Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy. A Study of the 'Constitutional Code' (review)

444 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:3 JULY X985 dwelling "only on those aspects of it which are required for an understanding of it as a system." As such I cannot recommend it. Most potential readers would be better advised to begin with Schopenhauer rather than with Magee, whose rather wooden and preachy style is no match for Schopenhauer's and whose expositions all too often will not stand up to careful scrutiny. Yet readers already familiar with Schopenhauer will find their understanding tested by Magee's sympathetic, yet critical, reading. Such testing invites a more thoughtful return to Schopenhauer's text, which deserves such thoughtfulness. KARSTEN HARRIES Yale University Frederick Rosen. Jeremy Bentham and RepresentativeDemocracy.A Study of the 'Constitutional Code'. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, t983. Pp. vii + 255. $42.oo, cloth. In the nineteenth century Bentham appeared most often as a philosopher of radical reform, of democracy and of liberalism. In the present century this view of him has been increasingly questioned, as commentators have explored the implications of some aspects of his thought, for example, his commitment to the 'greatest happiness' and his concern with the establishment of order and social control through law. While the more far-reaching reinterpretations, such as those of Gertrude Himmelfarb and C. B. Macpherson, have met considerable resistance, they and others have made Bentham's claims to being a spokesman for radicalism, liberalism, or democracy look distinctly insecure. Dr. Rosen has set out to re-establish those claims by providing a detailed commentary on Bentham's last major work, the Constitutional Code. In seeking to define Bentham's position from the Code, he stresses the importance of the author's "conversion to radicalism" in or about 18o9. He argues that the Bentham of the Codewas not concerned with maximising power or social control or leaving the citizen-subject wholly deprived of rights, initiative, or opportunities for participation. He maintains that the predominant spirit of the work is mistrust of those who exercise power combined with a commitment to reform, and that its principal reforming instrument is not law but an active public opinion. And he believes that, in practice, it provides not for a single concentration of sovereign power within the community but for 'functional limitations' on both sovereign people and omnicompetent legislature. He argues, further, that these are not arbitrary features of the Code but are supported by, and issue from, a substantial democratic theory, which includes a justification of democracy, a defence of 'positive' rights and securities for the citizen, a 'moral meaning ' as well as an 'instrumental character' in those rights and securities, and a 'prima facie case' for equality. Some of the contentions are clearly controversial, although all must be taken seriously. Perhaps the least controversial are those which refer to the role of public opinion in Bentham's program. Rosen produces ample evidence to show that Bent- BOOK REVIEWS 445 ham wanted an active not a passive citizenry, and that he took seriously the institutions and arrangements (the Public Opinion Tribunal and the quasi-jury) that he had devised for that purpose. And he demonstrates equally clearly that Bentham insisted that this activity depended on the securing of rights for the public against any government and the maintenance of a free and critical press independent of it. Similarly, Rosen experiences no great difficulty in demonstrating that Bentham favored equality in economic and social relations and expected his constitutional scheme to promote it and to benefit from it. All of this seems, on the evidence, a convincing account of Bentham's intentions in the Code. But there are other questions that can be asked, and when they are asked the nature and tendency of his scheme looks less clear and perhaps less appealing. One of them is whether his own proposals are capable of realising his intentions, and another is whether the intentions are consistent with his fundamental assumptions and criteria. How secure, for example, are the citizens' securities when the system begins to operate: will they really promote the greatest happiness, and what is to happen if they do not? And will the individual citizen invariably or even typically...