Kant: An Introduction (review)

260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY aller Biirger [volont6 de tous], p. 146). Note that this volontd de tous is not the volontd constante de tous of OC 3 :440, which Roussau indeed identifies with the general will but not with the "factual empirical" will of all. Yet according to Forschner the volontd de tous tout court, the actual will of all, does not have to be the will of all--it can be the will of most. He identifies the will of all (and even uses an identity-sign to do so) with the decision of the majority. This cannot be. The volontd de tous is really the will of a//, and the general will can be expressed without it. It is the relation between the two, and not the concept of the general will itself, that varies according to social conditions. Rousseau makes these points clear when he describes the variation in three stages (OC 3:437f.). In a tight community, everyone wills whatever new laws are needed; cette ndcessitb se foit universellement. When community ties loosen, "l'unanimit~ ne regne plus dans les voix, la volont~ g~n~rale n'est plus la voiontb, de tous, il s'~l~ve des.., dtbats, et le meilleur avis ne passe point sans disputes." Finally, when social ties are severed in every heart, the general will is mute. Since the general will ceases to be the volonN de tous as soon as there ceases to be unanimity, the volont( de tous must really be the will of all. Since there is a stage (the second one) when the general will is no longer the will of all yet is not mute, the general will need not (pace Forschner) be expressed through the will of all. On both points Forschner's reading defies the text. There are many good things in Forschner's book, from sound summaries of leading themes: Rousseau does not believe in the power of a formally grounded system ofjustice to form communities . He believes in the power of community life to form justice and rationality. (P. 79) to provocative comments on neglected topics: The alien world of bourgeois society finds its justification in that it is the foundation on which, for the first time, mortality, virtue and happiness become possible for the wise men who overcame it. (p. 203) However, Forschner's book is sufficiently unfaithful to Rousseau's central doctrines to suggest that it should be kept from students at all costs. The book has a chronology, a serviceable bibliography of English, French, and German secondary works (I regret the omission of Sen and Runciman's "Games, Justice, and the General Will"), a subject index, and a name index. The latter would be much improved by the inclusion of "Locke" and other entries beginning with the letter "L." MICHAEL NEUMANN Trent University C. D. Broad. Kant: An Introduction. Edited by C. Lewy. New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. xii + 320. $31.00, cloth; $8.95 paper. It is a pleasure to read a good book. C. D. Broad's Kant: An Introduction is such a book. The book consists of Broad's lectures on Kant as he gave them at Cambridge in 1950-51 and again, slightly revised, in 1951-52, with material from articles on the Analogies, the Antinomies, and Kant's theory of mathematics incorporated into the text BOOK REVIEWS 261 by the editor, C. Lewy. Since Broad always wrote out his lectures before delivery, the reader is here provided with what amounts to a transcript of Broad's course. And it was a good, straightforward course, with generally so clear and correct a presentation of the material as to make the book an ideal companion to a student's first reading of Kant. In addition, Broad's stated questions and problems with various passages tend to coincide with those of most undergraduates and his suggested solutions and criticisms are helpful and stimulating. The simplicity of Broad's language, his excellent and often amusing examples, his admissions of defeat, and his humor put the reader in the classroom and, indeed, in a classroom with a professor who is not just lecturing but working...