John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (review)

484 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY schemes is reflected. The dialecticaldevelopment is shown through the example of certain categorical determinations of the logic of the essence, especially the logical structure of Hegel's concept of contradiction and its function in the logical process. From the dialectics of being-initself and phenomenon it appears that the contradictions emerging in the Hegelian analysis can be exposed, from the finally reached viewpoint of their reconciliation, as mere pseudocontradictions . The dualism of being-in-itself and phenomenon taken over from Kant is outdone , at the end, by a Spinozistic conception of the Absolute in which the differences of possibility , reality, and necessity will be described as mere modes of the self-interpretation of the absolute. In the third hook of Hegel's Logic, which deals with the"Theory of concept," the Spinozistic position is even surpassed, as now the true concept of reality is no longer explained in the sense of substance but in that of the subject or of the absolute concept. This highest category must now be conceived as the absolute ground of the entire dialectic concept development. Maluschke reaches the conclusion that in the establishment of Hegel's theory of categories, which ends at this stage, the existence of a certain amount of dogmatism cannot be denied. HENRY WALTERB~N Takoma Park, Maryland Dennis F. Thompson. John Stuart Mill and Representative Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Pp. vii + 241. $13.50. Professor Thompson concludes his study with the observation that "those who contemplate the present and future condition of representative democracy would . .. he unwise to disregard the teachings of Representative Government." This conclusion is admirably supported by the analysis preceding it, which pursues two aims. The first is to provide an account of the structure of Mill's theory, to show that it has a thematic coherence, and to elucidate the complex relations between "the principle of participation" and the "principle of competence" within it. The second is to assess that theory--or at least parts of it--in the light of more recent work. In the course of developing his account of the structure of the theory, Thompson rebukes interpreters of Mill's work who have placed too much emphasis on either of the principles mentioned. Interpretations of Mill that point to the supposed existence of an authoritarian elite are shown to rest on a failure to take account of the character of the leadership Mill advocated , or to neglect the constraints Mill wished to impose upon the power of the "instructed few." Again, those who seek to find arguments supporting greater participation in Representative Government are reminded of the assumption on which Mill enunciated them: the existence of the steadying hand of the competent. Our attention is therefore drawn to the balance carefully struck between the two principles, further explained by Mill's intention to take account of both immediate possibilities and the desirable longer-term consequences of piecemeal reform. Nevertheless, despite this balancing, Mill is criticized for leaving too much political activity outside the scope of either principle, and for failing to specify how we should choose between alternative marginal improvements in the realization of the two values. In bringing Mill's theory face to face with more recent work, Thompson refers to a wide range of literature--dealing, for example, with deference, political culture, the effect of voting systems, and the methodology of social science. This sometimes leads to additional correction of misconceptions: Thompson denies that Mill was a "holist," or that his support of the voting scheme propounded by Hare excluded geographical representation. In these ways we are led to a better appreciation of Mill's aspirations in Representative Government. The twin enterprises of reconstructing Mill's theory and relating it to contemporary political practice and theory do not, perhaps, always sit comfortably side by fide, and BOOK REVIEWS 485 Mill's arguments are occasionally treated too sympathetically. FOr example, Mill thought that local government spent proportionally more time on dispensing money than national government did. Is this a good reason for his willingness to base a plural local franchise on money qualifications? Further, is the doctrine of "higher pleasures" properly used to argue that the competent...