived]" (6). This view of Ayers and Pappas is entirely plausible. In addition to several passages where Berkeley speaks of perceiving (rather than of immediately perceiving) physical objects (e.g., PHK I 3, 4, 364; 3D III [Works 2: a49]s), there are other passages where he speaks explicitly of immediately perceiving objects. Thus: Take away this material substance.., and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualifies, or ideas: and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. [PHK I 95] J GeorgeBerkeley: Philosophical Works including the works on vision (London, Dent; Totowa, N.J., Rowmanand Littlefield, 1975). " London, Henley,and Boston: Routledge & KeganPaul, 1977. 3 In ColinM. Turbayne, ed., Berkeley,Criticaland InterpretiveEssays(Minneapolis,University of MinnesotaPress, 198a),3-~1. 4 I.e., Principlesof Human Knowledge, Part I, Sections3, 4, and 36. 5 I.e., ThreeDialoguesbetweenHylasand Philonous,Third Dialogue,p. 249of Volume2 of The Works of GeorgeBerkeley,edited by A. A. Luceand T. E.Jessop (London:T. Nelson, 1948-57). [99] IOO JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 24:1 JANUARY 1981 Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discours, of, are things that I know. And I should not have known them, but that I perceive~ them by my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately per ceived.... [3DIII (Works2: 230)] If we look no further, thew passages seem to prove that Ayers and Pappa are right in attributing proposition 1 to Berkeley. But wait! Looking further, we find these passages: PHILONOUS .... Though I grant we may in one acceptation be said to perceiv, sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when from a frequently perceived connex ion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind other perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. Fo instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only th~ sound; but from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident, that in truth ant strictness, nothing can be heard but sound: and the coach is not then properly per ceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, bu suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure, which are properly perceive¢ by that sense..... [3D I (Works2: ~o4)] ALC1PHRON. How? Do we not, strictly speaking, perceive by sight such things a: trees, houses, men, rivers, and the like? EUPHRANOR. We do, indeed, perceive or apprehend those things by the faculty o sight. But will it follow from thence that they are the proper and immediate object: of sight, any more than that all those things are the proper and immediate objects o hearing which are signified by the help of words or sounds? [Alciphron, Fourt| Dialogue (Works3: 154)] ALCIPHRON. 1 see, therefore, in strict philosophical truth, that rock only in th~ same sense that I may be said to hear it...