Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence: The Structure of a Central part of Spinoza's "Ethics" (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 345 Arne Naess. Freedom, Emotion, and Self-subsistence: The Structure of a Central part of Spinoza's "'Ethics. '" Filosofiske Problemer, no. 42. Oslo-Bergen-Tromsr Universitetsforlaget , 1976. Distributed in the U.S. by Humanities Press. Pp. 122. $7.50. As the subtitle of this work indicates, Professor Naess here attempts to elucidate the structure of a portion of Spinoza's Ethics. Each major section of the book contains an informal statement of theorems, along with explanatory comments and discussion, followed by a symbolic representation of the theorems. The book does not attempt to provide a complete characterization of the structure of the Ethics (which would be an enormous undertaking), but it is concerned with almost all of the key notions employed in that work. (Among these are the notions of being in and being conceived through, causation, cognition, action, joy, sadness, good and evil, self-preservation, self-satisfaction, and virtue.) Although Naess frequently cites and discusses the Ethics, his main concern is not with historical or textual questions. This is partly because, in light of the many divergent (and, he holds, well-documented) interpretations of the text, he is inclined to be skeptical that one can pin down Spinoza's views "on anything at all" (p. 85). The aim of the book is thus to provide not a description but a reconstruction of Spinoza's main work (p. 85)--a reconstruction that, it seems, will help to bring out what in Spinoza is of use to us. (See the preface and the introduction , p. 11.) I will not here undertake an evaluation of the degree to which the reconstruction offered achieves this latter goal, nor does Naess devote much attention to this. But I will concentrate on some of the issues of interpretation with which he deals, and on the reconstruction itself. The most interesting, but quite problematic, feature of the reconstruction is that (after an initial treatment to the contrary) it is maintained that there are degrees of being in and being conceived through something. Everything, it is held (SD2, p. 73), is in itself to some degree, and nothing is completely in another (SD3, p. 73). And as one would expect, given this thesis, there is exactly one thing that is completely in itself (SDII and SDIIa, p. 74). The question of representation is handled by introducing a one-place predicate "d," to be read as "is a "ES . . . . . . . . degree," and defining predicates such as • >0tx) and ES 0 & ES, (x)" and "(3y).'d0') & d 0 & ES, (x)); use a two-sorted predicated calculus to the same effect. (Quantification over entia rationis would presumably be accepted by Spinoza, but only quantenus sunt modi cogitandi. Neither Naess's formalization, nor any other of which I am aware, attempts to provide a systematic representation of Spinoza's use of quatenus, which appears to be a non-truth-functionaloperator.) At least as important as this technical problem of bringing the representation in line with Spinoza's ontology is the question whether Spinoza did maintain, even implicitly, that things are in themselves or in others in different degrees. The main direct textual support cited (p. 59) for the grading of "is in itself" is E. 111,vi,' where Spinoza writes, "Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur" (literally: "Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persevere in its own being" [G. I1, ' "E. I11,vi" denotes prop. vi, pt. I11 of the Ethics. I use "d" for "demonstration" and "s" for "scholium." When "E" is omitted, reference to the Ethics is assumed. 346 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 146, 7-8].~ But an examination of the demonstration of this proposition shows that Spinoza is not here using the locution in se in its technical sense (i.e., the sense employed in I, def. iii). For the qualifying phrase "quantum in se est" is found in this proposition because of the use ofE. III, iv in E. Ill, vi, d. The relevant part of the proof of III, vi is as follows: "Nor does any thing have something in itself [neque ulla res aliquid in se habet] by which it can be destroyed, or which may take away its...